Larson Limestone Co. v. State, Div. of Oil, Gas and Min.
Decision Date | 25 September 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 940440,940440 |
Citation | 903 P.2d 429 |
Parties | LARSON LIMESTONE COMPANY, Farrell Larson, and Gerald Larson, Petitioners, v. STATE of Utah, DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, Respondent. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Scribner, Donald E. McCandless, Provo, for petitioners.
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Thomas A. Mitchell, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for amicus Associated General Contractors.
Larson Limestone Company (Larson) seeks review of an order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the Board) requiring that Larson file a notice of intent for large mining operations, post a $50,000 reclamation surety, and submit to the jurisdiction of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining (the Division). We affirm.
Larson extracts limestone from its quarry located in Utah County. Originally, U & I Sugar opened the quarry in the late 19th century to extract high calcium limestone. The limestone varies in quality and thickness, with high quality limestone sandwiched between layers of low quality limestone. To extract the high quality limestone, it is necessary to remove the low quality layers.
On May 12, 1988, Larson filed a notice of intent to commence small mining operations with the Division. Larson reported the total disturbed area 1 to be 4.6 acres because it believed that the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-8-1 to -23 (the Act), excluded the low quality limestone as "rock aggregate." Larson based its estimate of disturbed area solely on the volume of high quality limestone extracted from the quarry.
In 1992, the Division started examining Larson to ensure that it was still a small mining operation (under five acres of total disturbed area). After the examination, the Division determined that Larson's mining operations disturbed a minimum of twenty acres. On May 19, 1994, the Division petitioned the Board for an order requiring Larson to file a notice of intent for large mining operations and to post the required reclamation surety of $50,000. The Division also requested that the Board order Larson to cease mining operations and begin reclamation if Larson failed to post the $50,000 surety. The Board so ordered, and Larson sought review.
The first issue raised on review is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's finding of fact that Larson is a "mining operation" under the jurisdiction of the Act. 2 The second issue concerns the meaning of the term "rock aggregate" found in subsections 40-8-4(3)(b) and (8)(b) of the Utah Code. 3 Because the first issue is dispositive, we do not reach the second.
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the reviewing court shall provide relief if the person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's basing its actions on a determination of fact that "is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); see also Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993) ( ); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992) ( ). Substantial evidence "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); accord SEMECO Indus. v. State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). Thus, under the substantial evidence test, this court must determine if the findings of fact were reasonable and rational. Id.; see also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ( ). However, examining the Board's findings of fact does not constitute a de novo review or a reweighing of the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993).
Larson contends that the evidence does not support the Board's finding of fact that Larson is a large mining operation under the Act. Under the Act, a "mining operation" that "disturbs" more than five acres of land is a large mining operation and is required to file a notice of intent for large mining operations. Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-13. The amount of disturbed land under the Act includes:
(a) on-site private ways, roads, and railroads; (b) land excavations; (c) exploration sites; (d) drill sites or workings; (e) refuse banks or spoil piles; (f) evaporation or settling ponds; (g) stockpiles; (h) leaching dumps; (i) placer areas; (j) tailings ponds or dumps; and (k) work, parking, storage, or waste discharge areas, structures, and facilities.
After examining Larson's quarry, the Board found that Larson had disturbed over twenty acres of land within the meaning of the Act. On March 17, 1992, three Division employees went to the Larson quarry to measure the total disturbed area. Using a hip chain and a vehicle odometer, the employees measured twenty-two sites. They measured crushing and loading pads, stockpiles, bench areas, and access roads. To render conservative measurements, the Division excluded the main quarry and two turnout areas from their calculations. It is undisputed by the parties that all the areas measured by the Division employees are used in connection with the mining of high quality limestone. Thus, the Board's determination that Larson is a large mining operation is supported by the facts.
Larson contends, however, that all the sites used to evaluate the disturbed area should be excluded from the Board's calculations because those areas are also part of Larson's rock aggregate operation. Under the Act, the Board does not have jurisdiction over "the extraction of sand, gravel and rock aggregate." Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-4(8)(b) (emphasis added). According to Larson, the Board has jurisdiction only over the limited physical section of the quarry where the high quality limestone is actually extracted from the low quality limestone. Because this portion of the quarry does not exceed five acres,...
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