Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | MURPHY; KLUCZYNSKI; BURMAN |
| Citation | Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 199 N.E.2d 265, 48 Ill.App.2d 349 (Ill. App. 1964) |
| Decision Date | 06 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 49117 |
| Parties | Stanley LARSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, Chicago, for appellant, Harold W. Huff, James L. Tuohy, Chicago, of counsel.
Harry I. Parsons, Chicago, for Commonwealth Edison Co., Norton Wasserman, Charles D. Snewind, Chicago, of counsel.
Vogel & Vogel, Chicago, for Sargent & Lundy, L. H. Vogel, Albert F. Manion, Chicago, of counsel.
This is a Scaffold Act case, in which plaintiff was seriously injured in a fall from a scaffold erected by and for the use of plaintiff's employer, Paschen Contractors, Inc., in the course of a general rehabilitation and remodeling project of a plant of defendant Commonwealth Edison Company. Plaintiff appeals from a directed verdict and judgment in favor of defendant Sargent & Lundy, consulting engineers, and from a jury verdict and judgment in favor of defendant Edison. He appeals upon the theory that the directed verdict was improper, and that trial errors and an erroneous instruction invalidate the jury verdict.
The controlling facts are not controverted. The project rehabilitation was commenced by Edison on November 1, 1955. The plan under which the rehabilitation was to proceed was prepared by Sargent & Lundy, a partnership firm of consulting engineers, and the major portion of all the contracts was prepared by them. They were 'designers only' and had no authority with regard to the actual construction work. Edison let all of the contracts, and six of their employees were on the job at all times to inspect the progress of the work. A representative of Edison's Safety Department made regular visits to the construction site 'for the safety of the operating personnel in the station and not of the construction project,' and 'he had no authority to enforce any suggestions' as to contractors' employees. There were about 75 to 80 contracts with a large number of contractors, and each had a specific function or job to accomplish in connection with the rehabilitation. Two or three of these contracts were with Paschen.
The plant consisted of a number of buildings and occupied an area of at least three city blocks. The work involved clearing out the buildings entirely, leaving only the outside walls. It was accomplished in piecemeal fashion, so that old turbines were kept running while new generating turbines were being installed. The work was divided into 'units,' and we are concerned with operations in and about Units 7 and 8. Prior to the demolition of Unit 8, turbines were installed in Unit 7, and as the work moved from Unit 7 to Unit 8, a temporary barricade or partition (16 feet high) was erected between the two units.
The contract between Edison and Paschen consisted to a purchase order from Edison to Paschen to
The 'General Conditions, Exhibit 'C" were prepared by Sargent & Lundy and include the following:
Paschen contracted with Edison to construct the partition between Units 7 and 8 on a 'cost-plus' basis. To aid in building the partition, scaffolds were erected by the Paschen employees, and it was from one of these that plaintiff fell on August 7, 1958. The use of this type of scaffolding was regulated by rules promulgated by the Industrial Commission of the State of Illinois pursuant to the mandate of the Health and Safety Act. These rules require the wall brackets be secured to the wall by bolts.
No bolts were provided for the scaffold from which plaintiff fell, nor for any of the scaffolds previously erected by Paschen in the course of the work. These scaffolds were fastened with spikes, and as the scaffolds were moved from place to place, the brackets were pulled off and renailed to the new position. The scaffold in question was erected by nailing an upright to the partition wall and attaching a bracket. Planks were placed across this bracket to form the scaffold. When plaintiff reached the scaffold and stood upon it, the bracket pulled away from the wall and broke, and the end of the scaffold upon which he was standing fell, and plaintiff was injured.
Plaintiff charges each of these defendants with a violation of the Structural Work Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, Ch. 48, §§ 60-69 inclusive). Each defendant contends that the provisions of the act were inapplicable because each denies being 'in charge of the work.'
Initially, we agree that it was 'proper' for plaintiff to undertake to prove that both Commonwealth and Sargent & Lundy had an obligation under the statute. In Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 22 Ill.2d 305, p. 322, 175 N.E.2d 785, p. 794 (1961), the court stated:
Plaintiff contends that the directed verdict in favor of Sargent & Lundy was improper, and that 'the court erroneously quashed the subpoena which demanded the production' of the contract between Edison and Sargent & Lundy. Plaintiff sought the production of this contract 'to determine what agreement had been made between them pertaining to the supervision of the work and the distribution of responsibility,' and argues that it was evidence in the possession of Sargent & Lundy and it 'was relevant to the question of who was in charge of the work,' and 'by quashing the subpoena the court made it impossible for plaintiff to present the evidence.'
The quashed subpoena is not part of the record on appeal. From the record, it appears that during the trial a subpoena duces tecum was served upon Robert Roe, auditor and accountant of Sargent & Lundy, at 1:35 P.M. on September 11, 1962, 'commanding him to appear here at the hour of 2:00 P.M., of the same date, in this court room and to produce at that time any and all records, plans, account records, approval sheets, contracts, cost sheets, proposals, progress reports construction and alteration--Units 7 and 8 on the barrier wall * * *.' The motion to quash was made because 'it is too general and broad in its scope and constitutes nothing but a fishing expedition on the part of the plaintiff * * *,' and because the case had been pending since 1959 and 'no discovery procedures were followed at any time by the plaintiff in regard to Sargent & Lundy employees or records.'
In a discussion between court and counsel, plaintiff expressed a willingness to delay the production of the records until later in the...
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...performing the specific tasks involved. This construction of the Act would frustrate the legislative intent. Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 48 Ill.App.2d 349, 199 N.E.2d 265, affirmed a judgment for defendant-owner based on an instruction to the jury to the effect that the owner, to hav......
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Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
...defendant Edison upon which judgment was entered. On appeal by plaintiff both judgments were affirmed by the Appellate Court. (48 Ill.App.2d 349, 199 N.E.2d 265) We have granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal and, in addition, have permitted the filing of briefs by amici Factual b......
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Vykruta v. Thomas Hoist Co., Gen. No. 50459
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...in Barenfanger. We conclude that the authorities establish the admissibility into evidence of such rules. In Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 48 Ill.App.2d 349, 199 N.E.2d 265, an action under the Structural Work Act, the court noted that the use of the type of scaffold '(W)as regulat......