Laschober v. Ammons
| Decision Date | 29 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00107-MR-WCM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | GERALD R. LASCHOBER Plaintiff, v. AARON C. AMMONS, JOSHUA FREEMAN Defendants. |
GERALD R. LASCHOBER Plaintiff,
v.
AARON C. AMMONS, JOSHUA FREEMAN Defendants.
No. 1:21-cv-00107-MR-WCM
United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division
October 29, 2021
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
W. Carleton Metcalf, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Aaron Ammons' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 2), and Defendant Joshua Freeman's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). Both Motions have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 for the entry of a recommendation.
I. Procedural Background
On March 16, 2021, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the District Court of Swain County against Defendants Aaron C. Ammons (“Ammons”) and Joshua Freeman (“Freeman”). Doc. 1-1 at 3-6. The case was subsequently removed to this Court on April 16, 2021. Doc. 1.[1]
On April 21, 2021, Ammons filed his Motion to Dismiss along with a supporting memorandum (“Ammons' Motion to Dismiss, ” Docs. 2, 3).
On May 20, 2021, Freeman filed his Motion to Dismiss along with a supporting memorandum (“Freeman's Motion to Dismiss, ” Docs. 6, 7).
Both Motions have been fully briefed. See Docs. 9, 10, 12, 14 (relative to Ammons' Motion to Dismiss); Docs. 11, 13 (relative to Freeman's Motion to Dismiss).[2]
Although Freeman initially argued that Plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed due to insufficient service of process, Freeman later withdrew his Motion on that basis, and has adopted most of the arguments in Ammons' Motion to Dismiss. See Doc. 13.
II. Materials Considered
In responding to the Motions, Plaintiff has submitted numerous documents and has made various factual statements beyond those in his Complaint. Defendants have also submitted other documents in support of their Motions to Dismiss.
To the extent the parties' additional documents constitute official public records, are central to Plaintiff's claims, are sufficiently referred to by Plaintiff's Complaint, and/or are not challenged on authenticity grounds, they may be considered at this stage of the proceedings. See Witthohn v. Fed. Ins. Co., 164 Fed.Appx. 395, 396 (4th Cir. 2006) (“a court may consider official public records, documents central to plaintiff's claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint so long as the authenticity of these documents is not disputed”); Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Although as a general rule extrinsic evidence should not be considered at the 12(b)(6) stage, we have held that when a defendant attaches a document to its motion to dismiss, a court may consider it in determining whether to dismiss the complaint [if] it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and [if] the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity.”)(internal quotation marks omitted)(alterations in original).
III. Factual Background
Plaintiff's Complaint and the other items of record appropriately considered indicate that Plaintiff's claims stem from a March 17, 2017 motor vehicle stop involving Ammons, a North Carolina State Trooper, and Freeman, a Bryson City Police Officer, and the related issuance of a North Carolina Uniform Citation (the “Citation”).
The “Officer Comments” section of the Citation reads:
Checkpoint on Walker Woody Rd. Myself [Ammons] and Officer Freeman were conducting. [Plaintiff] was driving a dark gray Honda Accord and was in line coming from the U.S. 19 direction. He was about 3 cars back, both officers were wearing reflective vests, [Plaintiff] proceeded to make a 3 pt turn and drive away from the checkpoint. Officer Freeman ran after on foot, he stopped for a sec when Freeman yelled to stop. I heard him yell “no” and took off
Doc. 3-1.
Plaintiff alleges that Ammons pursued Plaintiff, displayed his lights and sirens, and directed Plaintiff to pull his vehicle over into a parking lot and to stop. Doc. 1-1 at ¶6. Ammons then approached Plaintiff and, “suddenly and without warning, reason, provocation or justification, ” attacked Plaintiff by grabbing and twisting his right arm. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Freeman arrived on the scene and attacked Plaintiff and that both Ammons and Freeman assaulted Plaintiff and put him in handcuffs. Id.[3]
Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that Ammons presented Plaintiff with the Citation at the scene of the incident. Doc. 12 at 2, 7. The Citation indicates that Plaintiff was charged with 1) failing, upon the approach of a state highway
patrol vehicle that was giving a warning signal by appropriate lights and sirens, audible under normal circumstances, to stop his vehicle in violation of N.C. G.S. §20-157(A) (“Failure to Heed”), and 2) resisting, delaying, and obstructing a public officer by failing to stop at a driver's license checkpoint and produce a driver's license, in violation of N.C. G.S. §14-223 (“Resisting Public Officer”).
Plaintiff's case appeared on multiple calendars in State District Court, including July 25, 2018 and October 31, 2018. See Doc. 9-1.
What transpired on or about July 25, 2018 is in dispute. Notations on the bottom of the Citation indicate that Plaintiff pled guilty to the Failure to Heed charge. Doc. 3-1. Plaintiff, however, disagrees and contends that he did not enter a guilty plea of any kind. See Doc. 9 at 2.
Plaintiff's case was last before the State District Court on October 31, 2018. A judgment signed by a State District Court Judge on that date indicates that Plaintiff was found guilty of the Failure to Heed charge pursuant to a plea, and that Plaintiff gave notice of appeal from the judgment of the District Court to the Superior Court. Doc. 3-2 at 1-2. While Plaintiff denies pleading guilty to either of the charges, he appears to acknowledge that he intended to give notice of appeal to the Superior Court. Doc. 9 at 2.
A jury trial was scheduled to begin in Superior Court on February 11, 2019. Doc. 9 at 3. In anticipation of that trial, Plaintiff (who was by then acting
through counsel) issued a subpoena for Ammons' dashboard and body camera recordings. That information was to be delivered to Plaintiff's attorney by January 10, however Plaintiff contends that the recordings were not delivered and that they would have been exculpatory for him. Doc. 9 at 3.
Subsequently, on January 16, 2019, the Failure to Heed and Resisting Public Officer charges were dismissed. The dismissal document states that the basis for the dismissal was that the officer who had “the initial contact with [Plaintiff] no longer works for law enforcement.” Doc. 3-3.[4]
Plaintiff appears to take issue with the way in which the dismissal was entered and alleges that the charges were subsequently “resolved in the Plaintiff's favor through dismissal by the court.” Doc. 1-1 at ¶11.
IV. Legal Standard
In a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the central issue is whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 2009). In that context, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192.
The court, however, is not required to accept “legal conclusions, elements
of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255; see Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192. That is, while “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. In short, the well-pled factual allegations must move a plaintiff's claim from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256.
Finally, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (internal citation omitted). At the same time, the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim and does not act as a pro se plaintiff's advocate or develop claims that a plaintiff fails to raise. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court
into an advocate. Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed”); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978) (district courts are not...
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