Laudig v. Marion County Bd. of Voters Registration

• Citation: 585 N.E.2d 700
• Decision Date: 06 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 73A05-9104-CV-100,73A05-9104-CV-100
• Parties: Stephen LAUDIG and Louis J. Mahern, Jr., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. MARION COUNTY BOARD OF VOTERS REGISTRATION, Janet E. Richart, in her official capacity as Republican Board Member, and Mary Agnes Bussing, in her official capacity as Democratic Board Member, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 700

585 N.E.2d 700

Stephen LAUDIG and Louis J. Mahern, Jr., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. MARION COUNTY BOARD OF VOTERS REGISTRATION, Janet E Richart, in her official capacity as Republican Board Member, and Mary Agnes Bussing, in her official capacity as Democratic Board Member, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 73A05-9104-CV-100.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fifth District.

Feb. 6, 1992.

Stephen Laudig, pro se, Indianapolis and for appellant-plaintiff.

Margo Barber, City-County Legal Div., Indianapolis, for appellees-defendants.

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Stephen Laudig and Louis J. Mahern, Jr. appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the Marion County Board of Voters Registration, et al., in an action for declaratory judgment, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction. We affirm.

On May 9, 1990, Stephen Laudig filed a complaint in Marion Superior Court for the purpose of obtaining from the Marion County Board of Voters Registration (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") a computer tape copy of the list of names, addresses and other information about registered voters in Marion County. On May 11, Laudig amended his complaint and added Louis Mahern, Jr. as a plaintiff.

On May 24, Laudig and Mahern, (hereinafter referred to as "Laudig"), filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On June 29, the Board filed an answer to Laudig's amended complaint. On July 3, Laudig filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a memorandum. On July 16, the Board responded to the summary judgment motion and filed a cross motion for summary judgment. On July 27, Laudig filed a reply to the Board's cross motion for summary judgment. The parties' reply included two exhibits, one of which was the affidavit of Bradford Mason.

On July 30, the trial court heard arguments on Laudig's request for a preliminary injunction and both parties' motions for summary judgment. On September 17, the court, after making findings of fact ¹ and conclusions of law, denied Laudig's motion for summary judgment and granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. According to the record, on that same day the court additionally granted the Board's motion to strike exhibit B from Laudig's reply to the Board's cross motion for summary judgment. ²

On October 10, Laudig filed a motion to correct error, supported by a memorandum, wherein he alleged newly discovered, material evidence. On October 19, Laudig filed a supplemental memorandum and submission in support of his motion to correct error. On October 24, the Board filed both a response to the Laudig's motion to correct error and a motion to strike the affidavits submitted by Laudig in support of his motion to correct error and his supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to correct error.

On November 1, the Board filed both a motion to quash Laudig's intended deposition of Thomas Moynahan and a motion for a protective order protecting the Board from any further discovery in the matter. That same day, the court issued such an order.

The trial court heard arguments on the motions to correct error and to strike affidavits on December 12. On January 8, 1991, the court granted the Board's motion to strike the affidavits of Mason attached to Laudig's motion to correct error, denied Laudig's motion for leave to take deposition, and overruled Laudig's motion to correct error, finding that Laudig failed to demonstrate newly discovered material evidence.

Laudig raises several issues for review, which we restate as:

(1) Was there an issue of material fact as to whether or not the Marion County Board of Voter Registration had acted arbitrarily or capriciously by denying Laudig's request for a copy of the computer tape containing the list of registered voters in Marion County?

(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting the Board's motion to strike the affidavit of Bradford Mason which was attached to Laudig's motion for summary judgment?

(3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting the Board's motion to strike the affidavits of Bradford Mason which was attached to Laudig's motion to correct error and to Laudig's supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to correct error?

(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by quashing the deposition of Thomas Moynahan and issuing an order protecting the Board from further discovery?

(5) Did the trial court err by denying Laudig's motion to correct error?

The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On November 7, 1989, Laudig submitted a written request to the Marion County Board of Voter Registration for a copy of a computer tape containing a list of the registered voters within Marion County. Pursuant to I.C. Sec. 3-7-2-22, the Board bears the responsibility of maintaining such a record. In addition to the information required by statute, (i.e., the voter's full name, address and assigned identification number), the Board's list also includes the voter's voting history and what party ballot, if any, the voter took in primary elections.

On November 15, the Board refused, in writing, to provide Laudig with a copy of the computer tape, which both parties agree is a public record. Instead, the Board advised Laudig that he could inspect and make notes of the list anytime during regular business hours.

Pursuant to I.C. Sec. 3-7-7-10, the Board provides copies of its list of registered voters to the precinct inspectors for use at the polls on election day and to the chairpersons of the major political parties of the county. The Board apparently provides the list in written form to the inspectors and in the form of a computer tape to the party chairpersons.

When we review a trial court's entry of summary judgment, we are bound by the same standard as the trial court: we must consider all of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and, where applicable, testimony in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for resolution by the trier of fact. Ayres v. Indiana Heights Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. If we have any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, and we must reverse the entry of summary judgment. Woodward Insurance, Inc. v. White (1982), Ind., 437 N.E.2d 59, 62. However, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we must affirm the entry of summary judgment. Id. The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a factual issue and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Norman v. Turkey Run Community School Corp. (1980), 274 Ind. 310, 312, 411 N.E.2d 614, 615.

The fact that both parties requested summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. Instead, we must separately consider each motion to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fisher v. Kaylor (1969), 145 Ind.App. 148, 250 N.E.2d 19.

We must first decide if there is an issue of material fact as to whether or not the Marion County Board of Voter Registration acted arbitrarily or capriciously by denying Laudig's request for a copy of the computer tape containing the list of registered voters in Marion County.

The statutes applicable to this issue include those statutes concerning registration officers, I.C. Sec. 3-7-2-1 et seq., and those concerning access to public records, I.C. Sec. 5-14-3-1 et seq. The relevant statutes, in pertinent part, are as follows:

Registration Officers:

I.C. Sec. 3-7-2-2:

In each county having a population of one hundred twenty-five thousand (125,000) or more, a board of registration is established. The board shall supervise the registration of voters of the county.

I.C. Sec. 3-7-2-22:

Each board of registration has custody of all registration facilities, equipment, supplies, forms, records (including the permanent records of registered voters of the county), registration affidavits, and other property used in connection with the registration of voters in the county.

I.C. Sec. 3-7-2-25:

The circuit court clerk or board of registration may keep records by use of electronic data processing equipment and may enter into contracts for this purpose.

I.C. Sec. 3-7-7-9:

Not later than ten (10) days before the election at which the registration books are to be used, the circuit court clerk or board of registration shall prepare certified copies of the list of registered voters for each precinct in the county. The lists must contain the full name, address, and assigned identification number of each registered voter.

I.C. Sec. 3-7-7-10:

Two (2) copies of the list required by section 9 of this chapter shall be furnished to the inspector of the precinct for use at the polls on election day, and one (1) copy of the list shall be furnished to each of the county chairmen of the major political parties of the county as soon as the lists are prepared. Additional copies of the registration lists shall be kept open to public inspection at the office of the circuit court clerk or board of registration as soon as they are completed.

Access to Public Records:

I.C. Sec. 5-14-3-1:

A fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government is that government is the servant of the people and not their master. Accordingly, it is the public policy of the state that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. This chapter shall be liberally...