Laughorn v. Eanes

• Decision Date: 28 November 1966
• Citation: Laughorn v. Eanes, 151 S.E.2d 378, 207 Va. 584 (1966)
• Parties: Linda W. LAUGHORN, an Infant, etc. v. Angela Denise EANES, an Infant, etc.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 378

151 S.E.2d 378

207 Va. 584

Linda W. LAUGHORN, an Infant, etc. v. Angela Denise EANES, an Infant, etc.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 28, 1966.

Frank D. Harris, South Hill (Hodges & Harris, South Hill, on brief), for plaintiff in error.

Lester L. Dillard, Don P. Bagwell, South Boston (Tuck, Bagwell, Dillard & Mapp, South Boston, on brief), for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO and GORDON, JJ.

GORDON, Justice.

Linda W. Laughorn appeals from a $10,000 judgment in favor of her guest-passenger, Angela Denise Eanes, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The question is whether the evidence supports the finding that Mrs. Laughorn was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile.

The accident happened in South Boston, Virginia, on April 24, 1964, at approximately 4:15 p.m. Earlier in the afternoon, while visiting at Angela's home, Mrs. Laughorn had agreed to take care of Angela while her mother was away from home on a shopping trip. Angela was only four weeks old, and her mother (Mrs. Laughorn's sister-in-law) preferred not to take Angela with her on the shopping trip. Mrs. Laughorn told Angela's mother she would take Angela to her sister's home, whom Mrs. Laughorn intended to visit that afternoon. Mrs. Laughorn, who was eighteen years old, was a licensed driver with one month's driving experience.

Shortly after the mother left her home on Fenton Street, Mrs. Laughorn got into her automobile and, with Angela lying on the front seat beside her, drove north on that street. She intended to make a sharp left turn (more than ninety degrees) at the intersection of Fenton Street, Jeffress Street and Ellyson Avenue, and to proceed west on Jeffress Street en route to her sister's house on Logan Street.

After Mrs. Laughorn had turned left onto Jeffress Street, her automobile veered toward the south (left) side of the street. Its left wheels crossed a low curb on the south side; then the automobile traveled about 36 feet in a westerly direction, with its left wheels on the south sidewalk, before hitting a telephone pole. Both Mrs. Laughorn and Angela were injured as a result of the collision.

The only testimony explaining why the accident happened was given by persons who repeated what Mrs. Laughorn said to them after the accident.

Mrs. Laughorn told the investigating officer 'she made a left turn into Jeffress Street from Fenton, and after she made the turn she saw the sun was in the baby's eyes that she had laying on the seat beside of her. She turned to put something over the eyes of the baby, and when she looked back the car was over on the sidewalk'.

The baby's mother testified Mrs. Laughorn said 'she was riding along the road, that she looked down and she saw the sun in the baby's eyes, and she reached down and pulled the shawl up over the baby's eyes. And when she did, when she looked up, she was headed toward the telephone pole. And she said she didn't know what happened then'.

The baby's father said '(a)ll she (Mrs. Laughorn) told me was that just when she looked at the baby and was going to pull this shawl over her eyes, and then she just don't know what happened. That's all that she told me'.

Betsy Reaves (the only witness who saw the accident) testified Mrs. Laughorn 'just said that she turned to attend the baby, and when she looked back it was going out of the street'.

The investigating officer found dirt on Jeffress Street which indicated that the automobile crossed the curb at a point approximately 36 feet east of the telephone pole. He found no mark to indicate that after the automobile reached the sidewalk its brakes were applied or its wheels were turned to the right or left. Betsy Reaves said the automobile's speed remained constant until it struck the pole.

Photographs introduced in evidence show the front center of the automobile struck the telephone pole and, at the time of the collision, the left wheels were on the sidewalk and the right wheels were on Jeffress Street. The telephone pole, which stood on the south sidewalk near the curb, was 177 feet west of the intersection of Fenton and Jeffress Streets.

The speed limit on Fenton Street in the vicinity of the accident was 25 miles an hour. Mrs. Laughorn told the investigating officer her speed before the accident was about 30 miles an hour or 'a little over that'. Betsy Reaves said there was nothing about the operation of Mrs. Laughorn's automobile to attract her attention until she saw it veer to the left. She said the automobile's speed was 'normal'.

Jeffress Street is 34 feet wide at the scene of the accident. When the investigating officer arrived at the scene, about five minutes after the accident happened, he found automobiles parked on the right side of the street occupying six or eight feet of the width of the street. Betsy Reaves said that except for Mrs. Laughorn's automobile, there was no vehicular traffic on Jeffress Street at the time of the accident.

The evidence, which we have outlined, was introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, Angela. The defendant, Mrs. Laughorn, offered no evidence. The plaintiff having received a favorable jury verdict, we must view the evidence and all proper inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to her.

We can uphold the judgment for the plaintiff only if the evidence and proper inferences therefrom are sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of gross negligence. Va. Code Ann. § 8--646.1 (Repl. vol. 1957). 'Gross negligenc is * * * conduct showing such indifference to others as constitutes an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety of the plaintiff guest, that is, such a degree of negligence as should shock fair minded men although something less than wilful recklessness.' Laster v. Tatum, 206 Va. 804, at 807, 146 S.E.2d 231, at 233 (1966).

The facts in this case are quite similar to the facts in Finney v. Finney, 203 Va. 530, 125 S.E.2d 191 (1962), where we held as a matter of law that the evidence was not sufficient to prove gross negligence. In that case the defendant's automobile hit a truck in the intersection of Llewellyn Avenue and 26th Street in Norfolk, injuring the plaintiff who was the defendant's guestpassenger. The defendant was driving south on Llewellyn Avenue, and the truck driver was driving east on 26th Street.

When the defendant's automobile was about two car lengths from the intersection, one of the passengers commented 'about how much * * * (the plaintiff's) little girl had grown'. Thereupon, the defendant looked at the little girl, who was sitting in the plaintiff's lap on the front seat. A witness said the defendant looked at the little girl for several seconds 'and we hit'. The defendant 'did not look back up, I don't think, until after we had already hit'. Id. at 531, 125 S.E.2d at 192.

A traffic signal was hanging over the center of the intersection, but the defendant failed to notice the signal because the red light controlling southbound traffic on Llewellyn Avenue was not functioning. She did not notice that northbound traffic (facing a functioning red light) had stopped. Testimony about the speed of the defendant's automobile ranged from 25 to 35 miles per hour. The applicable speed limit was 25 miles per hour.

The traffic signal controlling the truck driver, who was proceeding east on 26th Street, 'turned green well before he got to the intersection'. Id. at 532, 125 S.E.2d at 192. Two automobiles, which were ahead of the truck, passed in front of the defendant's automobile before it hit the truck.

We held in the Finney case that the defendant's inattention amounted to no more than ordinary negligence, not 'an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety of her daughter-in-law and grandchild (the plaintiff and her child), such as to be shocking to reasonable men'. Id. at 534, 125 S.E.2d at 194. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of gross negligence and the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, we entered final judgment for the defendant.

McDaniel v. Wern, 206 Va. 819, 147 S.E.2d 158 (1966), is also quite similar to the present case. There the defendant, after turning at an intersection, looked down at the gearshift which was not functioning properly. While the defendant was looking down, his automobile crossed the curb on...