Latronica v. Local 1430 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Pension Fund

Decision Date23 August 2019
Docket NumberNo. 17-cv-00550 (NSR),17-cv-00550 (NSR)
Citation403 F.Supp.3d 287
Parties John LATRONICA, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL 1430 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS PENSION FUND and Layne McCarthy, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Joshua Lawrence Weiner, Law Offices of Weiner & Weiner, LLC, Morristown, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Bryan C. McCarthy, Sheri Dorothy Preece, Bryan C. McCarthy & Associates, Brewster, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff John Latronica ("Latronica" or "Plaintiff") brings this action against Local 1430 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Pension Fund (the "Fund") and Layne McCarthy ("McCarthy") (collectively, "Defendants") asserting claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. , arising from the Fund's partial denial of Plaintiff's pension benefit claim. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33) and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37). Upon the conclusions set forth below, both motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the administrative record and parties' Rule 56.1 statements,1 and are not in dispute unless otherwise noted.

I. The Local 1430 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Pension Plan

At issue in this case is the Fund's calculation of Plaintiff's pension benefits under the Local 1430 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Pension Plan (the "Plan").

The Fund is a multiemployer labor-management pension fund organized and operated in accordance with ERISA.2 (Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("Pl.'s Statement") ¶¶ 11, ECF No. 36.) The Plan, which governs the Fund, provides for the eligibility of pension applicants, the determination of service credits, and the manner in which individual pension benefits are to be determined and calculated. (Id. ¶ 37; AR-0705-57.)3 Under the terms of the Plan, pension benefits are only available to an "employee," defined as "a person in the employ of an employer who worked or shall work in a classification for which the Union acted or shall act as a collective bargaining representative ... [and] all persons for whom contributions are required to be made to the Fund in accordance with the written agreement between an Employer and the Trustees." (Pl.'s Statement ¶¶ 38-39; Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("Defs.' Statement") ¶ 6, ECF No. 39; AR-0707; AR-0710.) The Plan at times uses the term "Employee" interchangeably with "Participant," which is defined as "any Employee who becomes covered under the Plan." (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 40; AR-0712.) An employee becomes a Plan participant on the later of: (1) the date his employer is first obliged under the collective bargaining agreement to make contributions to the Fund; or (2) the date he begins performing "Covered Employment." (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 41; AR-0709, 0713.) "Covered employment" is in turn defined as the employment of an employee who is either in a collective bargaining unit represented by the Union or is otherwise employed by any employer who is obligated to make contributions to the Fund on his behalf.4 (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 42; Defs.' Statement ¶ 5; AR-0709.) The Plan limits the maximum amount of credited pension service that an employee can earn to thirty years. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 43; AR-0708.)

The Plan provides that the Fund shall be administrated by the Board of Trustees (the "Trustees"). (AR-0803.) The Trustees are granted the "exclusive authority and discretion" to determine whether an individual is eligible for any benefits under the Plan; determine the amount of benefits, if any, an individual is entitled to under the Plan; interpret all provisions of the Plan; and interpret all of the terms used in the Plan. (Defs.' Statement ¶ 3; AR-0747.) If the Trustees deny a participant's appeal, judicial review of the Trustees' decision is authorized "to determine only whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious." (Defs.' Statement ¶ 1; AR-0745.) In addition, the Plan provides that "[a]ll designations and interpretations made by the Trustees, or their designee" shall be "given deference in all courts of law, to the greatest extent allowed by applicable law" and not be "overturned or set aside by any court of law, unless such court determines that the Trustees have abused their discretion in rendering such determination or interpretation." (Defs.' Statement ¶ 4; AR-0747.)

II. Plaintiff's Work History and His Employers' Contributions to the Fund Pursuant to Collective Bargaining Agreements

Plaintiff is a retired video and audio technician and operator. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 1.)

From 1972 to 1992, Plaintiff was employed by three entities, which were under common control or ownership and operated out of the same address: Technical Operations (1972-73), Techni-Vision Operations (1973-87), and Video Projects (1987-92) (collectively, "Tech Ops"). (Defs.' Statement ¶¶ 7-8.) As an employee for these three companies, Plaintiff served as a cameraman, video tape operator, judge's tape operator, audio engineer, switcher/TD, graphics operator, simulcast operator, and engineer. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 8; AR-0111.)

In 1973, Tech Ops became a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Worlds Local 1430 (the "Union"). (Defs.' Statement ¶ 10; AR-0663-70.) This collective bargaining agreement provided that the collective bargaining unit consisted of all "employees who are, or may be in the future, engaged in the operation, maintenance[,] and servicing of audio and video closed-circuit television systems and associated equipment." (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 9; AR-0663.) This collective bargaining agreement does not contain any exclusion for supervisors (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 55), nor does it reference any obligations to contribute to the Fund (Defs.' Statement ¶ 10). The only other surviving collective bargaining agreement between Tech Ops and the Union is dated January 1, 1989 and provides that contributions of three percent of gross payroll would be made to the Fund on behalf of "eligible" employees.5 (Defs.' Statement ¶ 11; AR-0674.)

When Tech Ops entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union in 1973, Plaintiff was named shop steward to the Union, a position which he held until September 2005. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 4.) As shop steward, Plaintiff was responsible for collecting the time sheets of his fellow Union members and co-workers, training new employees, and reporting his co-workers' issues or concerns to management. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 6; AR-0110-11.) In addition, as a result of holding this position, Plaintiff worked exclusively on behalf of his co-workers while sitting in on and being intimately involved in all the Union's contract negotiations with the employer.6 (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 5; AR-0116.)

Although, as noted above, the record is devoid of any collective bargaining agreement that mentions the Fund prior to 1983, the evidence shows that Tech Ops became a participant in the Fund starting in 1979. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 13.) According to the evidence, Tech Ops (Techni-Vision Operations in particular) made pension contributions to the Fund on Plaintiff's behalf in September 1979, October 1979, and each month in 1980. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 13; AR-0215-0222). There are no records of Plaintiff's covered hours or contributions for Technical Operations, Techni-Vision Operations, or Video Projects between 1981 and 1992 (Defs.' Statement ¶ 15; AR223-0491; AR0223-491). Defendants contend that Plaintiff's employer stopped reporting and/or making contributions because Plaintiff became a supervisor in January 1981. (Defs.' Statement ¶ 20.) They further contend that reporting or making contributions on Plaintiff's behalf was no longer required at that point because Tech Ops was not required under any written agreement with the Fund to report or make covered earnings or contributions on behalf of supervisors. (Defs.' Statement ¶¶ 20, 23.) Plaintiff, for his part, denies that he was a supervisor at any time ("Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Statement ¶ 20; AR-0111) and contends that the Plan does not define "employees" to exclude supervisors (Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Statement ¶ 23; AR-B0012).

In 1992, Plaintiff started working for a company known as International Sound, which had taken over Tech Ops' contract with the Meadowlands Racetrack—the location at which Plaintiff had been working since 1976. (Pl.'s Statement ¶¶ 7, 15; Defs.' Statement ¶ 16; AR-0006, 0083.) Plaintiff's job responsibilities and duties remained the same as they were during his employment with Tech Ops. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 17; Defs.' Supplemental Resp. Pl.'s Statement ¶ 17.) The President of International Sound, David Snyder, stated in an October 26, 2016 letter to the Fund that Plaintiff was employed by the company as a technician and that "[a]t no time during his employment was he an International Sound manager." (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 20; AR-0075.) Throughout his employment with International Sound, Plaintiff continued to serve as shop steward to the Union. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 18; Defs.' Supplemental Resp. Pl.'s Statement ¶ 18.)

International Sound, as a successor employer, became a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement with the Union and a participating employer in the Fund. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 16; Defs.' Supplemental Resp. Pl.'s Statement ¶ 18.) Like Tech Ops', International Sound's collective bargaining agreement provided that the bargaining unit consisted of all employees engaged in the operation, maintenance, and servicing of audio and video closed-circuit television systems and associated equipment, with no explicit exception for supervisory employees. (Pl.'s Statement ¶ 56.) In addition, Internal Sound's agreement required the employer to contribute to the Fund on behalf of eligible...

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