Laspina v. SEIU Pa. State Council
| Decision Date | 11 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-2018 |
| Citation | 413 F.Supp.3d 383 |
| Parties | Bethany LASPINA, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SEIU PENNSYLVANIA STATE COUNCIL, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Edmond R. Shinn, Law Offices of Edmond R. Shinn, Esq., Ltd., Fort Washington, PA, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Mitchell Law PLLC, Austin, TX, Shannon W. Conway, Talcott J. Franklin, Talcott Franklin P.C., Dallas, TX, Walter S. Zimolong, Zimolong LLC, Villanova, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Lauren M. Hoye, Willig, Williams & Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, P. Casey Pitts, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, J. Timothy Hinton, Haggerty Hinton & Cosgrove LLP, Scranton, PA, for Defendants.
Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint ("SAC"), (Doc. 66), of plaintiff Bethany LaSpina filed by defendant union SEIU1 Pennsylvania State Council ("State Council"), (Doc. 53), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) since she was not a member of this union and, for failure to have Article III standing to pursue class action claims on behalf of members and former members of this union pursuant to 12(b)(1). State Council also contends that its affiliation with the union defendant to which she paid fees is not sufficient to confer on plaintiff standing to sue it or to state a claim against it. For the reasons that follow, State Council's motion to dismiss will be GRANTED and plaintiff's federal claims against this defendant will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .
Plaintiff claims that she was unconstitutionally required to pay union dues and, in Counts 1, 2 and 3 of her SAC, she raises federal claims against all defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 In particular, plaintiff alleges that her First Amendment rights were violated when Local 668 continued to take dues from her paycheck after she resigned her membership in the union, based on the Janus 4 decision, and after she told her employer (i.e., Scranton Public Library) to "halt the payroll deduction of union-related fees." With respect to the union defendants other than Local 668, plaintiff alleges that they "enforced unconstitutional agency shops before the Supreme Court's ruling in Janus and violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff class members by tapping their paychecks against their will."
Further, plaintiff seeks relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2201, requesting a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from accepting dues or fees unless the employees have given their consent to join the unions.
Plaintiff also raises state law claims against all defendants for conversion, trespass to chattels, replevin, restitution, and unjust enrichment.
In addition to SEIU Pennsylvania State Council, remaining defendants in this case are Local 668, Lackawanna County Public Library System, and Scranton Public Library.5
Plaintiff alleges that State Council "coordinates and unifies the collective political, administrative, and communication structures of all SEIU locals and districts throughout Pennsylvania." Plaintiff also alleges that the other four union defendants were "affiliated with" State Council. Additionally, plaintiff purports to bring claims on behalf of public employee members and former members of the defendant union affiliates of State Council alleging that they were unconstitutionally required to pay union dues and fair share fees. She seeks to raise First Amendment claims and state law claims on behalf of public employees who were allegedly forced to pay dues and fair share fees to the defendant union affiliates of State Council.
Plaintiff further purports to bring claims on behalf of all employees in bargaining units represented by affiliates of State Council who were subjected to union-related payroll deductions to which they did not knowingly consent.
As relief, plaintiff seeks a refund of all of the dues she paid to Local 668. Plaintiff also seeks to require the defendant unions to refund all dues and fees they received from her. Additionally, plaintiff seeks punitive damages for herself and for members of all defendant unions who resigned from the unions or requested that the unions stop taking dues or fees after the Janus decision and who continued to have dues or fees withdrawn from their pay. Further, plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief on her own behalf and behalf of class members who were subjected to union-related payroll deductions without their consent, and she requests the court to enjoin "[State Council] and its affiliates from taking money from any public employee until the union obtains a freely given and fully informed waiver of the employee's constitutional rights under Janus."
Plaintiff is proceeding on her SAC filed January 28, 2019. (Doc. 66). On January 14, 2019, State Council filed its original motion to dismiss.6 (Doc. 53).
The motion to dismiss of State Council has been briefed. (Docs. 55, 74 & 78).
The court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) because plaintiff avers violations of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. The court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. Venue is appropriate in this court since the alleged constitutional violations occurred in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
State Council argues that plaintiff's allegations against it fail to state a cognizable claim since plaintiff only alleges that she was a member of Local 668 and not that she was ever a member of State Council. State Council also states that all of the plaintiff's allegations regarding her constitutional claims concern Local 668 and do not relate to it. State Council contends that plaintiff fails to allege any facts related to any of the union defendants other than Local 668, and that she only allege that these other unions were affiliated with State Council. State Council further states that plaintiff fails to allege that it took any dues/fees from her or caused her any harm. As such, State Council contends that plaintiff does not state any facts that show it had any participation in the unlawful activities alleged in her SAC. It points out that "[plaintiff] neither alleges paying any dues or other money to [State] Council or its ever having represented her in any respect at her job", and that she fails to describe how State Council's alleged role as coordinating and unifying "the collective political, administrative, and communication structures of all SEIU locals and districts throughout Pennsylvania" "bears any relationship to the membership and dues issues she raises in this action."
Thus, State Council states that since plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that she was injured or caused any harm by it, her SAC against it should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since plaintiff lacks standing to sue it under Article III and, for failure to state a cognizable claim against it.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. She must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, she was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). See also Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (). Liability in a civil rights action under § 1983 cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003). Rather, liability under section 1983 is personal in nature and can only follow personal involvement by each defendant in the alleged wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997) () (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) ). Acquiescence exists where "a supervisor with authority over a subordinate knows that the subordinate is violating someone's rights but fails to act to stop the subordinate from doing so." Festa v. Jordan, 803 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Further, "[a]llegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity." Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Plaintiff has failed to allege that State Council was personally involved in the violation of her constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not allege that she was ever a member of State Council, that State Council took any dues/fees from her or that State Council failed to advise her of her right not to join Local 668. Further, plaintiff does not allege that State Council participated in or acquiesced in the alleged unlawful activities of Local 668. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was essentially forced to join Local 668 since she was not advised of her right not to join the union and forced to pay this union dues, and that even though she resigned her membership with Local 668, it continued to take dues from her pay. However, plaintiff does not allege any facts to show that State Council played any role or had any involvement with the alleged unlawful conduct of Local 668 with respect to membership and dues. Nor can plaintiff attempt to hold this State Council or any defendant vicariously liable for...
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