Lattimore v. Oman Const.
| Decision Date | 04 August 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-7790,85-7790 |
| Citation | 795 F.2d 930 |
| Parties | 41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 780, 40 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,366 William LATTIMORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OMAN CONSTRUCTION, Defendant-Appellant, Bill White, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Charles K. Howard, Jr., Elarbee, Thompson & Trapnell, Joseph M. Freeman, Atlanta Ga., William B. Hairston, Jr., Engel, Hairston, Moses & Johanson, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellant.
Robert L. Wiggins, Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before HILL, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON *, Senior Circuit Judge, and LYNNE **, Senior District Judge.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court improperly enhanced the attorney fee awarded to plaintiff-appellee William Lattimore, who prevailed in a Title VII race discrimination case against defendant-appellant Oman Construction Company (Oman). See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. Lattimore sued Oman in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, successfully proving that Oman fired him because of his race. The court awarded Lattimore $25,675.53 for lost earnings and prejudgment interest. As the prevailing party, Lattimore sought reasonable attorneys' fees of $33,235.00, 1 see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k), and also moved the court to enhance this amount by 100 percent. The district court awarded Lattimore $55,973.75, or approximately 68 percent more than the $33,235.00 requested, or lodestar, amount. Oman does not dispute the reasonableness of the lodestar figure on appeal, but contends that the 68 percent enhancement was improvidently granted.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the results obtained in a case "generally will be subsumed within other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, [and] normally should not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d 891, 903 (1984). The lodestar figure therefore "is presumed to be the reasonable fee," id. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d at 891, and an enhancement may be justified only " 'in some cases of exceptional success.' " Id. at 901, 104 S.Ct. at 1550, 79 L.Ed.2d at 903 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 52 (1983)).
It is not clear exactly what constitutes "exceptional success." This court has wrestled with the problem. See Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586 (11th Cir.1984); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1983). It is certain, however, that the Supreme Court has differentiated "exceptional" and "excellent" results, and held that enhanced attorney awards are proper only when counsel achieves the former. Jones, 748 F.2d at 591. As we noted in Jones, completeness of success, "legal and factual hurdles, the economies of time and skill involved, the monetary award and the law created [may be weighed] in evaluating whether a result is 'exceptional.' " Id.
The pivotal analytic point is that many factors which arguably demonstrate "exceptional" results are effectively rewarded in arriving at the lodestar amount of reasonable hours times reasonable rate and therefore do not also justify an enhancement. For example, the Supreme Court noted in Blum that an attorney may possess special skill and experience that results in "the expenditure of fewer hours than counsel normally would be expected to spend on a particularly novel or complex issue." Blum, 465 U.S. at 898, 104 S.Ct. at 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d at 902. Nevertheless, Id. at 898-99, 104 S.Ct. at 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d at 902. 2 Quality of representation is another factor that normally is reflected in a reasonable rate and can support an enhancement only if the result obtained was "exceptional." Id. at 899, 104 S.Ct. at 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d at 902. 3
In Lattimore's case the district court predicated its conclusion on two basic factors. First, Lattimore's counsel achieved "exceptional results." Second, payment was "wholly contingent on success."
The results obtained were exceptional, according to the district court, because Lattimore "obtained all [the relief] that he could legally obtain" given the circumstances of the case. 4 Additionally, the court found it
These two factors do not withstand scrutiny. First, the relative success ratio of various types of Title VII cases in particular federal district courts may not establish "exceptional" results. Title VII cases, regardless of their underlying discriminatory bases, are all subject to the same burden of proof, and all district courts are required to apply the same law in the same manner. 5 "Personalizing" attorneys' fees for a particular cause of action in a particular district court by allowing an enhancement based on past success ratios in that court is a potentially dangerous, divisive and damaging step that we specifically decline to take. 6 To the extent the district court increased Lattimore's attorneys' fees based on such analysis, it was in error.
The district court also erred by enhancing the award because Lattimore "obtained all [the relief] that he could legally obtain." Jones makes clear that success, even total success, does not demand an increased fee award. Jones, 748 F.2d at 590-91; Blum, 465 U.S. at 900, 104 S.Ct. at 1549, 79 L.Ed.2d at 903. Such success is but one factor to weigh, Jones, 748 F.2d at 591, and the lodestar amount merits enhancement only if the result is "exceptional," not merely "excellent." Id. In other words, a plaintiff who receives all the relief he sought may or may not have procured an exceptional result. Barring some other substantiated, nonconclusory explanation demonstrating such results, a full recovery is not sufficient, by itself, to trigger an enhancement. Id. at 590-92; see also Blum, 465 U.S. at 898, 104 S.Ct. at 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d at 901. No such proof was forthcoming here.
The district court's second basis for increasing the fee--i.e., that the fee was wholly contingent on success 7--is a thorny issue as yet unresolved by the Supreme Court. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17, 79 L.Ed.2d 903 n. 17 (). The difficulty in increasing attorneys' fees based on contingency fee arrangements is that such a process arguably compensates an attorney for his losing cases, yet 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) permits attorneys' fees only to the prevailing party. See Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1430-32 (D.C.Cir.1984). This circuit has a well-established rule, however, "that a contingency fee arrangement may justify an increase in an award of attorney's fees." Jones, 748 F.2d at 591.
We agree with the court in Murray that a close reading of Blum indicates that an enhancement of attorneys' fees based on the contingency nature of the representation is proper only when the case is an "exceptional one." Murray, 741 F.2d at 1432. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 26-29 (D.C.Cir.1984) (). As discussed earlier, neither the district court nor Lattimore established that this was an exceptional case or that Lattimore's attorneys achieved exceptional results. 8
As a final matter, Oman moved to supplement the record on appeal with two of the memoranda of law it submitted to the district court. This motion is DENIED.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for the entry of a judgment for Lattimore's attorneys' fees in the amount of $33,235.00 plus interest.
* See Rule 3(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
** Honorable Seybourn H. Lynne, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
1 The requested fee, known as the "lodestar" amount, is derived by multiplying the reasonable hours worked on a case by a reasonable hourly charge. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 51 (1983). In this case one of Lattimore's attorneys, Michael Quinn, sought compensation for 139.85 hours of work at $100.00 per hour and the other attorney, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., 157.3 hours at $110.00 per hour. The reasonableness of the award is determined by evaluating twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974). In Bonner v. City of...
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Lattimore v. Oman Const.
...district court with directions that the court enter a judgment in the original lodestar amount of $33,235.00. See Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 795 F.2d 930 (11th Cir.1986). A year later, this court, sitting en banc, vacated that decision and remanded to the district court for further evidenti......
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