Lasater v. House
| Decision Date | 30 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 18A04-0305-CV-223.,18A04-0305-CV-223. |
| Parties | Gene LASATER and Carolyn Lasater, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Donald HOUSE, Sr., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Opal M. Pullen, Deceased, et al., Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Donald K. McClellan, McClellan, McClellan & Arnold, Muncie, IN, Attorney for Appellants.
P. Gregory Cross, The Cross Law Firm, Muncie, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
Gene and Carolyn Lasater filed their "Amended Complaint to Contest the Last Will and Testament of Opal M. Pullen and Void the Transfer of Non-Probate Bank Accounts" against Donald House, Sr., personally and as personal representative of Opal Pullen's estate, Mabel Dunn, Pricilla Studebaker, Gaston United Methodist Church, Masonic Lodge # 650, Theodore Coffman, Mutual Federal Savings Bank as trustee for Billy Dunn, and Judy Clemens (collectively "the Estate"). The Lasaters allege in their complaint that Pullen's will was the product of undue influence. Prior to trial, the Lasaters moved the court to rule on the admissibility of witness testimony regarding certain statements Pullen had made around the time she executed her will. And the Estate moved the court to exclude the opinions of the Lasaters' two expert witnesses. The trial court ruled in favor of the Estate on both motions. The Lasaters bring this interlocutory appeal challenging those rulings. They present the following issues for our review:
1. Whether Pullen's declarations made both before and after she executed her will are admissible under Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(3) to show her state of mind at the time she executed her will.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the Lasaters' expert witnesses' testimony.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.1
In 1994, Pullen, a widow with no children, executed a last will and testament. Under that will, she gave $2,000 each to five family members, including nephew Donald House, and $1,000 each to two charitable organizations. Pullen devised the residue of her estate, which included a 120-acre farm, to her neighbors the Lasaters. At that time, Pullen also executed a general power of attorney naming David A. Vannatter, a local banker and family friend, as her attorney-in-fact. Pullen's testamentary documents were prepared by Attorney William Bales, Jr.
On January 30, 1998, Pullen revoked Vannatter's power of attorney.2 Around that time, House became involved in Pullen's affairs and arranged a meeting between her and Attorney Wayne Lennington. On February 8, 1998, Pullen, with the assistance of Lennington, appointed House as her attorney-in-fact. Thereafter, on February 21, in the presence of Lennington and House, Pullen executed a second last will and testament that revoked her first will. Under the second will, Pullen left her charitable bequests intact, but increased her bequests to family members at the expense of the Lasaters. Although Pullen left the Lasaters half of her farm, she left House, along with three other family members, $20,000 each and the residue of her estate, which included the other half of the farm. The will also named House as personal representative of Pullen's estate.
Pullen died on January 2, 2001, at the age of ninety-one. Thereafter, her last will and testament was admitted to probate, and, pursuant to the will, House was appointed as personal representative. On February 21, 2001, the Lasaters filed their complaint and alleged that Pullen's second will was void because it was the product of House's undue influence. A jury trial was scheduled for November 12, 2002.
During discovery, several witnesses gave testimony regarding statements Pullen had made about her relationships with the Lasaters and House and about her estate plan. The Lasaters also deposed two expert witnesses, William Fatout, a probate attorney, and Dr. Thomas Murray, a licensed psychologist. Based on their review of Pullen's estate plan and the witness depositions that the Lasaters had provided to them, both Fatout and Dr. Murray testified in their depositions that they believed that House exercised undue influence over Pullen at the time she executed the second will.
A few weeks prior to the scheduled trial date, the Estate filed a motion in limine to exclude hearsay evidence of Pullen's statements and a motion to preclude Fatout and Dr. Murray's testimony. After a hearing,3 the trial court indicated that it "preliminarily intend[ed] to grant in whole or in part" the Estate's motions.
In response, the Lasaters moved the court to "reconsider granting [the Estate's] motion in limine concerning hearsay evidence upon undue influence filed." The court denied that motion. The Estate then moved for a change of judge, which the trial court granted. In February 2003, the new judge accepted jurisdiction. The Lasaters requested a second hearing on the admissibility of Pullen's statements and Fatout and Dr. Murray's testimony. On March 20, 2003, the trial court entered two orders excluding the proffered hearsay evidence and expert testimony. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the hearsay statements were inadmissible under Indiana law and that the expert testimony was unreliable and did not meet the criteria of admissibility under Indiana Rules of Evidence 702 and 704.
The Lasaters filed a petition with the trial court requesting certification of those orders for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted the petition and agreed to stay matters pending resolution of the appeal. The Lasaters then moved this court to accept jurisdiction over their interlocutory appeal, which this court granted. This appeal ensued.
The Lasaters contend that Pullen's hearsay statements are admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(3) as evidence of her state of mind at the time she executed the second will. The Estate, on the other hand, contends that those hearsay statements should be excluded because Indiana law has traditionally excluded a testator's statements which were not made at the time of the will's execution.
As an initial matter, the parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review. The Estate contends that an abuse of discretion standard applies, while the Lasaters contend that our review is de novo. Generally, a trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion because those rulings are predicated on factual findings that are entitled to deference on appeal. See Stahl v. State, 686 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ind.1997). However, where, as here, a trial court's evidentiary ruling involves the interpretation of a rule of evidence, which is a question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. See id.
The following hearsay statements4 are at issue: (1) Pullen's former insurance agent, Larry Fenstermaker, stated that Pullen told him that she had a nephew, but that she did not "want him to have anything;" (2) Angela Stocker, a former caretaker of Pullen's, stated that Pullen had told her that she was good friends with the Lasaters, but that she was never close to House until she signed the power of attorney and that it was House's idea to give a family member her power of attorney; (3) Rita Clock, another former caretaker of Pullen's, stated that the Lasaters were her longtime friends; (4) David Vannatter, Pullen's former attorney-in-fact stated that Pullen had told him, prior to revoking his power of attorney and executing a new will, that she was afraid of House and that she was going to have to change her power of attorney to keep peace in the family; (5) Pullen's former hairdresser, Julie Herron, stated that Pullen had always said that the Lasaters would be heirs to her farm and her house; she also testified that Pullen had said that she changed her will against her wishes because "[House is] family."5
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless admitted pursuant to a recognized exception. Evid. R. 802. The Lasaters concede that Pullen's statements are hearsay, but they contend that those statements are admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, which provides in relevant part:
Ind. R. Evid. 803(3). In particular, the Lasaters contend that Pullen's statements are admissible under Rule 803(3) because Indiana courts have admitted similar types of statements under that exception in other cases.6
For instance, in criminal cases, our supreme court has held that a victim's statements expressing her feelings about her relationship with a defendant may be admitted into evidence, provided the victim's state of mind is at issue. See Vehorn v. State, 717 N.E.2d 869, 874 (Ind.1999) (); Pierce v. State, 705 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind.1998) (); Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 459-60 (Ind.1998) (...
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