Larry E. Parrish. P.C. v. Bennett

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Citation: 989 F.3d 452
• Docket Number: No. 20-5898,20-5898
• Parties: LARRY E. PARRISH. P.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andy D. BENNETT, Frank G. Clement, Jr., and W. Neal McBrayer, Judges of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.
• Decision Date: 02 March 2021

989 F.3d 452

LARRY E. PARRISH. P.C., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Andy D. BENNETT, Frank G. Clement, Jr., and W. Neal McBrayer, Judges of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-5898

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: March 2, 2021

ON BRIEF: Larry E. Parrish, PARRISH LAWYERS, P.C., Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Laura Miller, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

In this action, Larry E. Parrish, P.C., a Tennessee law firm (the "Parrish Firm") sued three judges of the Tennessee Court of Appeals because they allegedly made false statements in a written opinion resolving an appeal to which the Parrish Firm was a party. Plaintiff claims that the false statements were a violation of its Fourteenth Amendment rights, but as a remedy, it seeks no damages or injunctive relief—instead, requesting only a declaration that defendants violated its constitutional rights.

The district court, however, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that it was "not a close issue" that it lacked jurisdiction, and that even if it had jurisdiction, dismissal was required by judicial immunity and the relevant statute of limitations. Finally, even ignoring these sizable defects, the district court concluded that the facts pleaded by plaintiff were insufficient to state a claim. Now on appeal, plaintiff primarily challenges the district court's rulings regarding jurisdiction and judicial immunity. We affirm the judgment of the district court and direct plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be assessed against them on appeal.

I.

After a falling out in the early 2000s, business partners Paul Braden and Nancy Strong used the Tennessee state courts to resolve issues stemming from the dissolution of their partnership. See Larry E. Parrish P.C. v. Strong , No. M2017-02451-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6843402, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018). During that process, Ms. Strong believed she was the victim of legal malpractice, so she hired plaintiff, Larry E. Parrish, P.C., to represent her in a civil action against her original attorney. Id. Strong's malpractice case was later dismissed when the Parrish Firm did not comply with discovery deadlines. Id. Thereafter, Strong assigned some of her rights in the partnership dissolution action to the Parrish Firm to secure payment and reimbursement of money advanced to defray costs and expenses for the malpractice action. Id.

A few months later, the Parrish Firm filed suit to recover $116,316 pursuant to the assignment. Id. Strong responded with counterclaims. Id. Those claims were resolved in yet more protracted state-court litigation when a jury found for Strong on

989 F.3d 455

her breach-of-contract counterclaim and later awarded her damages of $2,293,878.70, including $2,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at *2–3.

The Parrish Firm appealed, seeking to vacate the trial court judgment. Defendants were the assigned panel of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, and the opinion they issued forms the basis of this action. See Larry E. Parrish P.C. , 2018 WL 6843402. That court affirmed in relevant part the judgment of the trial court, while making factual statements that plaintiff claims were false. Id. at *4–5. After defendants issued the opinion, plaintiff unsuccessfully pursued "a string of appeals and dilatory motions, concerning the same underlying case."¹

Undaunted, the Parrish Firm turned its attention to the federal courts and filed this action against defendants, alleging that two assertions in the Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion were false. Specifically, plaintiff disagreed with the Tennessee Court of Appeals regarding whether Strong's counterclaim was against the Parrish Firm or against Larry Parrish individually and alleged that the court misconstrued a motion to strike it had filed in the state trial court. The Parrish Firm claims that these statements contained in the judicial opinion violated its right to a "fair trial" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its right "to access justice" under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought a declaratory judgment to vindicate those rights. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and raised several independent reasons for dismissal of the suit. (R. 11.) After full briefing, the district court accepted each of defendants’ arguments for dismissal and entered judgment in their favor.² Plaintiff timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Intern. Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy , 974 F.3d 690, 701 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff's claims were barred by Rooker - Feldman ,³ and because the complaint did not present a justiciable controversy. We agree with the district court that it was without jurisdiction for both reasons.

First, under what is known as the Rooker - Feldman doctrine, district courts may not consider "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."

989 F.3d 456

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which "vests sole jurisdiction" to "conduct[ ] appellate review of final state-court judgments" in the Supreme Court. Berry v. Schmitt , 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012). "We determine whether Rooker - Feldman bars a claim by looking to the ‘source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’ ... If the source of the plaintiff's injury is the state-court judgment itself, then Rooker - Feldman applies." VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C. , 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting McCormick v. Braverman , 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006) ). To determine the source of a plaintiff's injury, a court must look to the requested relief. Id.

Applying these standards, we conclude that plaintiff's suit is barred by Rooker - Feldman . Plaintiff alleges only that the Tennessee Court of Appeals made false statements about the facts of a case before it, and that the resulting errors—memorialized in the court's opinion—injured it. The district court correctly observed that the complaint essentially sought another round of state appellate review in disguise because "[e]valuating whether statements in the [Tennessee Court of Appeals’] opinion were...