Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Ctr.
| Decision Date | 05 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11-CV-11086 |
| Parties | JENNIFER LATOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. NORTHWOODS NURSING CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
(Doc. 28)
For the reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
By order of U.S. District Judge Thomas L. Ludington, this case was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for general case management on March 22, 2011. (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) alleges claims of employment discrimination based on her gender and pregnancy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Counts I and II), and under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq. (Counts III and IV). Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §12111(7) and (5)(a) and theMichigan Persons with Disability Civil Rights Act ("PWDCRA"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq. (Counts V and VI). Finally, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Count VII), and interference in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (Count VIII). Plaintiff seeks both economic and non-economic damages. (Doc. 17 at 9.)
Plaintiff avers that she exhausted her administrative remedies by filing an action with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and that she received a right-to-sue letter on December 16, 2009, as required by Title VII. (Doc. 17 at 2.)
Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment on February 28, 2012 (Doc. 28), Plaintiff responded (Doc. 32), and Defendant replied. (Doc. 33.) Oral argument was held on May 1, 2012. Supplemental briefing was ordered and briefs by both parties were filed. (Docs. 36, 37.) Therefore, the motion is ready for report and recommendation.
Plaintiff began working as a Certified Nurse Assistant ("CNA") at Defendant North Woods Nursing Center in Farwell, Michigan, in July 2007. (Doc. 8 ¶ 13.) The evidence of record shows that Plaintiff informed Defendant of her pregnancy on Friday, September 26, 2008. (Doc. 37 at 2; Doc. 32 at Ex. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that the following day, September 27, 2008, she was informed that, pursuant to Defendant's policy, she would need to bring in a doctor's note stating that she was medically cleared to continue working. (Doc. 8 ¶ 17.) Defendant clarified that its policy was that "whenever an employee brought any medical issue to North Wood's attention, [Defendant] request[ed] that on that employee's next visit to a doctor, the employee obtain a doctor's note, either informing North Woods of any medically necessary restrictions or stating that the employeewas free to work without restrictions despite the medical issue." (Doc. 29 at 11; Ex. C.) Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this policy or that it was applied to other medical circumstances besides pregnancy.
Plaintiff states that even though she was "having a normal pregnancy, had not missed any work due to her pregnancy, and had neither sought nor received any medical restrictions," she asked her doctor for the note, and it was faxed directly to Defendant. (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 18-19.)
Plaintiff worked on September 27, 28, and 30 as scheduled. (Doc. 37 at 2; Doc. 32 at Ex. 7; Doc. 8 ¶ 20.)1 Plaintiff did not report to work on October 1, 2008, because she received a message via voicemail telling her to not report to work that evening as scheduled because her doctor's note stated that she was restricted from lifting over fifty pounds. (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 21-22; Doc. 37 at 2.) "Plaintiff contacted her doctor to try and have this corrected, but through further apparent miscommunication with that office, that never occurred." (Doc. 32 at 11.) Plaintiff adds that her doctor, "Dr. Traenkle[,] has since clarified (in a letter written after this litigation commenced) that there was nothing unusual about Ms. Latowski's pregnancy, and a 50 lb. weight restriction is typical for an uneventful pregnancy that was not high risk." (Doc. 32 at 11; Ex. 4.)
Plaintiff states that she was told by Judy Doyle, Defendant's Director of Nursing, that "she could not work with any restrictions and was going to be taken off the schedule until she presented a doctor's note stating that she could return to work with no restrictions." (Doc. 8 ¶ 23.) Ms. Doyle also allegedly told Plaintiff that "her only other choice was to reapply for her position after her pregnancy, but that her position would not be guaranteed." (Id.; Doc. 32 at 11.)
Plaintiff states that on October 2, 2008, she went to North Woods and requested a copy of the policy stating that a doctor's note was required from pregnant employees and a copy of her job description. (Doc. 8 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff was told that it was not a written policy; she did, however, obtain a copy of her job description, which "did not include a lifting standard." (Id.) Plaintiff's evidence adds that she "was not the only pregnant woman required by North Woods to obtain a doctor's note as soon as they learned of her pregnancy[,] [f]or example, Defendant gave Amanda J----- a letter that clearly is such a directive: 'Upon learning of your pregnancy we requested any information regarding possible work restrictions.'" (Doc. 32 at 10-11.) Ms. J----- "thought it was policy." (Doc. 32 at 11.) Plaintiff notes that "Ms. Doyle admits that North Woods does not permit pregnant individuals with restrictions (or anyone else with a 'non-work related disability') to work at the facility" and that "she told Plaintiff, in justifying the policy, that they could be 'liable if something happened to her baby,' and that 'you wouldn't want to lose your baby.'" (Doc. 32 at 12; Ex. 8.)
Plaintiff alleges that she "reported to work on the evening of October 2, 2008, but was told she was not on the schedule, and further told by Ms. Doyle that she had 'resigned.'" (Doc. 8 ¶ 26.) Plaintiff indicates that she was "walked out of the facility" that evening. (Doc. 37 at 3.)
On October 15, 2008, Plaintiff was informed by Ms. Doyle that she was eligible for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). (Doc. 8 ¶ 27.) Plaintiff declined, not wanting to use up her leave during the second trimester of her pregnancy "because she would still be pregnant at the expiration of her twelve-week eligibility." (Id.; Doc. 32 at 12.) Plaintiff contends that "Ms. Doyle responded that either she could get the restrictions lifted, or that 'who knows, you might not even be pregnant then.'" (Doc. 32 at 12; Ex. 7.)
From the supplemental briefing, Plaintiff summarizes that the evidence shows: "(1) she was directed to provide a doctor's note, despite no indication of her inability to perform the essential functions of her job; and (2) there is insufficient evidence (or at least a factual dispute) that the lifting requirements were, in fact, essential functions of Plaintiff's job." (Doc. 37 at 3.) Defendant summarizes that "as proven by the schedule, Plaintiff worked on the date of her pregnancy disclosure, September 27, 2008, and continued to work as scheduled thereafter until the work restriction note was received on October 1, 2008." (Doc. 36 at 2.)
A motion for summary judgment will be granted under Rule 56(c) where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). In determining whether the moving party has met its considerable burden, a court may consider the plausibility of the moving party's evidence. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. Summary judgment is also proper where the moving party shows that the non-moving party is unable to meet its burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326.
In response, the non-moving party cannot rest merely on the pleadings alone. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Instead, the non-moving party has an obligation to present "significant probative evidence" to show that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1993). When the nonmoving party fails to adequately respond to a summary judgment motion, a district court is not required to search the record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-80. Instead, the court will rely upon the "facts presented and designated by the moving party." Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit explicitly instructed that it is "utterly inappropriate for the court to abandon its position of neutrality in favor of a role equivalent to champion for the non-moving party: seeking out facts, developing legal theories, and finding ways to defeat the motion." Id. at 406.
After examining the evidence designated by the parties, the court then determines "'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304,...
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