Lattimore v. Vill. of Streamwood
| Decision Date | 11 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17 C 8683 |
| Parties | KERMITT LATTIMORE and CAROL G. HUTTON-LATTIMORE, Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF STREAMWOOD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Judge Amy St. Eve
The Court grants in part with prejudice, grants in part without prejudice, and denies Defendants' motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [26]. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this ruling by no later than June 8, 2018. Status hearing set for May 31, 2018 is stricken and reset to June 13, 2018 at 8:30 a.m.
On November 30, 2017, Plaintiffs Kermit Lattimore and Carol G. Hutton-Lattimore filed the present seven-count Complaint against Defendant Village of Streamwood ("Streamwood") and certain Streamwood police officers bringing constitutional claims, along with state law claims, pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a). Before the Court is Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims as alleged in Counts V and VI of the Complaint with prejudice. The Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment federal malicious prosecution claim as alleged in Count II. Last, the Court grants in part without prejudice the remainder of Defendants' motion.
"A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
When determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Forgue v. City of Chicago, 873 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2017). Moreover, a "limitations defense is not often resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because 'a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations.'" Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, "dismissal at this early stage is appropriate when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish that the suit is indeed tardy." Id.; see also Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 875 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) ().
Plaintiff Kermit Lattimore ("Lattimore") and Maribeth Rivera ("Rivera") were married and began living together at their Streamwood residence ("Residence"), which was a pre-marital asset owned by Lattimore. Plaintiff Carol G. Hutton-Lattimore ("Hutton-Lattimore") is Lattimore's daughter, who lived at the Residence. (Id. ¶ 2.) Eventually Lattimore's and Rivera's marriage became troubled resulting in Lattimore filing a petition for dissolution of the union. (Id. ¶ 3.)
On January 26, 2015, Lattimore returned to the Residence with his nephew Steven and Hutton-Lattimore. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege that at that time Rivera had locked Lattimore out of the Residence. (Id. ¶ 5.) Once they gained entry into the Residence, Rivera's son, Michael, assaulted Lattimore with a knife. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) Thereafter, Lattimore dialed 911 to request police assistance. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant Officers Steinmetz and Van Der Linden responded to the 911 call, knowing that Lattimore had made the call and was seeking assistance. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Officers Steinmetz and Van Der Linden had heard the recorded 911 audio of Michael threatening Lattimore. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Shortly thereafter, Defendant Officers Stoiber, McPherson, and Klein arrived to assist Defendant Officers Steinmetz and Van Der Linden at the Residence. (Id. ¶ 13.) Defendant Officers Steinmetz, Van Der Linden, Stoiber, McPherson, and Klein (the "Responding Officers") entered the Residence and interviewed the occupants therein. (Id. ¶ 14.) According to Plaintiffs, the Responding Officers knew the occupants at the Residence and had no authority to remove Lattimore, his nephew Steven, or Hutton-Lattimore from the Residence. (Id. ¶ 15.) As to Hutton-Lattimore, the Responding Officers found her in the kitchen on January 26, 2015, and also knew that at that time knew she had not committed a crime and that she was not a threat to the occupants of the Residence. (Id. ¶¶ 16-18.) Nonetheless, on January 28, 2015, Streamwood police officers arrested Hutton-Lattimore and charged her with home invasion. (Id. ¶ 31.)
As to Lattimore, once the Responding Officers arrived on January 26, 2015, they seized Lattimore's lawfully owned gun and escorted him out of the Residence. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Onceoutside the Residence, the Responding Officers searched Lattimore's car to recover his wallet and then towed the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.) The Responding Officers thereafter arrested Lattimore and charged him with unlawful use/possession of a weapon and home invasion despite Lattimore's valid firearm credentials and documents. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Officer Klein submitted a complaint for a search warrant to search Lattimore's property that stated Lattimore's concealed carry license and FOID cards had been revoked - although they were in fact valid. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 33.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Officers Gallagher, Barnes, and Zeigler assisted in the arrest, as well as investigated the home invasion charges against Lattimore and Hutton-Lattimore. (Id. ¶ 32.) On December 2, 2015, after a jury trial, the jury acquitted Lattimore of the home invasion charges. (Id. ¶ 34.) Lattimore's unlawful use of a weapon charges had been dropped before trial. (Id. ¶ 36.) The charges against Hutton-Lattimore were dropped on January 6, 2016. (Id. ¶ 35.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring the following claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim (Count I); (2) a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim (Count II); (3) a Fourteenth Amendment due process fabricated evidence claim (Count III); (4) a constitutional conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV); (5) an Illinois common law malicious prosecution claim (Count V); (6) an Illinois common law intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress claim (Count VI); and (7) an indemnification claim under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Count VII).
In Count V of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege a state law claim of malicious prosecution. In the present motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim is untimely under the one-year limitations period pursuant to Section 8-101(a) of the Illinois Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. Section 8-101(a) states that "[n]o civil action ... may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued." 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a).
Plaintiffs' state law malicious prosecution claims accrued at the time the criminal proceedings at issue were terminated in Plaintiffs' favor. Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 99 (Ill. 2004); Simon v. Northwestern Univ., 183 F. Supp. 3d 908, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2016). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Lattimore was acquitted on December 2, 2015, and thus he had one-year from that date to file the present Complaint, namely, December 2, 2016. Instead, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on November 30, 2017. Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that the charges against Hutton-Lattimore were "dropped in a manner indicative of her innocence" on January 6, 2016, yet she did not bring her claims until November 30, 2017. In sum, both Lattimore's and Hutton-Lattimore's state law malicious prosecution claims are time-barred under Section 8-101(a) of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that their malicious prosecution claim is timely based on the doctrine of equitable tolling. Plaintiffs specifically maintain that even after the proceedings wereterminated in their favor, "Lattimore was still going through the legal process to reclaim his unjustly confiscated property and to clear his name." (R. 34, Resp., at 4.) Further, Plaintiffs argue that Hutton-Lattimore's case was "ongoing over a month after Plaintiff Lattimore's case was terminated" and that "both Plaintiffs faced continuing harm because their 'case received news attention.'" (Id.)
Equitable tolling is a rare remedy, which should be granted only when claimants have exercised due diligence in preserving their legal rights. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007). More specifically, "[e]quitable tolling applies when a plaintiff, despite the exercise of due diligence and through no fault of his own, cannot determine information essential to...
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