Lasley v. Running Supply, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 September 2015
• Docket Number: CIV 13-4090
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
• Parties: JAMES LASLEY, Plaintiff, v. RUNNING SUPPLY, INC., Defendant.

JAMES LASLEY, Plaintiff, v. RUNNING SUPPLY, INC., Defendant.

CIV 13-4090

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA SOUTHERN DIVISION

FILED: September 24, 2015

September 23, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

After a jury trial, Defendant, Running Supply, Inc., obtained a verdict in its favor on Plaintiff's claim of negligence. Plaintiff, James Lasley (Lasley) has filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.

BACKGROUND

The evidence at trial showed that, on May 28, 2013, Lasley, a self-employed tractor-trailer driver, picked up a shipment of cattle panels from Powder River Livestock Handling Equipment Company in Provo, Utah, to be delivered to six different locations including the Running Supply store in Huron, South Dakota. When he picked up the load, Lasley was given a diagram of the load, packing slips for each delivery, instructions, and unloading precautions. Lasley testified that he read the unloading precautions. Those precautions indicated that he was responsible for removing his straps that held the load to the flatbed, and the customer was responsible for unloading the cattle panels.

Lasley started with deliveries to Jackson, Wyoming, Billings, Montana, Gillette, Wyoming, and then Pierre, South Dakota. When Lasley drove his truck onto Running's parking lot in Huron, South Dakota on May 31, 2013, he was approached by a single employee, Melvin Brown, driving a forklift. Lasley said he asked Brown where his help was. When Brown responded that he was "it,"Lasley thought Brown was short-handed because more than one employee was provided to unload the four deliveries made earlier in the week. Brown testified that he always unloaded this type of freight himself. Lasley asked for a tool to cut the bands, and Brown handed him a bolt cutter. Brown testified that when he observed Lasley on the truck cutting bands and assisting in unloading the first set of panels, it appeared Lasley knew what he was doing. Brown removed the first set of panels with the forklift and drove away to unload them into the storage facility in the parking lot. As Brown was backing out to return to Lasley's truck, he saw Lasley on the ground with panels on top of him. Lasley testified that when he cut the black bands that held the set of panels to the load, the panels shifted, fell and knocked him off the truck and onto the parking lot. Brown testified that those bands should only be cut when the forklift is in place. Lasley admitted that the precautions he read included the language: "When popping black bands, be careful that you stand clear of the product and bands, they will spring open and could injure you."

Lasley suffered back and leg injuries as a result of the fall. On August 30, 2013, Lasley commenced this diversity action. Lasley's one count Complaint turns on the alleged negligent omissions of Defendant's employees: 1) failure to provide an adequate number of employees to unload the shipment, 2) failure to supervise the unloading of the shipment, and 3) failure to properly instruct the unloading. (Doc. 1.) Lasley did not identify a physical defect in the condition of the premises that caused his injuries or damages. He never amended the Complaint.

The pretrial conference was held in this case on October 6, 2014. No pretrial motions had been filed and the Court's knowledge of the case was based solely on the information contained in the complaint and the answer. At the pretrial conference, the Court cited Parker v. Casa Del Rey-Rapid City, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 113 (S.D. 2002), for the proposition that Lasley was a business invitee, and the Court asked what standard of care applied. Counsel for Defendant argued that a straight negligence standard applied because Lasley was unloading his own truck when he was injured. Counsel for Lasley did not argue that his was a cause of action for premises liability, but the Court wondered if a higher standard of cared applied because Lasley was a business invitee at the time of his injury.

Prior to trial, Lasley proposed jury instructions on premises liability:

DUTY OWED TO INVITEE

Defendant is liable for the physical harm caused to Lasley if it:

(1) knew or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered the condition, and should have realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Lasley; and

(2) should have expected that Lasley would not have discovered or realized the danger, or would have failed to protect himself against it; and

(3) failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Lasley against the danger; and

(4) that Defendant's breach of such duty or duties were the legal cause of Lasley's injuries.

(Doc. 19, Proposed Jury Instructions by James Lasley, at p. 6.)

DUTY - REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CARE

Reasonable and ordinary care required Defendant to keep its premises safe and warn any invitee, like Lasley, of any concealed, dangerous conditions known to Defendant.

(Id. at 7.)

LANDOWNER LIABILITY - DUTY TO INVITEE - OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITIONS

Defendant is not liable to Lasley for physical harm caused to Lasley by an activity or condition on its land whose danger is known or obvious to Lasley.

The word "known" means that Lasley both knew of the existence of the dangerous condition, and appreciated the probability and gravity of the danger posed by that condition.

The word "obvious" means that the condition and the risk would be recognized by a reasonable person in Lasley's position, regardless of whether Lasley subjectively recognized the danger.

However, if Defendant had reason to believe that the condition would harm Lasley despite its obviousness, Defendant had a duty to warn Lasley regarding the condition or to take other reasonable steps to protect Lasley.

(Id. at 8.)

In contrast, Defendant's proposed jury instructions contained general negligence principles. (Doc. 16.) Lasley submitted a memorandum objecting to general negligence jury instructions, arguing that the accident occurred on Defendant's premises, that Lasley was a business invitee, that Defendant had control over the unloading process and had knowledge of the dangers involved in unloading cattle panels. (Doc. 26.)

Defendant then submitted a brief arguing that this is not a premises liability case because it does not involve a condition on the land. (Doc. 30.) Defendant wrote, "the site where the accident occurred was property owned by the Defendant, but the condition of the property owned by the Defendant had nothing to do with the accident giving rise to the claim. Lasley was not injured by the condition of Running's land, but because he fell off his own truck." (Doc. 30 at p. 5.)

Recognizing that the circumstances of this case were different than the usual South Dakota premises liability case which is predicated on a property possessor's failure to warn or make safe dangerous or defective conditions on property, the Court carefully listened to all of the evidence presented at trial. The Court ultimately determined that Lasley's was not a premises liability case because it was based solely on alleged acts or omissions of Defendant's employees. The Court prepared a set of jury instructions incorporating general negligence principles and gave copies to the lawyers for each party. After the lawyers had time to review the instructions, the Court went through each instruction for objections. No objections were made to the Court's instructions during the settling of instructions. The jury was given the general negligence instructions.

During deliberations, the jury submitted three questions concerning a business's responsibility to individuals harmed on the property and a business's responsibility for the behavior of individuals on its property. (Docs. 36, 37.) Counsel for Lasley asked the Court to respond to the questions with premises liability principles, but that request was denied. The Court was in the process of drafting answers to the questions when the jury indicated that it had reached a verdict. (Doc. 38.) Before receiving the verdict, the Court completed the answers and a supplemental instruction was delivered to the jury:

Question No. 1:

If a customer is harmed/hurt on a business's property, is the business responsible?

The instruction in response from the Court is as follows:

The defendant business, Running Supply, Inc., can be liable to Plaintiff James Lasley if he meets the requirements as set out in the Court's written instructions. The fact alone that James Lasley was hurt while on the property of Running Supply, Inc. does not in and of itself make Running Supply, Inc. liable. The burdens of proof are set outin Instruction No. 13. That instruction and all other instructions must all be considered and followed by the jury.

Question No.2:

How responsible is a business for the behavior of individuals on their property?

The instruction in response from the Court is as follows:

As the Court stated in Instruction No. 11, "Any act or omission of an employee within the scope of his employment is the act or omission of the corporation for which he was then acting." There is no suggestion in this case that any employee of Defendant Running Supply, Inc. was outside the scope of his employment.

Question No.3:

Specifically, an individual allows themselves to walk into harm's way, and is not stopped. Can you site precidence, or is that asking too much?

The instruction in response from the Court is as follows:

Each case has different facts. I give you the law in the Instructions and you apply that law to the facts as the jury sees the facts to be. You have various Instructions on the doctrines of negligence as applied to Defendant Running Supply, Inc. and contributory negligence and assumption of risk as to Plaintiff James Lasley. Who has the burden of proving what is set forth in Instruction 13, but you have to consider all Instructions.

(Doc. 39, Supplemental Instruction No. 1.)

Shortly thereafter, the jury indicated that it had still reached a verdict. (Doc. 40....