Larson v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, Fla.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-225-CIV-T-23C.,91-225-CIV-T-23C.
• Citation: 820 F. Supp. 596
• Parties: Dawn S. LARSON, Plaintiff, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

820 F. Supp. 596

Dawn S. LARSON, Plaintiff, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants.

No. 91-225-CIV-T-23C.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

March 31, 1993.

Charles E. Lykes, Jr., Clearwater, FL, for Dawn S. Larson.

Dawn S. Larson, pro se.

Bruce P. Taylor, Law Office of Bruce P. Taylor, Largo, FL, for Pinellas County School Bd.

Robert George Walker, Jr., Law Office of Robert G. Walker, Jr., Clearwater, FL, for Stuart A. Weston, James M. Barker and Theodore J. Pafundi.

ORDER

JENKINS, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes on for consideration of Defendant School Board's Motion To Dismiss Count I of the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt.49), the Individual Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Counts I, VI and VIII of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt.54) and plaintiff's responses thereto. (Dkts.52, 56) For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.¹

I

This employment discrimination action alleges that the School Board of Pinellas County, Florida ("School Board") and individual defendants Ted Pafundi, Stuart Weston and James Barker discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her sex and physical condition during the course of her employment with the School Board from September 1983 through June 1990.

The School Board and defendants Pafundi and Weston have filed motions to dismiss Counts I, VI and VIII of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action under: (a) the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), a part of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") (Count I); (b) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (Count VI); and (c) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count VIII).

II

The accepted rule is that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court is required to accept the material allegations of the complaint as true and to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of America, 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir.1986).

Count I

Defendants Weston and Pafundi argue that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under the Equal Pay Act because plaintiff fails to allege that either of them is an "employer" or that they participated in any way in the alleged discrimination. Defendant School Board argues that the complaint fails to allege that any of the work performed by plaintiff was of equal responsibility and performed under similar conditions as work performed by defendant Ted Pafundi, a male employee. The School Board also states plaintiff has failed to allege when the alleged actions occurred.

In order to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that "an employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sexes `for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.'" Price v. Lockheed Space Operations Co., 856 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by comparing the jobs held by the female and male employees and showing that those jobs are substantially equal, and not by comparing the skills and qualifications of the individuals holding those jobs. Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1032 (11th Cir.1985).

Count I of plaintiff's complaint alleges that prior to May 8, 1989, plaintiff and defendant Ted Pafundi "served in positions which required equal skill, effort and ability, to wit: Personnel Technician in charge of tax shelter programs and supervisor of employee benefits, respectively. Each position required them to apply employee payroll deductions to pay for employee benefits." Plaintiff also alleges that she was paid less money than defendant Pafundi because of her sex.

Plaintiff further alleges that on or about May 8, 1989, plaintiff's position was transferred into the Risk Management section by defendant School Board, acting through defendant Weston. Plaintiff states her job description was revised by defendant Weston to remove responsibilities which she was still performing, and defendant Pafundi was assigned supervisory responsibility over her in an effort to conceal the wrongful pay differential between plaintiff and defendant Pafundi. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 10, 11, 12)

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the School Board's argument as to Count I must be rejected.

Defendants' argument that plaintiff has not alleged that any of the individual defendants is an "employer" is also not persuasive. Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants are officials or agents of defendant School Board with the authority to take the discriminatory actions alleged in the amended complaint. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 2)

"Employer" is defined more broadly under the FLSA than the term would otherwise be interpreted under traditional common law applications in order to meet the remedial purposes of the FLSA. McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir.1989). An individual who lacks a possessory interest in a business or corporation may still be an "employer" under the FLSA if he or she "effectively dominates its administration or otherwise acts, or has the power to act, on behalf of the corporation vis-a-vis its employees." Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194-195 (5th Cir.1983). See also Dole v. Lombardi Enterprises, Inc., 761 F.Supp. 233, 237 (D.Conn.1991) (individuals who control or operate a business and act directly upon employees are considered to be "employers" for purposes of the FLSA).

In light of the broad definition of "employer" under the FLSA and the fact that the allegations in the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge cannot conclude at this time that it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts" which would subject the individual defendants to liability as employers under the FLSA. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102. The motions to dismiss are therefore denied as to Count I.

Count VI

The individual defendants contend that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, ("Title VI") because there is no allegation that defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of race, color, or national origin. This argument must be rejected.

Count VI alleges a cause of action for discrimination on the basis of plaintiff's medical condition but cites Title VI as the statutory basis for plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff states that the remedies of Title VI are applicable to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which is the actual basis of her claim in Count VI.

Section 504 provides, in relevant part:

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...

29 U.S.C. § 794.

Section 794a provides that the remedies of Title VI are applicable to claims brought pursuant to section 504. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). The fact that plaintiff has not specifically cited section 504 as the basis for her claim in Count VI does not warrant dismissal of Count VI pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. See Doss v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 834 F.2d 421, 423-424 (5th Cir.1987) (pleading improper legal theory does not preclude recovery under proper legal theory); Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. St. Louis, 596 F.2d 784, 787 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899, 100 S.Ct. 208, 62 L.Ed.2d 135 (1979) (complaint should not be dismissed merely because the allegations do not support the particular legal theory advanced in the complaint); Sessions v. Chrysler Corp., 517 F.2d 759, 760-761 (9th Cir.1975) (fact that the plaintiff mislabelled his cause of action against defendants was irrelevant as long as he was entitled to relief against the defendants on any theory).

Count VI alleges that plaintiff has suffered loss of wages, employment opportunities and medical benefits as a result of discriminatory actions taken by defendants against her because of her medical condition of renal failure. See generally Arline v. School Bd., 772 F.2d 759, 764 (11th Cir.1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987) (teacher with contagious tuberculosis was within the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act). Plaintiff also alleges that she was fully able to perform her job with reasonable or no accommodation by defendants.

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it does not appear "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied as to Count VI, as it states a claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act, to which Title VI remedies apply.

Count VIII

Count VIII alleges that defendants Pafundi, Weston and Barker violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by conspiring to commit the actions described in Counts I through VII of the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also alleges that these actions were "intentional and malicious." (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 40, 41).

The individual defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for...