Laukaitis v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Kelly, Battin and Wm. R. Taylor, Billings; CASTLES; HARRISON
• Citation: Laukaitis v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 135 Mont. 469, 342 P.2d 752 (Mont. 1959)
• Decision Date: 16 July 1959
• Docket Number: No. 10002,10002
• Parties: Mrs. Petronella LAUKAITIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SISTERS OF CHARITY OF LEAVENWORTH, and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Defendants and Respondents.

Page 752

342 P.2d 752

135 Mont. 469

Mrs. Petronella LAUKAITIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SISTERS OF CHARITY OF LEAVENWORTH, and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 10002.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted May 11, 1959.

Decided July 16, 1959.

Kelly, Battin and Wm. R. Taylor, Billings, J. H. McAlear, Red Lodge, William T. Kelly, Billings, for appellant. J. H. McAlear and William T. Kelly argued orally, for appellant.

Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great Falls, for respondent. William L. Baillie, William L. Baillie argued orally, for respondent.

CASTLES, Justice.

This appeal is from a district court judgment, which judgment affirmed the decision of the Industrial Accident Board. The judgment provided total disability payments for 500 weeks. The appeal is from that part of the judgment denying a lump sum payment.

The sole question presented is whether the district court and the Board abused their discretion in disallowing a lump sum settlement.

The claimant, appellant herein, was injured while working as a kitchen helper in St. Vincent's Hospital. The injury consisted of a collapse of the 11th thoracic vertebra. Claimant was born in the year 1883, and was at the time of her accident in 1954, 70 years of age. Medical testimony indicated that she was in poor health, and that much of her disability was due to age and other factors not attributable to the accident. Nonetheless, total permanent disability payments were allowed. This total permanent disability rating is not disputed on this appeal. The only dispute is as to whether the payments should be weekly or in a lump sum.

Prior to the accident, the claimant lived alone in a small apartment. She was making a bare living, but was independent from anyone in her own support and care. Her living conditions consisted of a two-room apartment, sharing a bathroom, not modern, with six others.

Several months after the accident the claimant moved in with her 43 year old unmarried son and now lives in a small but modern apartment. She also has four adult independent daughters who maintain their own homes.

Claimant's financial condition now is that she draws $80 per month social security and $18 per week workmen's compensation payments. The total is more than she received prior to the accident. It is also quite clear from the record that her living conditions are improved, although her physical condition is poor.

The claimant cannot do very much in the way of caring for herself, but evidence in the record indicates that she does shop for groceries, but largely the burden of her care, except financially, falls upon her son. The son testified that it was what counsel called 'a tragic hardship' on him to care for his mother, and that he has had to hire a day companion for her. The day companion cooks meals and keeps house for the son, as well as the claimant. The son seems to benefit as much as the mother.

The plan for a lump sum settlement was to hire a full-time nurse and companion for the claimant. The five adult children for reasons of employment, families, etc., all claimed that it would be an 'insufferable burden' on them to care for their aged mother in their homes. Counsel for claimant states in his brief that the district court's failure to grant a lump sum settlement had the effect of making the claimant an economic burden on her children.

In quoting counsel's use of the term to be applied to adult children's care of an aged and infirm parent as being an 'insufferable burden', we think it comment enought. But see statutory requirement in R.C.M.1947, Sec. 61-124, as to indigent parents. See Bible, Exodus XX, verse 12.

The question of whether monthly payments can be converted into a lump sum rests in the discretion of the board, both as to the amount and the advisability of such conversion. See section 92-715, R.C.M.1947, as amended, which provides:

'The monthly payments provided for in this act may be converted, in whole or in part, into a lump sum payment, which lump sum payment shall not exceed the estimated value of the present worth of the deferred payments capitalized at the rate of five per centum (5%) per annum. Such conversion can only be made upon the written application of the injured workman, his beneficiary, or major or minor dependents, as the case may be, and shall rest in the discretion of the board, both as to the amount of such lump sum payment and the advisability of such conversion. * * *'

This court has stated that the intention of the legislature in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act was that the monthly payment plan provided should be the rule and the lump sum settlement the exception. This is the ruling in Davis v. Industrial Accident Board, 92 Mont. 503, 507, 15 P.2d 919, 920. There the court said: 'Undoubtedly the legislature intended that the monthly payment plan should be the rule and the lump-sum payment the exception; the monthly payment is the substitute for the pay check. * * *

"The principle involved in the Compensation Acts is that the benefits received are a substitute for the wages of the injured employee, and with this theory in mind the legislatures of all states, except three, have provided for periodical payments. The purpose of this method is to preclude any possibility of an imprudent employee or dependent wasting the means for support and thereby becoming a burden upon society.

"Fraternal insurance statistics show that more than fifty per cent of the insurance money paid to widows and orphans reaches the hands of swindlers.' (Schneider on Workmen's Compensation Law, 1296; Cogdill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 Mont. 244, 2 P.2d 292, 296.)' And see Williams v. Industrial Accident Board, 109 Mont. 235, 97 P.2d 1115.

In Landeen v. Toole County Refining Co., 85 Mont. 41, 46, 47, 277 P. 615, 617, we held regarding a lump sum award that 'in view of the language of this section [R.C.M.1947, Sec. 92-715], we have no doubt that the power to convert the monthly payments into a lump sum payment is reposed, in the first instance, in the Industrial Accident Board. The question 'shall rest in the discretion of the board, both as to the amount of such lump sum payment and the advisability of such conversion.' Experience has demonstrated that lump sum awards should be the exception rather than the rule. Lincoln Water & Light Co. v. Industrial Commission, 332 Ill. 64, 163 N.E. 381; Harper's Workmen's Compensation, 2d Ed., Sec. 185.

"The fundamental basis of workmen's compensation laws is that there is a large element of public interest in accidents occurring from modern industrial conditions, and that the economic loss caused by such accidents shall not necessarily rest upon the public but that the industry in which the accident occurred shall pay, in the first instance, for the accident. Clark Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 Ill. 561, 126 N.E. 579. Generally, the best interest of the disabled workman or his dependents will be best served by paying the compensation in regular installments as wages are paid. Such payments supply...