Lastrape v. Barnhart, 1:03 CV 1392.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:03 CV 1392.,1:03 CV 1392. |
| Citation | 376 F.Supp.2d 704 |
| Parties | Lawrence LASTRAPE v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Lawrence Lastrape (pro se plaintiff), for Plaintiff.
Gregory White, Social Sec. Admin., Dallas, TX, Tina M. Waddell, Office of Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec. Admin., Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
The Court heretofore ordered that this matter be referred to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, for consideration pursuant to applicable law and orders of this Court. The Court has received and considered the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to such order, along with record, pleadings and all available evidence. No objections to the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed by the parties.
Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the United States Magistrate Judge are correct, and the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge ADOPTED. A final Judgment will be entered separately, affirming the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action.
This case is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review, hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.1
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration's (SSA) decision denying his application for Social Security disability benefits. United States district courts may review such decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2003). However, Congress limits the scope of judicial review to determinations as to whether (a) the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir.1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.1992). Moreover, if proper principles of law were applied, and the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co., 305 U.S. 197, 230, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff applied on November 6, 2001 (Tr. 77, 297), claiming disability due to "high blood pressure, diabetes, asthma" (Tr. 104). In a "Reconsideration Disability Report," plaintiff also claimed disabling chest pain (Tr. 133).
Plaintiff's claim was denied initially (Tr. 45) and upon reconsideration (Tr. 46). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") (Tr. 59). ALJ Gerald Meyer convened an evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2003, at which plaintiff appeared without representation.
At the evidentiary hearing ALJ Meyer received direct testimony from plaintiff, a medical expert,2 and a vocational expert.3 The remaining evidentiary record consisted of reports and treatment notes from treating sources;4 treating physician's statement;5 and Case Assessments completed by two medical consultants6 contracted by Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services Division for Disability Determination Services.7
ALJ Meyer concluded that plaintiff is not disabled. Specifically, he found that plaintiff's combination of impairments — diabetes mellitus, asthma, and hypertension — do not prevent him from performing work at the "sedentary exertional level," with "no exposure to dust, fumes, noxious odors, mists, gases, and poor ventilation." Tr. 16, Finding 7. He therefore found that plaintiff "was not under a `disability,' as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision." Tr. 16, Finding 13.
Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court ordered the Commissioner to file a transcript of administrative proceedings (Dkt. No. 11), and requested that the Commissioner accompany the transcript with a motion for summary judgment should the Commissioner advocate affirming the administrative disposition (Dkt. No. 12). On June 17, 2004, the Commissioner filed the administrative transcript and a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 13. The Commissioner argues that plaintiff's evidence failed to demonstrate disability, and that ALJ Meyer's decision is supported by substantial evidence of record.
Plaintiff's response disagrees. Plaintiff points to evidence which plaintiff perceives as favoring his application, and personally attests that he is in fact disabled and unable to perform the work that ALJ Meyer concluded he can do. Plaintiff asks the court to accept this evidence and find him disabled. Plaintiff also argues that the Commissioner's brief is inaccurate when stating that plaintiff took Maalox for pain relief. Plaintiff argues that he takes prescribed Prevacid instead. Id. at p. 4.
The Commissioner's motion defends her decision rather than impugning it. The court cannot reasonably expect more. To order the Commissioner to ferret out possible errors and argue them in plaintiff's behalf would, at best, be akin to asking the fox to guard the hen house.
The lay plaintiff, predictably, invites the court to re-weigh the evidence and direct the Commissioner to award benefits. Plaintiff's unfamiliarity with legal terms of art such as "substantial evidence" and lack of expertise in arcane rules governing administrative adjudication of social security applications handicap plaintiff in articulating cognizable grounds for judicial review.
The parties' submissions, while useful in the sense of getting the administrative record before the court and for familiarizing the court with basic contentions, do not focus well on the critical issues that courts can address in limited judicial review under Section 405(g). The court, therefore, must function sua sponte to a great extent.
No statute, regulation or court decision prescribes a precise analytical model for pro se actions seeking judicial review of adverse administrative decisions by the Commissioner of Social Security. Necessarily, the level of scrutiny rests in sound discretion of each reviewing court. However, several universal principles factor logically into that equation. Courts must construe pro se pleadings and arguments liberally in light of a party's lay status, but must zealously guard their raison d'être as neutral and unbiased arbiters. Courts are not bound to "scour the record for every conceivable error,"8 but fundamental fairness and interests of justice require that courts not disregard obvious errors, especially when a lay litigant's ignorance may cause legal errors to go unrecognized.
To strike a fair balance, the court should engage in more than a superficial review of the Commissioner's decision. However, since the court is not an advocate, it has no duty to plumb the depths of every facet of the administrative process. How deeply to probe is inherently imprecise, and most likely governed by unique facts of any given case. In this instance, however, the undersigned elects to examine the decision to the same extent as would an experienced lawyer when advising a potential client regarding advisability of pursuing an action for judicial review. This approach assumes that the practitioner is experienced in the subject matter, and willing, but not compelled, to represent the plaintiff. It further assumes that the practitioner's first exposure to the case is after the Commissioner's decision has become final.
A seasoned practitioner would first examine whether the Commissioner's decision generally reflects the protocol established under the Commissioner's own regulations. Next, the practitioner would focuses on ALJ Meyer's critical findings, and review them for compliance with applicable law. Finally, the practitioner would examine the evidentiary record to determine whether substantial evidence supports those critical findings.
Plaintiff proceeded pro se before ALJ Meyer, who could not proceed without first securing a valid waiver of the claimant's right to counsel.9 Moreover, upon receiving a valid waiver, ALJ Meyer then had a heightened duty to "scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.'" Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir.1978)); see also Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912, 102 S.Ct. 1263, 71 L.Ed.2d 452 (1982); Gullett v. Chater, 973 F.Supp. at 622.10
Here, ALJ Meyer complied with both responsibilities. Plaintiff received notice of his right to counsel both in writing and again orally before the evidentiary hearing. ALJ Meyer informed plaintiff of his right to counsel and advised him of the assistance a representative could provide in advancing his case. He identified possible sources of free counsel and explained contingency arrangements. He informed plaintiff regarding limitation of attorney fees to twenty-five percent of past due benefits. Plaintiff nevertheless chose to proceed with the hearing and represent himself, stating:
"[N]o one knows me better than me."
Tr. 23. ALJ Meyer fulfilled his duty to fully inform plaintiff regarding right to counsel.
Second, ALJ Meyer amply developed the evidentiary record. He allowed plaintiff to testify fully, and he helped to clarify, amplify and focus that testimony through helpful questioning. ALJ Meyer actively solicited plaintiff's own description of...
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...under the evidence, and the ALJ's ultimate determination is consistent with the expert vocational testimony." Lastrape v. Barnhart, 376 F. Supp. 2d 704, 715 (E.D. Tex. 2005), reportand recommendation adopted (Apr. 21, 2005) (citing Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1988)). Here, the A......