Lassiter v. Labcorp Occupational Testing Services

• Decision Date: 21 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.1:03CV00771.,CIV.1:03CV00771.
• Citation: 337 F.Supp.2d 746
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Sandra LASSITER, Plaintiff, v. LABCORP OCCUPATIONAL TESTING SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

337 F.Supp.2d 746

Sandra LASSITER, Plaintiff, v. LABCORP OCCUPATIONAL TESTING SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.1:03CV00771.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

September 21, 2004.

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James Edward Hairston, Jr., Olubayo O. Agbetunsin, Law Offices of James E. Hairston, Jr., Durham, NC, for Plaintiff.

Paul K. Sun, Jr., Ellis & Winters, LLP, Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Durham County, North Carolina, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). Defendant timely removed the action. Plaintiff asserts a claim based on gender discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. Before the court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. Also before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. For reasons set forth below, the court will deny in part and grant in part Defendant's motion to dismiss, and grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

FACTS

Sandra Lassiter ("Plaintiff") is an African-American female who was an at-will employee of LabCorp Occupational Testing Services, Inc. ("Defendant"). Defendant is a diagnostic and clinical testing laboratory.

At all times relevant to this matter Plaintiff worked in Defendant's confirmations department as a team leader. Plaintiff's responsibilities as team leader included reviewing and assigning work; researching, troubleshooting, and following up on customer inquiries and problems; training employees; performing administrative functions as determined by her supervisor; and having knowledge of office equipment and computer experience. The purpose of Defendant's confirmations department is to retest samples that initially test positive to reconfirm the results. In Defendant's confirmations department, clerks report to team leaders, who report to supervisors, who report to managers. During the events most pertinent to this matter, Plaintiff's supervisor was Molly Fares ("Fares") and Plaintiff's manager was Don Jarrell ("Jarrell").

On September 11, 2002, Defendant issued Plaintiff a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP") as a result of matching the wrong bottle in the Pl matching process.¹ The PIP stated that the "[f]ailure to follow departmental performance standards for Pl matching ... will result in termination of your employment with LabCorp." (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 3.) Both Plaintiff and Fares signed the PIP.

In fall of 2002, Jarrell instructed Plaintiff to cease pre-labeling control sampling bottles. The purpose behind Jarrell's instruction was to increase quality control measures. Plaintiff was told to "get rid of the pre-labeled bottles" and understood the importance of the new policy. (Def.'s Notice of Filing, Ex. A, Lassiter Dep. at 49-50, 52-55.)

On December 12, 2002, Plaintiff conversed with Wanda Johnson ("Johnson"), a manager employed by Defendant. Johnson made an off-color comment about the size of Plaintiff's breasts. Johnson apologized to Plaintiff immediately after making the comment. Although Plaintiff asserts that she was not offended or upset by the comment, Plaintiff discussed the interchange with her peers. (Id. at 57.)

On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff asked Fares whether a female manager could sexually harass a female employee.² Fares overheard Plaintiff and others discussing the inappropriate comment. Fares later learned that the inappropriate comment was made by Johnson.

Fares went to Defendant's human resources department to inquire about the proper handling of the incident. Defendant's human resources department directed Fares to instruct Plaintiff to write out a statement of what happened and to return it to them.

Fares delivered an inter-office envelope to Plaintiff and instructed Plaintiff to write out a statement of the incident and to return it to the human resources department. Fares did not direct Plaintiff to lie about the incident nor did she instruct Plaintiff to label the incident as sexual harassment. Plaintiff adamantly refused to make a written account of the incident. Plaintiff stressed that she was not upset about Johnson's comment and did not consider it sexual harassment.

In mid-December 2002, Defendant determined that two separate batches of samples failed because Plaintiff incorrectly set up the tests. Defendant determined that Plaintiff failed to put the quality control material in the correct vials. (Def.'s Br. Supp. Mots. Dismiss and Summ. J., Ex. B, Fares Dep. at 89-90.) Other employees' batches also failed during this time period and resulted in no adverse employment action against the employees. Defendant maintains that instrument problems, rather than employee error, caused the other employees' batch failures.

Also in mid-December 2002, Fares found pre-labeled bottles in the confirmations department in direct violation of Jarrell's instructions to Plaintiff. While Plaintiff may not have caused the presence of the pre-labeled vials, they were present in the department under Plaintiff's supervision.

On December 31, 2002, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. As justification for Plaintiff's termination, Defendant cited performance issues including the failed batches and the continued presence of pre-labeled bottles contrary to Jarrell's instructions.

After Plaintiff's termination, Defendant discovered entries in a logbook indicating that Plaintiff falsified temperature readings of a freezer.

In early January 2003, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Plaintiff's formal EEOC charge cited retaliation as the sole basis of Defendant's discrimination. Plaintiff based her retaliation claim on her refusal to comply with Fares's request that Plaintiff document the inappropriate comment for the human resources department. Plaintiff never amended her charge against Defendant to include other claims.

On March 28 2003, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff received the letter by April 1, 2003.

On June 26, 2003, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed for an extension of time to file a complaint under Rule 3 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in the Durham County Superior Court. The court issued a summons on that day. Plaintiff then filed her complaint on July 15, 2003, within the twenty-day extension granted by the state court.

Defendant subsequently removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff Timely Filed her Complaint

Dismissal is appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir.1996). "A complaint showing that the statute of limitations has run on the claim is the most common situation in which the affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleading" and dismissal is appropriate. 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 352 (2d ed.1990).

Title VII provides that an aggrieved party may bring an action within ninety days of notice from the EEOC of a final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The statute does not specify the means necessary to commence an action. See id. ("[W]ithin ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought.").

A plaintiff may file suit alleging a violation of Title VII in either state or federal court. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990) ("To give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an exercise of its powers under the supremacy clause, affirmatively divest state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction."). Generally, a plaintiff must file a complaint to initiate a Title VII action in federal district court. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate the filing of a complaint commences an action in federal court). But see Page v. Arkansas Dep't Corr., 222 F.3d 453, 454 (8th Cir.2000) (concluding that litigant commenced a Title VII proceeding despite her failure to file a complaint when she submitted to the court a letter requesting assistance in filing a lawsuit and attaching a copy of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter and initial charge). A plaintiff may have alternate means for initiating a Title VII action in state court, however, depending on the state's statutory methods for commencing lawsuits. See, e.g., Vail v. Harleysville Group, Inc., No. CIV.A.2002-CV-02933, 2002 WL 32172799 (E.D.Pa.2003) (finding that plaintiff's compliance with Pennsylvania procedural requirements for commencing a lawsuit, despite failure to file a complaint within the ninety-day period, satisfied Title VII); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 872 F.Supp. 203, 205 (W.D.Pa.1994) (observing that Section 2000e-5(f)(1) "contains no reference at all to [filing] a `complaint,'" and finding that "the statute requires only that a civil action be brought within the 90-day limitations period, but it does not specify the manner of commencing the `civil action.'")

The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not limit the commencement of a lawsuit to the filing of a complaint. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 3(a). A plaintiff may, alternatively, commence an action by filing for an extension of time and by securing a summons from the state court. Id. Merely filing an application for an extension of time is insufficient; a plaintiff must have a summons issued within the relevant statutory period to sustain his claims. See, e.g., Sink v. Easter, 284 N.C. 555, 558, 202 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1974) (concluding that plaintiff's state law suit was...