Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co.

• Citation: 102 Conn. 76,128 A. 117
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 23 February 1925
• Parties: LASSEN v. STAMFORD TRANSIT CO.

128 A. 117

102 Conn. 76

LASSEN v. STAMFORD TRANSIT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 23, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Christopher L. Avery Judge.

Action by Joseph D. Lassen (Lassen & Last) against the Stamford Transit Company for damages to plaintiff's automobile by negligence of defendant's servant in bringing his automobile into collision with plaintiff's. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $850. Motion to set aside verdict and for new trial denied, and defendant appeals. No error.

Raymond E. Hackett, of Stamford, for appellant.

Matthew H. Kenealy, of Stamford, for appellee.

HAINES, J.

The plaintiff claims that on the 10th of November, 1923, his duly registered automobile was being driven by his agent toward the railroad station at Stamford; that upon nearing the station, and while upon his right-hand side of the traveled way and going in in a westerly direction, he met an automobile driven by an agent of the defendant and going easterly; that, when the machines had approached within 10 feet of each other, the defendant's agent lost control of the car he was driving, swerved to the left and struck the plaintiff's car, causing a considerable damage to it. The plaintiff seeks to recover the cost of making the repairs made necessary by this injury, for the loss of the use of his machine, its loss in value, and the loss of earnings of the machine for a period while repairs were being made. It is claimed that the collision was caused solely by the negligence of the defendant's agent, and that such agent was then upon the defendant's business, and acting within the scope of his employment. Upon appeal to this court, counsel filed a stipulation which has restricted the matters to be considered to the controlling question which we are asked to pass upon, which is whether the driver of the defendant's car was the employee or agent of the defendant at the time of the collision, and acting within the scope of his employment, and upon the employer's business, rendering the employer responsible for his admitted negligence.

The plaintiff called to the stand the president and manager of the defendant company, who testified that the company was incorporated, and had an exclusive concession from the railroad company for handling the taxicab business at this station, and had maintained an office there for that purpose for several years before the occasion in question. He further stated that the company advertised its business in the newspapers; that it called attention in these advertisements to the fact that there were 20 odd cars at the station, and these were shown in a picture, accompanied with a statement of the service rendered by the company which included all kinds of automobile service, and that in none of these advertisements had there ever appeared a statement that these cars did not belong to the company. It also appeared from the statements of the same witness that his company operated 27 cars in the conduct of the business, the cars standing in the name and being owned by the individual drivers, and that the company itself owned 3 hearses. It was also explained by this witness that, when a driver did not have money to buy a car, the company sometimes loaned him the necessary amount; that the company solicited all the business, and designated the driver who was to take a passenger in his car, but did not direct the driver as to how the passenger was to be conducted to his destination. He further stated that the cash fares were paid by the passenger to the driver, who turned the full amount in at the office of the company at the station, and, if a charge was made for a fare in lieu of cash, this was reported to the office by the driver, and was entered by the company on its books, and the responsibility for its collection from the passenger rested with the company, and not with the driver. For the services thus rendered by the drivers with their machines, they received from the company, four times each month, a sum representing 75 per cent. of the business which the driver had done for such cash or credit. The title, maintenance, and handling of the taxicabs remained with the drivers themselves. The company exercised the right to " hire and fire" these drivers.

It was further stated by this witness that, on the night in question, Santors was in the " employ" of the company as a driver for the defendant company and " working" for them, and that under that arrangement he had a passenger with him who had been procured by the company. The effect of the stipulation referred to is to rest the case upon the testimony appearing in the record.

The driver was obviously either the employee and agent of the company, or he was an independent contractor. If the former relation existed, then the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff in this case, otherwise not.

We have heretofore had occasion to state the legal incidents of each relation and these principles are well established. " An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to the control of his employer, except as...