Latham v. Link, Civil Action No. 16-1005

• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
• Decision Date: 15 May 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16-1005
• Citation: Latham v. Link, Civil Action No. 16-1005 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2019)
• Parties: SHONTEE LATHAM, Petitioner, v. CYNTHIA LINK, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, and THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF LAWRENCE, Respondents.

SHONTEE LATHAM, Petitioner, v. CYNTHIA LINK, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,and THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF LAWRENCE, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 16-1005

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 15, 2019

Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

OPINION AND ORDER

Shontee Latham ("Petitioner"), has filed this pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the "Petition"), ECF No. 1, seeking to attack his state court convictions for, inter alia, possession of a firearm without a license, reckless endangering another person and terroristic threats, in connection with his firing of a gun near a neighbor in the course of a disagreement. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 5 - 10 years on the possession of a firearm without a license conviction, with the remaining sentences all to run concurrently to the 5 - 10 year sentence.

For the reasons that follow, the Petition will be denied because none of the five grounds for relief merits the grant of federal habeas relief. Furthermore, because jurists of reason would not find this disposition of the Petition debatable, a certificate of appealability will also be denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in its November 16, 2015 Memorandum, summarized the rather simple facts of the crimes as follows:

On the evening of September 30, 2008, [Sherbelle] Hall was at her neighbor's house at 219 West Lincoln Avenue in the Lincoln housing project in New Castle [, Pennsylvania] hanging out with friends when she looked outside and saw [Latham] leaning on a car that did not belong to him parked outside the residence. Ms. Hall recognized [Latham] so she went outside and told him to get off the car and when he wouldn't leave[,] she nudged him to try to make him move. [Latham] told Ms. Hall that no one was going to disrespect him and proceeded to pull a gun out of his pocket and fired a bullet into the air right above her head. Ms. Hall started yelling at [Latham] and began to walk away when [Latham] started following her and telling her that no one is going to disrespect him[.][H]e [then] pointed a gun at [Ms. Hall's] chest and told her he would "put one in her." Ms. Hall walked away from [Latham] and went back to her house and called the police.

ECF No. 10-30 at 1 - 2 (quoting the PCRA trial court opinion at 2 - 3).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court Procedural History

The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in its November 16, 2015 Memorandum, also summarized the state court procedural history as follows:

On April 23, 2010, a jury convicted Latham of firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a firearm prohibited, recklessly endangering another person, and terroristic threats. On August 6, 2010, the trial court sentenced Latham to five to ten years' imprisonment. This Court affirmed Latham's judgment of sentence on appeal. Commonwealth v. Latham, 60 WDA 2011 (Pa. Super., filed Oct. 18, 2011) (mem. op.). Latham did not seek allocatur with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Latham filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Latham as a first time, indigent PCRA petitioner. Subsequently, Latham filed a pro se "Motion to Dismiss Counsel and Proceed Pro Se," expressing dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel. The PCRA court granted Latham's motion, and Latham proceeded to represent himself throughout the PCRA hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Latham's PCRA petition. This timely pro se appeal followed.³

³On July 16, 2015, this Court remanded the proceedings and directed the PCRA court to conduct a hearing and an on-the-record colloquy to confirm Latham's desire to proceed pro se. On August 28, 2015, the PCRA court conducted a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), and affirmed that Latham had made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and that he continued to desire to proceed pro se. Latham additionally executed a written waiver of counsel on that date. Accordingly, we will now proceed to address the merits of Latham's appeal.

Latham raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether my conviction resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel which so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place?

2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek suppression of police testimony regarding the unlawful forced entry into my home and arresting me in my shower?

3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting damaging hearsay testimony and submitted additional hearsay testimony to my prejudice.

4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Sherbell[e] Hall with her multiple prior contradictory inconsistent statements.

5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument and moving for a mistrial on the grounds of:

a. Appealing to the emotions of the jury

b. Bolstering the credibility of witnesses, and

c. Injecting facts not in evidence.

Appellant's Brief at 5.

ECF No. 10-30 at 2 - 3.

After the Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief, Petitioner did not file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

B. Federal Court Procedural History

Petitioner filed the instant Petition in this Court. ECF No. 1. He raises five Grounds for Relief.

GROUND ONE: There was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on all charges contained in the Information. A violation of Due Process.

ECF No. 1 at 5.

GROUND TWO: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to seek suppression of police testimony by motion in limine.

Id. at 7.

GROUND THREE: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to impeach the Commonwealth's witness with her prior statements.

Id. at 8.

GROUND FOUR: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for eliciting damaging hearsay testimony, and submitting additional hearsay to my prejudice.

Id. at 10.

GROUND FIVE: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to prosecutor's closing argument and moving for a mistrial.

Id. at 12.

After requesting and receiving an extension of time, Respondents filed their Answer, ECF No. 10, and a Memorandum for Respondents, ECF No. 10-2, asserting that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. Along with the Answer, Respondents filed copies of much of the state court record. ECF Nos. 10-3 - 10-30. Respondents also caused the original state court records to be lodged with this Court. Petitioner filed a Traverse, ECF No. 13, and a Brief in Support of the Traverse. ECF No. 14.

All parties have consented to the exercise of plenary jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge. ECF Nos. 5 and 9.

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I, §101 (1996) (the "AEDPA") which amended the standards for reviewing state court judgments in federal habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was enacted on April 24, 1996. Because Petitioner's habeas Petition was filed after its effective date, the AEDPA is applicable to this case. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).

Where the state court has reviewed a federal issue presented to them and disposed of the issue on the merits, and that issue is also raised in a federal habeas petition, the AEDPA provides the applicable deferential standards by which the federal habeas court is to review the state court's disposition of that issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e).

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court has expounded upon the standard found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Williams, the Supreme Court explained that Congress intended that habeas relief for errors of law may only be granted in two situations: 1) where the state court decision was "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or 2) where that state court decision "involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 404-05 (emphasis deleted). A state court decision can be contrary to clearly established federal law in one of two ways. First, the state courts could apply a wrong rule of law that is different from the rule of law required by the United States Supreme Court. Secondly, the state courts can apply the correct rule of law but reach an outcome that is different from a case decided by the United States Supreme Court where the facts are indistinguishable between the state court case and the United States Supreme Court case.

In addition, it is to be stressed that we look to the United States Supreme Court holdings under the AEDPA analysis as "[n]o principle of constitutional law grounded solely in the holdings of the various courts of appeals or even in the dicta of the Supreme Court can provide the basis for habeas relief." Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that "Circuit precedent cannot create or refine clearly established Supreme Court law, and lower federal courts 'may not canvass circuit decisions to determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to [the Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct.'" Dennis v. Sec., Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 834 F.3d 263, 368 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting, Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam)). As the United States Supreme Court has further explained: "[s]ection 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this Court's precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license ...