Laudermilk v. Fordice
| Decision Date | 12 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:95cv161-D-D. |
| Citation | 948 F.Supp. 596 |
| Parties | Abraham LAUDERMILK and M.C. Rogers, Plaintiffs, v. Governor Kirk FORDICE, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Ruby White, North Mississippi Rural Legal Services, Grenada, MS, Nancy Hunt Stewart, North Mississippi Rural Legal Services, West Point, MS, for Plaintiffs.
Leonard McClellan, Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, MS, for Defendants Kirk Fordice, Governor, etc. and Mike Moore, Attorney General.
H. Russell Rogers, II, Starkville, MS, for Defendants Board of Supervisors, Supervisors and County Tax Collector.
Presently before the court are the motions of both the plaintiffs and the defendants for the entry of summary judgment on their behalf. Finding that the motion of the plaintiffs is well taken, the undersigned shall grant it and enter judgment for them in this action. Finding that the motion of the defendants is not well taken, the undersigned shall deny it.
Mississippi statutes provide that a county board of supervisors may operate a county-wide garbage and rubbish disposal system. Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-17. Further, the board may levy ad valorem taxes or assess and collect fees to fund such a system. Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-21. This statutory scheme also provides that:
The board of supervisors may notify the tax collector of any unpaid fees assessed under Section 19-5-21 within ninety (90) days after the fees are due. Upon receipt of a delinquency notice, the tax collector shall not issue or renew a motor vehicle road and bridge privilege license for any motor vehicle owned by a person who is delinquent in the payment of fees unless those fees, in addition to any other taxes or fees assessed against the motor vehicle, are paid.
Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-22(4)(a) (Supp.1996) (formerly Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-22(3)). The implementation of this provision by the Oktibbeha County Board of Supervisors has given rise to this action. The parties have agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1. Abraham Laudermilk and M.C. Rogers, Plaintiffs, are residents of rural Oktibbeha County.
2. The Plaintiffs reside in areas of the county wherein the Oktibbeha County Board of Supervisors has statutory authority to provide for garbage collection.
3. Both of the Plaintiffs own motor vehicles and use the vehicles to travel to and from town to obtain the necessities of life.
4. The Plaintiffs are not exempt from state law requiring a valid car tag.
5. Messrs. Laudermilk and Rogers were each provided written notice of their delinquent status with regard to non-payment of fees for garbage collection and disposal.
6. Messrs. Laudermilk and Rogers received written notification of the opportunity to pay their accounts current and that a failure to do so would result in their inability to renew or obtain a new car tag.
7. Messrs. Laudermilk and Rogers, without paying their accounts current, attempted to purchase or renew a car tag.
8. Messrs. Laudermilk and Rogers were unable to renew or purchase car tags due to the delinquent status of their accounts with regard to fees for the collection and disposal of garbage.
9. Messrs. Laudermilk and Rogers were not provided a hearing prior to the non-renewal of their car tags.
10. While State statute does not provide for a hearing, there is no evidence Messrs. Laudermilk or Rogers made a formal request for a hearing, or received a hearing from the county.
11. Oktibbeha County's policy is to grant no exemptions for personal or financial reasons; the only exemption allowed is a Department of Environmental Quality Disposal Permit and Messrs. Laudermilk and Rogers did not present a Department of Environmental Quality Disposal Permit to the Board.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir.1994). "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir.1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1994).
In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenge the facial validity of Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-22(4) (1996 Supp.), as well as Oktibbeha County's application of that statutory provision to them. However, the only ground upon which they make their challenge is their assertion that the statutory provision and its application to them is unconstitutional as a violation of the constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV, § 1 (); MISS. CONST., ART. III, § 14 (). As both parties recognize, in order to trigger the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment2, the claimant must suffer a deprivation of a protected interest: life, liberty or property. Only after it is found that the plaintiffs have been deprived of such an interest does the inquiry turn to the sufficiency of the process received.
The first issue to be addressed, then, is whether the plaintiffs possess a constitutionally protected interest. The plaintiffs do not argue that they possess a liberty interest in this case, but rather that they possess a property interest in the retention of state-issued automobile license tags. In determining whether the plaintiffs possess such a property interest, this court must first look to state law to determine if there is an underlying substantive interest. Then, the court turns to federal constitutional law to determine if that interest rises to the level of a "legitimate claim of entitlement." Memphis Light, Gas & Water v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 56 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1978); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
The plaintiffs rely heavily in their argument to this court upon the decision of Bell v. Burson, in which the United States Supreme Court found a protected property interest in a driver's license under Georgia law. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1591, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, 94 (1971). In Bell, the court determined without much effort that the plaintiff possessed a property interest in the retention of his driver's license:
If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not follow, however, that the amendment also permits the Georgia statutory scheme where not all motorists, but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are required to post security under penalty of loss under the licenses. Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bell, 402 U.S. at 539, 91 S.Ct. at 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d at 94.
The defendants respond that the case at bar is distinguishable from cases like Bell where licenses were revoked, stating "Plaintiffs ... are not faced with the suspension or revocation of their license plates, but are being denied the opportunity to renew their plates." Defendants' Memorandum Brief, p. 5. This court finds the difference only semantical. A state's characterization of an interest as a "privilege" is not dispositive of whether that interest is a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment, for federal constitutional law determines whether or not an interest is protected by the requirements of procedural due process:
This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a `right' or a `privilege.'
Bell, 402 U.S. at 539, 91 S.Ct. at 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d at 94. Likewise, this court finds the state's distinction between "revoked" and "not renewed" non-dispositive. See, e.g., Easter House v. Felder, 852 F.2d 901, 912 (7th Cir.1988) (); Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir.1981) (); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1983) ().
The question is whether the plaintiffs possess under Mississippi law a property interest in the retention of their automobile license tags, and...
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