Larson v. Domestic Foreign Commerce Corporation, No. 31

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtVINSON
PartiesLARSON v. DOMESTIC & FOREIGN COMMERCE CORPORATION
Docket NumberNo. 31
Decision Date27 June 1949

337 U.S. 682
69 S.Ct. 1457
93 L.Ed. 1628
LARSON

v.

DOMESTIC & FOREIGN COMMERCE CORPORATION.

No. 31.
Argued Nov. 12, 1948.
Decided June 27, 1949.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1949.

See 70 S.Ct. 31.

[Syllabus from pages 682-684 intentionally omitted]

Page 684

Mr. H. G. Morison, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. T. Peter Ansberry, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by the Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation against Robert M. Littlejohn, the then head of the War Assets Administration.1 The complaint alleged that the Administration had sold certain surplus coal to the plaintiff; that the Administrator refused to deliver the coal but, on the contrary, had entered into a new contract to sell it to others. The prayer was for an injunction prohibiting the Administrator from selling or delivering the coal to any one other than the plaintiff and for a declaration that the sale to the plaintiff was valid and the sale to the second purchaser invalid.

A temporary restraining order was issued ex parte. At the subsequent hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the court did not have jurisdiction because the suit was one against the United

Page 685

States. The motion was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jurisdictional capacity of the court depended on whether or not title to the coal had passed.2 Since this was also one of the questions on the merits, it remanded the case for trial. We granted certiorari, 333 U.S. 872, 68 S.Ct. 903, 92 L.Ed. 1149.3

The controversy on the merits concerns the interpretation to be given to the contract of sale. The War Assets Administration construed the contract as requiring the plaintiff to deposit funds to pay for the coal in advance and, when an unsatisfactory letter of credit was offered in place of a deposit, it considered that the contract was breached. The respondent, on the other hand, construed the contract as requiring payment only on delivery of the documents covering the coal shipment. In its view, it was not obliged to deposit any funds in advance of shipment and, therefore, had not breached the contract by failing to do so.

A second question, related to but different from the question of breach, was whether legal title to the coal had passed to the responden when the contract was made. If the contract required the deposit of funds then, of course, title could not pass until the contract terms were complied with. If, on the other hand, the contract required payment only on the delivery of documents, a question remained as to whether title nevertheless passed at the time the contract was made.

Since these questions were not decided by the courts below we do not pass on them here. They are important only insofar as they illuminate the basis on which it

Page 686

was claimed that the district court had jurisdiction over the suit. It was not alleged that the contract for the sale of the coal was a contract with the officer personally.4 The basis of the action, on the contrary, was that a contract had been entered into with the United States. Nor was it claimed that the Administrator had any personal interest in this coal or, indeed, that he himself had taken any wrongful action. The complaint was directed against him because of his official function as chief of the War Assets Administration.5 It asked for an injunction against him in that capacity, and against 'his agents, assistants, deputies and employees and all persons acting or assuming to act under their direction.' The relief sought was, in short, relief against the Administration for wrongs allegedly committed by subordinate officials in that Administration. The question presented to the courts below was whether such an injunction was barred by the sovereign's immunity from suit.

Before answering that question it is perhaps advisable to state clearly what is and what is not involved. There is not involved any question of the immunization of Government officers against responsibility for their wrongful actions. If those actions are such as to create a personal liability, whether sounding in tort or in contract, the fact that the officer is an instrumentality of the sovereign does not, of course, forbid a court from taking jurisdiction over a suit against him. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 1922, 258 U.S. 549, 567, 42 S.Ct. 386, 388, 66 L.Ed. 762. As was said in Brady

Page 687

v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 1943, 317 U.S. 575, 580, 63 S.Ct. 425, 428, 87 L.Ed. 471, the principle that an agent is liable for his own torts 'is an ancient one and applies even to certain acts of public officers or public instrumentalities.' But the existence of a right to sue the officer is not the issue in this case. The issue here is whether this particular suit is not also, in effect, a suit against the sovereign. If it is, it must fail, whether or not the officer might otherwise be suable.

If the denomination of the party defendant by the plaintiff were the sole test of whether a suit was against the officer individually or against his principal, the sovereign, our task would be easy. Our decision then would be that the United States is not being sued here because it is not named as a party. This would be simple and would not leave room for controversy. But controversy there has been, in this field above all others, because it has long been established that the crucial question is whether the relief sought in a suit nominally addressed to the officer is relief against the sovereign.6 In a suit against the officer to recover damages for the agent's personal actions that question is easily answered. The judgment sought will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign's property. There is, therefore, no jurisdictional difficulty.7 The question becomes difficul

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and the area of controversy is entered when the suit is not one for damages but for specific relief: i.e., the recovery of specific property or monies, ejectment from land, or injunction either directing or restraining the defendant officer's actions. In each such case the question is directly posed as to whether, by obtaining relief against the officer, relief will not, in effect, be obtained against the sovereign. For the sovereign can act only through agents and, when the agents' actions are restrained, the sovereign itself may, through him, be restrained. As indicated, this question does not arise because of any distinction between law and equity. It arises whenever suit is brought against an officer of the sovereign in which the relief sought from him is not compensation for an alleged wrong but, rather, the prevention or discontinuance, in rem, of the wrong. In each such case the compulsion, which the court is asked to impose, may be compulsion against the sovereign, although nominally directed against the individual officer. If it is, then the suit is barred, not because it is a suit against an officer of the Government, but because it is, in substance, a suit against the Government over which the court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction.

The relief sought in this case was not the payment of damages by the individual defendant.8 To the contrary,

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it was asked that the court order the War Assets Administrator, his agents, assistants, deputies and employees and all persons acting under their direction, not to sell the coal involved and not to deliver it to anyone other than the respondent.9 The district court held that this was relief against the sovereign and therefore dismissed the suit. We agree.

There may be, of course, suits for specific relief against officers of the sovereign which are not suits against the sovereign. If the officer purports to act as an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his personal home, he presumably could be enjoined from later conveying it to a third person On a similar theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is important to note

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that in such cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient. And, since the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case may depend, as we have recently recognized,10 upon the decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the statutory limitation on which he relies.

A second type of case is that in which the statute or order conferring power upon the officer to take action in the sovereign's name is claimed to be unconstitutional. Actions for habeas corpus against a warden and injunctions against the threatened enforcement of unconstitutional statutes are familiar examples of this type. Here, too, the conduct against which specific relief is sought is beyond the officer's powers and is, therefore, not the conduct of the sovereign. The only difference is that in this case the power has been conferred in form but the grant is lacking in substance because of its constitutional invalidity.

These two types have frequently been recognized by this Court as the only ones in which a restraint may be obtained against the conduct of Government officials. The rule was...

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1376 practice notes
  • Bowen v. Massachusetts Massachusetts v. Bowen, Nos. 87-712
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1988
    ...from land, or injunction either directing or restraining the defendant officer's actions." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1460, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (emphasis added). The fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to anothe......
  • Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., No. 13–1523.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • December 5, 2014
    ...Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868, 884 (D.C.Cir.2008). 773 F.3d 553By contrast, in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949), the Court dismissed an action brought against the head of the War Assets Administration alleging that......
  • King v. United States, No. 248-65.
    • United States
    • Court of Federal Claims
    • February 16, 1968
    ...a * * * public officer for acting beyond his statutory authority, even though a subordinate, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-702, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628; and the declaratory judgment, together with an enforcing injunction, furnishes a proper device to te......
  • Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, No. 85-1716
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1987
    ...Amendment was thereafter enacted with "vehement speed," displacing the Chisholm ruling. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1470, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). The dissent of Justice Iredell is generally regarded as embodying the rationale of the Eleventh ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1374 cases
  • Bowen v. Massachusetts Massachusetts v. Bowen, Nos. 87-712
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1988
    ...from land, or injunction either directing or restraining the defendant officer's actions." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1460, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (emphasis added). The fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to anothe......
  • Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., No. 13–1523.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • December 5, 2014
    ...Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 531 F.3d 868, 884 (D.C.Cir.2008). 773 F.3d 553By contrast, in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949), the Court dismissed an action brought against the head of the War Assets Administration alleging that......
  • King v. United States, No. 248-65.
    • United States
    • Court of Federal Claims
    • February 16, 1968
    ...a * * * public officer for acting beyond his statutory authority, even though a subordinate, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-702, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628; and the declaratory judgment, together with an enforcing injunction, furnishes a proper device to te......
  • Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, No. 85-1716
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1987
    ...Amendment was thereafter enacted with "vehement speed," displacing the Chisholm ruling. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1470, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). The dissent of Justice Iredell is generally regarded as embodying the rationale of the Eleventh ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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