Latham v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 01 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-180J |
| Parties | WILLIAM LATHAM, JR. Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
AND NOW, this 1st day of October, 2012, upon due consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 13) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 10) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains the reasons for doing so. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F. 3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those findings, even if it would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F. 3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.2001). These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed his pending application for DIB on June 15, 2007, alleging a disability onset date of February 15, 1999, due to carpal tunnel syndrome, bad knees, back problems, impaired hearing, acid reflux disease, allergies, post-traumatic stress disorder and impaired vision.1 Plaintiff's application was denied initially. At plaintiff's request an ALJ held a hearing on October 1, 2008, at which plaintiff appeared and testified. On October 20, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. On July 7, 2009, the Appeals Council denied review making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff was 51 years old on his date last insured which is classified as a person closely approaching advanced age under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1563(d). Plaintiff has at least a high school education and has past relevant work experience as a power plant superintendent, which the ALJ classified as light,skilled work. He did not engage in any substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period of August 21, 2001, through December 31, 2004.
After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of history of carpal tunnel syndrome, history of knee surgery, shoulder and back pain, major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, those impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
The ALJ further found that although plaintiff's impairments preclude him from returning to his past relevant work, through the date last insured, plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work with numerous restrictions recognizing the limiting effects of his impairments,2 including, inter alia, that plaintiff must "avoid more than occasionalstanding and walking, 2 hours out of an 8 hour day." (R. 23).
Taking into account these limiting effects, a vocational expert identified numerous categories of light jobs which plaintiff could perform based upon his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, including the light, unskilled jobs of routing clerk, inspector/packer and shoe packer, and, significantly, the sedentary, unskilled jobs of final assembler and product inspector. Relying on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, plaintiff was capable of making an adjustment to work which existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act at any time during the relevant time period.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423 (d) (1) (A) . The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ...." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether aclaimant is under a disability.3 20 C.F.R. §404.1520; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F. 3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003) . If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, the claim need not be reviewed further. Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003) .
Here, plaintiff raises several challenges to the ALJ's finding of not disabled: (1) the ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff has the residual factual capacity to perform "light work" where the ALJ further limited him to "occasional standing and walking, 2 hours out of an 8 hour day;" (2) because the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding limits plaintiff to, at most, sedentary work, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, or "grids," dictate a finding of disabled; (3) the ALJ improperly relied on the vocational expert's testimony where the ALJ's hypothetical to the vocational expert was less restrictive than the residual functional capacity finding and where the ALJ failed to resolve conflicts between the jobs identified by the vocational expert and the descriptions of those jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT").
Upon review, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding and his finding that through plaintiff's date last insured jobs existed in the national economy that plaintiff could have performed both are supported by substantial evidence.
At step 5 of the sequential evaluation process the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform consistent with his medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(f). Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a); Farqnoli, 247 F.3d at 40.
Here, the ALJ found that:
"through the date last insured, [plaintiff] had the residual factual capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), except that [he] had to avoid more than occasional standing or walking, two hours out of an eight hour work day ...."
(R. 23) .
Plaintiff's primary argument is that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding that plaintiff is limited to stand or walking "two hours out of an eight-hour work day" is so restrictive as to effectively preclude him from performing even a limited range of light work as it is defined in the regulations. However, while the ALJ's finding precludes plaintiff from performing the standing or walking requirements of light work, thedefinition of light work set forth in the regulations nevertheless allows for the performance of some jobs which involve sitting most of the time.
Initially, as plaintiff correctly notes, under the regulations and rulings, standing and walking "no more than two hours" is the maximum amount that an individual limited to sedentary work can do. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, the regulations recognize that "a certain amount of standing and walking are required occasionally in carrying out job duties." 20 C.F.R. §404.1567(a). SSR 83-10 states that "since being on one's feet is required 'occasionally' at the sedentary level of exertion, periods of standing or walking should generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday." See also SSR 96-9p ().
Nevertheless, the restrictions set forth in the ALJ's residual functional capacity are compatible with the definition of light work set forth in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1567(b) defines "light work" as work which involves lifting no more than 20 pounds with frequent lifting of up to 10 pounds. The regulation further instructs that "[e]ven though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of leg and arm controls."
SSR 83-10 expands upon the definition of light work. That ruling instructs that a job may be categorized as light when it "involves sitting most of the time but with some pushing and pulling of arm-hand or leg-foot controls, which require greater exertion than in sedentary work, e.g., mattress sewing machine operator, motor-grader operator and road-roller operator."
Here, while the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding restricting plaintiff to only occasional standing or walking effectively precludes plaintiff from doing the standing or walking necessary for the full range of light work, it does not preclude him from performing the lifting requirements of light work, nor from performing sitting jobs that may require "some pushing and pulling of arm-hand or leg-foot controls, which...
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