Lassen v. Hoyt Livery, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 August 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:13–cv–01529 (VAB).
• Citation: 120 F.Supp.3d 165
• Parties: Roger LASSEN, Jr., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. HOYT LIVERY, INC., Santo Silvestro, and Lynda Silvestro, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

120 F.Supp.3d 165

Roger LASSEN, Jr., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff,

v.HOYT LIVERY, INC., Santo Silvestro, and Lynda Silvestro, Defendants.

Case No. 3:13–cv–01529 (VAB).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed Aug. 5, 2015.

Anthony J. Pantuso, III, Erick Ignacio Diaz–Vazquez, Margaret B. Ferron, Richard Eugene Hayber, Hayber Law Firm LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Barry J. Miller, Anthony S. Califano, Seyfarth Shaw, Boston, MA, Jan A. Marcus, Keidel, Weldon & Cunningham, LLP, Wilton, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Roger Lassen, Jr., brought this action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals against Defendants, Hoyt Livery, Inc., Santo Silvestro, and Lynda Silvestro, under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act ("CMWA"), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–58 et seq. The Complaint [Doc. No. 1] asserts claims under three counts: (1) a collective action claim under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA ("Count One"); (2) a class action claim for violation of the overtime provisions of the CMWA ("Count Two"); and (3) a class action claim for illegal deductions in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–71e ("Count Three").

On September 17, 2014, the Court conditionally certified a collective action under § 216(b) of the FLSA and a class action under Rule 23 for the CMWA claims.¹ Doc. No. 43. Plaintiffs now move for partial summary judgment on the issue of Defendants' liability on Counts One and Two of the Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. Factual Background²

For nearly three years, plaintiff Roger Lassen, Jr., worked as a limousine driver for defendant Hoyt Livery, Inc. ("Hoyt Livery" or "the company"), a Connecticut company owned by defendants Santo Silvestro and Lynda Silvestro that provides transportation services to individuals in the state and surrounding areas, including the New York metropolitan area. See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 65 ¶ 1, 65–7 ¶¶ 4–5. Santo Silvestro serves as president and treasurer of the company, while Lynda Silvestro is secretary, vice president, and chief financial officer and is responsible for overseeing human resources.See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 65 ¶¶ 4–5, 65–7 ¶ 3, 21–5, at 6. Both the Silvestros are responsible for determining the rate and method of payment to Hoyt Livery's limousine drivers, and for ensuring the company's compliance with state and federal wage and hour laws. See, e.g., Doc. No. 65 ¶¶ 9, 13.

Plaintiff Lassen and all other limousine drivers at Hoyt Livery were paid in accordance with a commission-based system. See, e.g., Doc. No. 21–4, at 18–19. Under this system, limousine drivers were assigned by a dispatcher to work trips requested by customers, and the assigned driver would earn 40% of whatever fee was charged to the customer for the requested trip. That 40% figure included two components: 25% was designated as a "commission," while 15% was designated as a "built-in gratuity."³ Hoyt Livery requires its full-time drivers to be available six days a week. See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 42–2 ¶ 3, 42–4 ¶ 13.

Hoyt Livery further requires its full-time drivers to perform certain activities for which they receive no additional compensation beyond the 40% commission. For example, Hoyt Livery provides customers with one "free" hour of wait time for pick-up at an airport, for which drivers do not receive any compensation. Nor does the company provide any additional compensation to drivers for time spent driving to a pick-up location without a customer in the vehicle. Additionally, drivers are expected to maintain their assigned company vehicle, bring company vehicles assigned to them in for service, check their vehicle's fluids, wash and wax their vehicle, take the vehicle to an auto body shop if necessary, bring the vehicle to an auto repair shop for regular oil changes and transmission service, and rotate the vehicle's tires—all without additional compensation. See, e.g., Doc. No. 21–4, at 21–29.

Limousine drivers at Hoyt Livery are required to maintain daily trip tickets and weekly trip logs in order to be paid. The daily trip tickets include information about the customer's name and destination, as well as the price that the customer is charged and the driver's mileage on each trip. The weekly trip logs indicate the date, place of pick-up and drop-off, and the mileage of the round trip, among other information. Hoyt Livery also uses a computer software system to track trips made by its drivers and to calculate the commission earned by each driver. While the software system has an option to track the hours worked by drivers, defendants did not utilize that feature. Until July 2013, Hoyt Livery did not maintain any hourly time records for its limousine drivers. See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 21–5, at 12–21, 65–3, at 6.

In addition, Hoyt Livery's drivers did not receive more money if they worked more than forty hours in a week. Drivers earned the same "flat rate" 40% commission per trip no matter how many hours they had worked or trips they had taken in a week. See, e.g., Doc. No. 21–4, at 30. However, that policy has changed and, at present, Defendants do pay their drivers "[o]ne and a half times their weekly commission" when they work more than forty hours in a workweek. See, e.g., Doc. No. 42–10, at 5.

II. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir.2005). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not try issues of fact, but must leave those issues to the jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, the trial court's task is "carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined ... to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994).

"[T]he moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment." United Transp. Union v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 F.3d 805, 809 (2d Cir.2009). Once the moving party has satisfied that burden, in order to defeat the motion, "the party opposing summary judgment ... must set forth ‘specific facts' demonstrating that there is ‘a genuine issue for trial.’ " Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ). Summary judgment is inappropriate only if the issue to be resolved is both genuine and related to a material fact. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. An issue is "genuine ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks omitted). A material fact is one that would "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. Only those facts that must be decided in order to resolve a claim or defense will prevent summary judgment from being granted. Immaterial or minor facts will not prevent summary judgment. See Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir.1990).

When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must "assess the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and ... draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000). However, the inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant must be supported by evidence. "[M]ere speculation and conjecture" is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir.1997), as is the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position," Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Discussion

A. Applicable Law

Under the FLSA, "no employer shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Similarly, under the CMWA, "[n]o employer, except as otherwise provided herein, shall employ any of his employees for a workweek longer than forty hours, unless such employee receives remuneration for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–76c. The Connecticut Supreme Court has indicated that, in interpreting the CMWA, federal precedent interpreting analogous provisions of the FLSA can be used. Roto–Rooter Servs. Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 219 Conn. 520, 528 n. 8, 593 A.2d 1386 (Conn.1991).

B. Liability

Plaintiffs argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried with respect to the issue of Defendants' liability under the FLSA and CMWA overtime provisions. Defendants have not argued that Plaintiffs are exempt employees under the FLSA or the CMWA or disputed that Plaintiffs were their "employees" and they were Plaintiffs' "employers." As a result, Plaintiffs were entitled to receive overtime compensation if they worked more than forty hours in any workweek. Thus, the only question is whether the evidence shows, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Defendants, that any plaintiff worked more...