Lassiter v. Topeka Unified School Dist. No. 501, 04-2213-JWL.
Decision Date | 17 December 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 04-2213-JWL.,04-2213-JWL. |
Citation | 347 F.Supp.2d 1033 |
Parties | Sandra LASSITER, Plaintiff, v. TOPEKA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 501, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Laronna L. Saunders, Olathe, KS, for Plaintiff.
N. Larry Bork, Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, Topeka, KS, for Defendants.
This lawsuit arises from events culminating in plaintiff Sandra Lassiter's departure from the employment of defendant Topeka Unified School District No. 501. Plaintiff asserts civil rights and state law claims against the school district, the school board, and certain school district personnel in their individual capacities. This matter is presently before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 22), which the court construes as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it was filed after defendants filed their answer to plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons explained below, defendants' motion is granted without prejudice to plaintiff filing an amended complaint on or before January 3, 2005.
Plaintiff was an employee of the school district for thirty-three years as a counselor, teacher, and administrator, and in all of those years she had never had any grievance or disciplinary actions taken against her until the events that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred. At that time, she was a principal at Quinton Heights Elementary School. In March of 2002, six teachers at Quinton Heights made false allegations against her to her supervisor, defendant Barbara Davis, who was the Director of Elementary Education for the school district. Ms. Davis did not tell plaintiff about those false allegations at that time, but instead waited and told plaintiff about the allegations around May 13, 2002. On May 14, 2002, plaintiff met with the then-superintendent of the school district, defendant Robert McFrazier, and informed him that the allegations were bogus. She asked Mr. McFrazier how to deal with the staff and the situation at the school. He did not give her any suggestions, limitations, or restrictions on what she could say to the staff regarding the allegations. Plaintiff requested that Mr. McFrazier have an impartial officer conduct an investigation and speak with the other twenty-four staff members at Quinton Heights regarding the allegations. Mr. McFrazier, however, did not have an investigation performed at that time.
Plaintiff had previously scheduled an end-of-year staff meeting for May 15, 2002. At that meeting, in addition to the regular agenda, plaintiff informed the staff that she had requested that an impartial officer come and speak with the staff regarding the concerns that had been raised. That same day, plaintiff was suspended2 despite the fact that she had not been instructed not to discuss the matter with staff. On May 17, 2002, Mr. McFrazier asked plaintiff to return to the school the following Monday, May 20, 2002. He did not offer her any explanation regarding the suspension, the allegations, or the investigation.
An investigation into the allegations began on or about June 6, 2002. Plaintiff spoke with the investigator on or about June 17, 2002. At that time, the investigator informed her that the results of the investigation were favorable to her and would be submitted to Mr. McFrazier that same day. Approximately one week later, plaintiff asked the school district's attorney, Joe Zima, when the results of the investigation would be made available to clear her of the allegations. Mr. Zima informed plaintiff that results are usually disclosed immediately and that he would find out why the results had not yet been given to her.
More than a month later, on July 25, 2002, Mr. McFrazier scheduled a meeting with plaintiff to inform her of the results of the investigation. Plaintiff was apprehensive about the way Mr. McFrazier had appeared to be handling the investigation and also about the amount of time that he had let pass before informing plaintiff about the results of the investigation. Consequently, plaintiff brought two persons to be witnesses at the meeting. When they arrived at the meeting, Mr McFrazier was upset with the presence of these third-party witnesses. Although he had never told plaintiff that she could not bring witnesses to the meeting, he cited her with insubordination and wrote her a remand letter.
On July 31, 2002, plaintiff attended the rescheduled meeting with Mr. McFrazier and Ms. Davis. At that meeting, Mr. McFrazier informed plaintiff that she would be on probationary status for the 2002-2003 school year because of an evaluation performed by Ms. Davis. That evaluation was based on the false allegations despite the fact that those allegations had been cleared by the investigation.
During the first semester of the 2002-2003 school year, plaintiff experienced harassment and a series of trumped up charges and attacks against her by Mr. McFrazier and Ms. Davis. Those complaints ranged from making it difficult to hire paraprofessionals to criticizing plaintiff's school plan and curriculum, which is the same plan the school district now utilizes. On or about December 4, 2002, Mr. McFrazier gave plaintiff a document consisting of questions relating to the same false allegations, despite the results of the investigation dismissing those claims. Mr. McFrazier instructed plaintiff to respond to the questions within five days. Plaintiff retained counsel to assist in responding to the questions.
On January 3, 2003, Mr. McFrazier suspended plaintiff and informed her that he was going to request that she be terminated because he did not agree with her responses to the questions. At that point, plaintiff and her attorney requested a due process hearing. On January 10, 2004, a meeting took place with the president of the school board, plaintiff, Mr. McFrazier, Ms. Davis, and the parties' attorneys. On January 15, 2003, plaintiff's attorney sent a letter stating that plaintiff intended to pursue a due process hearing before the entire school board. The hearing before the school board was set for February 7, 2003. Before that date, plaintiff and her attorney learned that the school board was intending to terminate plaintiff at the behest of Mr. McFrazier and Ms. Davis.
On February 7, 2003, plaintiff entered into a resolution of personnel matter with Mr. McFrazier as superintendent of the school district.3 By virtue of the resolution, Mr. McFrazier withdrew his recommendation that plaintiff be terminated, plaintiff withdrew her request for a due process hearing, plaintiff was re-assigned to an administrative position within the school district for the remainder of the school year, and it was agreed that she would be considered for employment within the district the following school year which would be determined based on her compliance with her probation terms, successfully completing the school year, and the normal evaluation process. The resolution also included a confidentiality clause and a waiver and release of liability from the events surrounding plaintiff's evaluation in June of 2002, the fact that she was placed on probation on or about July 31, 2002, and Mr. McFrazier's January 3, 2003, recommendation that she be terminated. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. McFrazier and Ms. Davis breached the confidentiality provision of the resolution by sharing confidential information with members of the public.
Plaintiff completed the 2002-2003 school year with a satisfactory evaluation. On April 30, 2003, she met with Mr. McFrazier concerning the completion of her probationary status. He informed her that her probationary status was complete and that he would "take care of it later." At the end of June, Mr. McFrazier retired without having cleared plaintiff's probationary status.
On July 1, 2003, defendant Tony Sawyer took office as superintendent of the school district. Plaintiff met with him on or about August 1, 2003, explained the circumstances surrounding her probation, and asked him to clear her probationary status. Mr. Sawyer responded that he did not want to touch the situation and refused to do anything about her probationary status. Plaintiff expressed concern to Mr. Sawyer that she was in a position "created" by Mr. McFrazier and that it was a position for which she was qualified, but not certified. In fact, on plaintiff's evaluation the school administration had stated that it was concerned with this created position. Plaintiff told Mr. Sawyer that she was concerned that she might be vulnerable to the same type of attacks that she experienced the previous school year if she remained in an uncertified position. She further explained to Mr. Sawyer that Mr. McFrazier had been aware of this dilemma, but his attitude had been that plaintiff could either retire or stay in this susceptible position. Mr. Sawyer agreed that plaintiff's options were to either stay in that vulnerable position or retire, but he refused to clear her probationary status. Plaintiff appealed to the school board numerous times, but the school board refused to provide any recourse or clear the probationary status. Plaintiff alleges that because defendants kept her in an uncertified position on probationary status she could easily have been terminated, which would have impacted her retirement benefits. Thus, she was forced to retire.
Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the school district, the school board, and Mr. McFrazier, Ms. Davis, and Mr. Sawyer in their individual capacities. Plaintiff asserts seven separate claims, entitled: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendments due process rights; (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) breach of contract; (5) negligence under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. § 75-6103; (6)...
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