Lasker v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 12 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. WD 61783.,WD 61783.
• Citation: 123 S.W.3d 283
• Parties: Patania LASKER, Respondent, v. Clinton JOHNSON, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

123 S.W.3d 283

Patania LASKER, Respondent, v. Clinton JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. WD 61783.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

November 12, 2003.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied December 23, 2003.

Application for Transfer Denied January 27, 2004.

Richard Colbert, Kansas City, for appellant.

Patania Lasker, Kansas City, pro se.

PAUL M. SPINDEN, Judge.

The issue in this case is whether or not a parent can alter his future child support obligations without the circuit court's approval by entering into an agreement with the other parent. We conclude that he cannot and affirm the circuit court's judgment in part and reverse it in part.

Clinton Johnson raises this issue in his appeal of the circuit court's judgment ordering him to pay $63,780 in unpaid child support and modifying his child support obligation retroactively. Among Johnson's primary contentions is an assertion that the circuit court erred in not crediting him with the value of a house that, he claims, he transferred to Patania Lasker as payment of his future child support obligation.

Johnson was the father of a child born to Lasker. On August 28, 1992, when the child was 10 years old, the circuit court ordered Johnson to pay $500 per month in child support. Johnson complied with the order through October 1995. After that, Lasker was evicted from her residence. Johnson owned a house in Kansas City and allowed her to move into it with her children. Johnson claimed that he and Lasker agreed that he would give the house to her and their son in lieu of future child support payments. Lasker disagreed and claimed that Johnson gave the house to her because he did not want his son to be homeless. Johnson executed a warranty deed conveying the property to Lasker and their son, but it was not recorded until August 22, 1997, almost two years after Lasker and her children moved into the house.

After moving into the house, Lasker notified the Division of Child Support Enforcement that Johnson had quit paying child support. The division determined that his arrearage was $27,700. It issued an income withholding order on November 26, 1996, directing that $750 per month be withheld from his pay—$500 for the current support obligation and $250 for the arrearage. Apparently the division was not aware that Johnson had made payments through October 1995 directly to Lasker.

Johnson petitioned the circuit court for a writ of prohibition to stop the division's collection efforts. The division voluntarily terminated its income withholding order, but Johnson pursued his action. On August 14, 1997, the circuit court entered its judgment permanently prohibiting the division from enforcing its income withholding order. Johnson believed that this order established that he had no obligation for child support payments after October 1995.

On April 8, 1999, Lasker asked the circuit court to modify Johnson's child support payments. She contended that continuing circumstances had changed so substantially that Johnson's obligation of $500 each month was unreasonable. She alleged that Johnson was making more money, and she was making less. She averred that her and the child's living expenses had increased. Johnson responded by asking the circuit court for summary judgment on the ground that the requisite change of circumstances did not exist and that he had conveyed to Lasker a house worth $50,000 in lieu of his obligation for future support payments. The circuit court denied Johnson's motion because these matters presented genuine issues of fact.

Before a hearing on Lasker's motion to modify child support, Lasker obtained a writ permitting her to garnish money from Johnson's bank account. Johnson sought to quash the garnishment. Lasker's entitlement to garnish Johnson's funds depended on whether or not he had already satisfied his child support obligation by giving her the house. The circuit court determined this matter and discovery disputes presented exceptional conditions that required it appoint a special master.

The master reported that the circuit court had previously determined that Johnson owed no arrearage and that his giving the house to Lasker was in lieu of future support payments. The master, however, questioned whether or not the circuit court's ruling was accurate and suggested that the circuit court decide the matter anew. She also suggested that, if the transfer was truly in lieu of future child support payments, the circuit court needed to determine the property's value so it could make a proper credit. The master heard evidence that the property was worth $48,500 during January 2001, but the master made no finding concerning its value then or at the time of transfer.

After two days of testimony and argument on the motion, the circuit court determined that Johnson's conveyance of the house to Lasker was a fraud on the court and that the deed did not transfer title. The circuit court rested its decision on Johnson's deeding the property as a single man when he was married, his deed's covenanting that the property was free of any encumbrances although it was mortgaged, his claiming it on his personal tax returns as rental property, and his occasional attempts to evict Lasker. Furthermore, the circuit court found that the parties were without authority to relieve Johnson from future child support payments in exchange for conveying the house to Lasker.

On August 9, 2002, the court entered judgment retroactively modifying Johnson's child support obligation. On the basis of four Form 14s prepared by the circuit court, it increased Johnson's support obligation to $991 per month for May 1999 through December 1999, $918 a month during 2000, and $914 a month during 2001 and later years. The circuit court concluded that Johnson's arrearage was $63,780 and ordered him to pay $1,414 per month—$914 for his current obligation as modified and $500 towards his arrearage. Johnson appeals.

In reviewing a child support modification proceeding, we consider whether or not substantial evidence supports the judgment, whether or not the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, or whether or not the judgment erroneously declares or applies the law. Pelch v. Schupp, 991 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Mo.App. 1999). Johnson makes four charges of error.

He first alleges that the circuit court erred in denying him credit for the house because the special master admitted evidence that the house's value was $48,500, and, because the circuit court did not adopt the special master's findings, it erred in not holding a hearing as required by Rule 68.01(g)(3). The point has no merit. The record does not support Johnson's contentions.

We surmise that Johnson is contending that his not being granted a $48,500 credit for the house established per se that the circuit court did not adopt the report and denied him a hearing on the issue. If he is, he is wrong. The special master made no finding concerning the house's value. Although the master heard testimony concerning the house's value, she declared that the circuit court would have to set the house's value.

Moreover, Johnson premises his contentions on beliefs that the circuit court had to give him credit for the house's fair market value because the circuit court had determined in the prohibition action that his transferring the house to Lasker satisfied his future child support obligations. The circuit court apparently adopted the same interpretation of the judgment because it concluded that it had to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent to modify Johnson's child support obligations and to find that he had not paid past child support obligations.

The circuit court's earlier judgment in the prohibition action, however, did not approve of the transfer in lieu of Johnson's future support payments. It dealt only with the Division of Child Support Enforcement's income withholding order. The circuit court had ruled that the order was improper because the division had erroneously assumed that Johnson had not been making child support payments. The circuit court did not decide that Lasker was not entitled to future child support payments or that the division was prohibited from collecting those future payments. The only reference to the house in the circuit court's judgment was its statement that "[t]he application of [Johnson] for a writ of prohibition was duly served upon the Division of Child Support Enforcement... with attachments showing all payment through the current date including [r]eal [e]state ... in lieu of future support payments." This merely was an acknowledgment of the document. It was not judicial approval of the transfer scheme.

Johnson next argues that, because the issue before the circuit court was modification of child support, it exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside his conveyance of the house to Lasker as a fraud on the court. He confusingly added an assertion to his point relied on that the court erred in not requiring Lasker to pay him rent for living in the house. Combining this argument in a single point with his contention that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the conveyance is confounding and inconsistent. His argument, however, does not mention the rent issue. Claims of error presented without supporting argument preserve nothing for appellate review, and we deem them to be abandoned. Papineau v. Baier, 901 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo.App.1995). As for the remainder of his point, we agree that the conveyance's validity was not an issue that was properly before the circuit court. Not only did the circuit court misinterpret the 1997 judgment, but it also stepped beyond its proper role. Taylor v. Taylor, 47 S.W.3d 377 (Mo.App.2001).

In Taylor, we examined whether a circuit court, in considering a support modification motion, possessed subject matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights. We held that it did not and that the circuit court's purported...