Latta v. Caulfield

• Decision Date: 07 February 1979
• Citation: 398 A.2d 91,79 N.J. 128
• Parties: Martha LATTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James T. CAULFIELD, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 128

79 N.J. 128

398 A.2d 91

Martha LATTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James T. CAULFIELD, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 31, 1978.

Decided Feb. 7, 1979.

Herbert J. Kessler, Westfield, for plaintiff-appellant (Berenson, Kessler & Woodruff, Westfield, attorneys).

Michael T. Cooney, Elizabeth, for defendant-respondent (Hueston, Hueston & Sheehan, Elizabeth, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PASHMAN, J.

We are called upon in this case to decide whether certain jury instructions regarding contributory negligence and proximate cause were so inaccurate and misleading as to require reversal of the verdict returned below. Upon careful scrutiny of the record, we conclude that the trial court's charge failed to adequately convey the pertinent legal principles and that this error could have led the jury to a result it might otherwise not have reached. We therefore affirm the result reached by the Appellate Division and hold that a new trial is required. In so doing we do not endorse its reasoning.

Martha Latta, the plaintiff herein, resided at 303 East Fifth Street, Plainfield, near the intersection of East Fifth and Roosevelt Streets. On the evening of April 29, 1972, while sitting on her front porch, she attempted to quell an argument involving 20 to 25 youths. When her efforts proved unsuccessful, she went into her house to call the police. Before she reached the telephone, however, her granddaughter notified her that a police car had already arrived on the scene. Mrs. Latta came back out of the house, saw that a police car was parked directly across the street, and started towards it in order to request the officer's assistance in stopping the disturbance. She had reached a point somewhere between the street's center line and the police car when she was struck by Mr. Caulfield's oncoming vehicle.

On November 11, 1974 plaintiff filed this negligence suit to recover for the injuries sustained as a result of that collision. A jury trial was held, limited solely to the issue of liability. Divergent testimony was presented relating to the exact circumstances of the accident.

Plaintiff testified that she looked both ways before crossing the street and saw no cars coming toward her. She began walking across the street and

A. (t)hen just as I got halfway in the street or across the white line . . . I made but three more steps, and then I saw this car and I throw up my hands, I thought maybe he was going to let me pass.

Q. Did he let you pass?

A. No, he didn't.

Q. What happened?

A. He hit me.

Q. Now, how far across the street had you gotten when he hit you?

A. I had gotten three or four feet across from the white line.

Mrs. Latta further testified that she was wearing a blue dress and a pink and yellow apron.

This testimony was contradicted by Mrs. Latta's earlier statements during a pretrial deposition. When deposed, she testified that she first saw the Caulfield vehicle stopped at the red light at the Roosevelt Street intersection and that she thought its driver would allow her to cross before starting up.

Defendant's story was that he stopped for the red light at the Roosevelt Street intersection. When the light changed he proceeded slowly (8-10 m. p. h.) because there was a disturbance up ahead. Although it was dark, the weather was clear and he could see the police car and a group of people nearby. Nevertheless, he did not see Mrs. Latta until the time of impact, whereupon he applied the brakes.

Police officer Leitz testified, under subpoena, on behalf of defendant. He stated that he was sitting in the passenger side of a police car parked on East Fifth Street across from Mrs. Latta's home. He claimed that Mrs. Latta was running across the street when the collision occurred. Furthermore, he stated that she was wearing dark clothing at the time.

At the close of the case, the judge instructed the jury as to negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause. Over the objections of defense counsel, he then charged the jury that:

* * * even if you find that Mrs. Latta negligently placed herself in the position in the street exposed to danger, if her position was discoverable by a proper lookout on the part of Mr. Caulfield in time to have avoided the accident and he failed to use reasonable care in making a proper lookout, you may find that such failure by him was the sole proximate cause of the accident. If that is your finding, then even though both parties may have been negligent, your verdict would show that only Mr. Caulfield's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

In response to the jury's later request for clarification of the term "proximate cause," the trial judge repeated the above instruction, and, over the defense's objections, attempted to convey the meaning of the term through the use of an example. It involved a hypothetical situation in which a plaintiff had placed himself in a position of extreme danger in front of an oncoming motorist. That driver was not properly watching the roadway and hence struck the plaintiff. In such a case, the judge stated, the jury could find that the plaintiff's negligence was not near or "proximate" enough to the actual accident as to constitute a proximate cause. Since the driver of the car had a "chance" to avoid the accident but negligently failed to do so, his actions would be deemed the sole legal cause of the collision.

The jury then retired to continue its deliberations and, shortly thereafter, returned a unanimous verdict in favor of plaintiff. The jurors responded to four special interrogatories as follows:

1. Was the defendant, James T. Caulfield, guilty of negligence? Yes.

2. Did the negligence proximately cause the accident? Yes.

3. Was the plaintiff, Martha Latta, guilty of contributory negligence? Yes.

4. Was her contributory negligence a proximate cause of the accident? No.

Accordingly, judgment on liability was entered in favor of plaintiff on April 30, 1976. A motion for a new trial was denied and a trial on damages held.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial. Latta v. Caulfield, 158 N.J.Super. 151, 385 A.2d 910 (App.Div.1978). It held that the jury charge quoted above was an "inaccurate and incomplete statement of the law capable of misleading the jury and constituting reversible error." Id. at 153, 385 A.2d at 911. We granted plaintiff's petition for certification. 77 N.J. 481, 391 A.2d 496 (1978).

I

Although a variety of acts may contribute to the occurrence of a collision in the sense that absent each such act, the accident would not have transpired, not all such acts are deemed "proximate" or legal causes of the accident. As this Court has stated:

(i)n the trial of cases * * * where it appears that both parties were in fault, the primary consideration is whether the faulty act of the plaintiff was so remote from the injury as not to be regarded, in a legal sense, as a cause of the accident, or whether the injury was proximately due to the plaintiff's negligence, as well as to the negligence of the defendant. If the faulty act of the plaintiff simply presents the condition under which the injury was received, and was not in a legal sense a contributory cause thereof, then the sole question will be whether, under the circumstances and in the situation in which the injury was received, it was due...