Larry Donald Howard, M.D. v. Cornerstone Medical Assoc.

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Larry Donald Howard, M.D. v. Cornerstone Medical Assoc., 54 S.W.3d 238 (Tenn. 2001)
• Decision Date: 31 August 2001
• Docket Number: 00-01659
• Parties: LARRY DONALD HOWARD, M.D. v. CORNERSTONE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C.IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs

LARRY DONALD HOWARD, M.D. v CORNERSTONE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C.

No. E2000-01659-SC-WCM-CV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 31, 2001

Filed August 31, 2001

Appeal by Permission from the Supreme Court Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel Chancery Court for Hamilton County, No. 98-0856

W. Frank Brown, III, Chancellor

In this workers' compensation case, the employee sustained injuries in an automobile accident while traveling to one of two nursing homes at which he worked as medical director pursuant to his employment contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that the employee's injuries did not occur in the course of his employment. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the trial court's decision, held that the injuries were compensable, and remanded the case for a determination of benefits. We disagree with the Panel's recommendation and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-226(e); Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed

Janice M. Holder, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. Riley Anderson, C.J., and Frank F. Drowota, III, and Adolpho A. Birch, Jr. JJ, joined. William M. Barker, J, not participating.

Michael A. Wagner, Chattanooga, TN, for the appellant, Larry Donald Howard, M.D.

W. Randall Wilson and Lynda Motes, Chattanooga, TN, for the appellee, Cornerstone Medical Associates, P.C.

OPINION

At the time of the accident in this case, Larry Donald Howard, M.D., worked as a physician for Cornerstone Medical Associates (Cornerstone). Dr. Howard's main office was located in the Atrium Memorial Building (the Atrium Office) in Chattanooga, Tennessee. In his position with Cornerstone, he served as the medical director of two nursing homes, including the Life Care Center Nursing Home (Life Care). Under the terms of Dr. Howard's employment contract, he was required to see patients at the Atrium Office, the nursing homes, and various hospitals. He used his personal automobile when traveling between these sites. On the morning of June 21, 1996, Dr. Howard received a phone call at his home from Life Care advising him that the nursing home had new patients whom Dr. Howard needed to see. While traveling between his home and Life Care, Dr. Howard was injured in an automobile accident. He suffered facial bone fractures, a closed head injury, and the loss of his left eye.

The trial court granted Cornerstone's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the facts of the case did not satisfy any of the exceptions to the general rule that travel to and from work does not fall within the course of employment. As a result, the court found that Dr. Howard's injuries were not compensable.

Dr. Howard appealed, and the appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3). The Panel disagreed with the trial court's ruling. The Panel held that Dr. Howard was acting within the course of his employment because driving to Life Care furthered Cornerstone's business. We granted Cornerstone's petition for full Court review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5).

ANALYSIS

Review of an award of summary judgment in a workers' compensation case is governed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn. 2001). "Under Rule 56, a court must 'review the record without a presumption of correctness to determine whether the absence of genuine and material factual issues entitle [sic] the movant to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Finister v. Humboldt Gen. Hosp., Inc., 970 S.W.2d 435, 437-38 (Tenn. 1998)). We "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must also draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." McCann v. Hatchett, 19 S.W.3d 218, 219 (Tenn. 2000). "Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion." Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

A compensable workers' compensation injury must arise out of and occur in the course of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12); Cunningham v. Shelton Sec. Serv., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn. 2001). "The phrase 'in the course of' refers to time, place and circumstances, and 'arising out of' refers to cause or origin." Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997). The general rule is that an employee is not acting within the course of employment when the employee is going to or coming from work unless the injury occurs on the employer's premises. Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 150 (Tenn. 1989); 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 15.11 (1994). If the employer provides a parking lot for its employees, the parking lot is considered part of the employer's premises. Lollar, 767 S.W.2d at 150. This Court has extended the premises rule to allow recovery when an employee is injured while crossing a public street between the employer's work facility and parking lot. Copeland v. Leaf, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. 1992). However, "[once] the employee has exited the parking area and begins traveling on personal time, away from the employer's premises, he is no longer in the course of employment." McCurry v. Container Corp. of America, 982 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tenn. 1998).

Tennessee has recognized certain exceptions to the "going and coming" rule. For example, this Court recognized the "special errand rule" exception in Stephens v. Maxima Corp., 774 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1989). Under the "special errand rule" exception, an employee may be compensated for an off-premises injury "while performing some special act, assignment or mission at the direction of the employer." Id. at 934. Another exception applies to injuries sustained by employees traveling in a company car while going to or coming from work. Eslinger v. F & B Frontier Constr. Co., 618 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tenn. 1981) ("It is well settled law in this State that where transportation is furnished by an employer as an incident of the employment, an injury suffered by the employee while going to or returning from his work in the vehicle furnished arises out of and is within the course of the employment.").

In Pool v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tenn. 1984), we held that the employee's need to carry his own carpentry tools in his truck, combined with a provision for travel reimbursement in the employment contract, was sufficient to remove the case from the general rule of non-compensability in going and coming cases. "In general, we have allowed coverage where the journey itself 'is a substantial part of the services for which the workman was employed and compensated.'" Id. (quoting Smith v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., Inc., 551 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tenn. 1977)). See also 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.00 (1994). The reason for this exception is that "the employment imposes the duty upon the employee to go from place to place at the will of the employer in the performance of duty and the risks of travel are directly incident to the employment itself." Smith, 551 S.W.2d at 681 (quoting Cent. Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Court, 162 Tenn. 477, 480, 36 S.W.2d 907, 908 (1931)).

The Panel cited this Court's opinion in McCann v. Hatchett, 19 S.W.3d 218 (Tenn. 2000), concluding that Dr. Howard was "acting rationally to further the employer's business" when he traveled from his home to Life Care. The Panel therefore held that Dr. Howard was acting in the course of his employment. In McCann, the employee drowned in a hotel swimming pool while on an out-of-town business trip. Id. at 220. This Court found the death compensable under the majority rule allowing recovery for "traveling employees." Id. at 221.

A "traveling employee" is an employee working away from the regular job site. Id. at 220. In the majority of jurisdictions, an employee "whose work entails travel away from the employer's premises" is considered to be within the course of employment throughout the entire trip. 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 25.00 (1994). The "traveling employee" exception is generally applied to employees who travel extensively to further the employer's business, such as traveling salesmen. See Smith, 551 S.W.2d at 681. The travel is an integral part of the job and differs from an ordinary commuter's travel, thereby exposing the traveling employee to greater risks. See id. Dr. Howard's drive from his home to Life Care does not fall under the "traveling employee" ex...