Launza v. City of Mesquite

Decision Date08 October 2021
Docket Number3:20-cv-01710-E (BT)
PartiesKENNETH WAYNE LAUNZA, JR. Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MESQUITE, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

KENNETH WAYNE LAUNZA, JR. Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MESQUITE, et al.
Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-01710-E (BT)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

October 8, 2021


FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REBECCA RUTHERFORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff Kenneth Wayne Launza Jr. filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various Defendants related to his arrests for-and subsequent convictions of-failure to identify and resisting arrest, search, or transportation under Texas law. The Court granted Launza leave to proceed in forma pauperis but withheld issuing service pending judicial screening. (See ECF No. 3.) For the reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss Launza's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Background

Launza's complaint initially includes a series of allegations that appear to be based on the so-called “sovereign citizen” ideology. United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The sovereign citizen movement is a loose group of litigants, commentators, and tax protestors

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who often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes and proceedings.”). For example, Launza notes that he is going to change his legal name because he “does not consent to it.” (See ECF No. 3 at 2.) He associates his “sanity” instead with Sanoaman Sedago Leae. (Id.) He also states that, while he consents to the government, he does not consent to “people acting as government, using my government to govern my freedom and any of my other property beyond my consent.” (Id. at 3.) He states further: “I am not a subject. I am a sovereign.” (Id.) Launza claims that he goes to jail every year because of fictitious things to which he does not consent and that artificial rules and regulations beyond his consent do not apply to him. (See id.) He opines that “[i]f government can control my freedom beyond my consent, then that makes me a slave to government.” (Id.)

Launza also includes a myriad of substantive allegations stemming from an encounter with a City of Mesquite Police officer, Defendant Lijin John, on June 27, 2018. Specifically, Launza alleges that, at around 2:00 a.m. on June 27, he drove to Mesquite after work to exercise at ¶ 24-hour fitness club at which he had a membership. (Id. at 4.) Launza was homeless at the time. (Id.) As he entered the parking lot, he noticed a police vehicle parked behind the building. (Id.) Launza parked his vehicle in the spot furthest from the gym, which was the first spot that he saw, and turned his car off. (Id.) While changing, he noticed the police vehicle moving towards

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his. (Id.) Launza grabbed his cell phone and began to record what he “knew was going to be a verbal engagement between the police officer and [himself].” It was Launza's “intent to verbally engage with the police officer because [he] wanted to talk to the officer about [his] issues and concerns by protesting [the officer's] actions.” (Id.) Launza recounts the entirety of his interaction with Defendant John. In pertinent part, the account reads as follows:

At the time I started recording the video I was still sitting in my driver seat, and John was sitting in the driver seat of his vehicle
When I realized that my camera was recording, I asked John if he needed something
John responded ‘what's up' [sic]?
I said, ‘you need something?'
John said ‘no.'
I then told John he was running my plates without justification.
John told me he can run my plates anytime he wants.
I told John to come over to me.
John said ‘what.'
I told John to go ahead and come over to me.
John told me he doesn't need to.
At this time I was going to get out of my car to talk to John face to face or at least closer than we were because I wanted to, but I knew I did not have my shoes on.
I reached down and put my shoes on my feet.
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While I was putting my shoes on my feet, I asked John to go ahead and dispatch his supervisor.
After I put my shoes on, I then exited my vehicle to talk with John.
As I was getting out, I realized John was getting out of his vehicle.
John told me that he couldn't hear me.
I was completely out of my vehicle.
I then asked John, as we approached one another, what his name and badge number was.
John responded with his name only.
I then asked John for his badge number.
John told me his badge number.
I told John to get his supervisor here.
John said, ‘for what?'
I told John it was an order and that I did not ask him to try and debate about it.
John responded, ‘it's an order.'
I asked John again to get his supervisor here.
John then asked me to do him a favor and get back in the car and he would call his supervisor.
I asked John if he was ordering me to get in my car.
John told me for his safety and my safety to get in the car.
I asked John again if he was ordering me to get in my car. John told me again to get in my car.
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I asked John if he was going to place me under arrest if I didn't get in my car.
John responded, ‘just get in the car.'
I then began to talk directly to my camera as I was recording (vlogging) expressing what I was wearing, where I was standing among other statements.
I then told John that I need him to go ahead and get his supervisor again.
John asked me if I had a 24-hour membership.
I remained silent to John's question directly.
I told John if he doesn't want to get the supervisor there then I will get the supervisor there myself.
John told me to get in my car as I was reaching towards the inside of my left front windshield for my other phone.
The phone was attached to a window phone retainer.
As I was turning towards my car [sic] he pointed a flashlight at me while he made his last statement.
I grabbed my second cell phone and turned to face John again.
I stood in place while trying to turn on my second phone.
John kept the flashlight pointed at me when he initially turned it on.
After a few seconds when I turned to face John, he turned off the flashlight.
I told John that I never got his badge number.
I became interested in John's vehicle number.
5
I took some steps towards John's vehicle to get his [sic] the unit number on his vehicle and came back to the original position where I was standing while engaging with John.
I asked John if he was recording the video.
He responded ‘yes' and that he was recording audio and video.
I responded, ‘that's good to know.'
I then made a statement ‘just gone pull up to my motor vehicle and run my plates as if you got justification.'
I told John I like his confidence.
John said, ‘that's fine man, I'm just gonna pat you down to see if you got any weapons.'
As John was making this statement, he took some steps towards me and grabbed by body.
This is when John began to assault me.

(Id. at 5-7.) Launza informed John that he could not pat him down without justification. (Id. at 7.) John and Launza tussled. (Id.) Other officers arrived. (Id.) Both John and another officer had hands on Launza and ordered him to the ground, face down. (Id.) Another officer grabbed Launza's phone and threw it, cracking the screen and destroying the phone. (Id.) After restraining Launza, the officers searched his pockets. (Id.)

John then had a conversation with his “partner” about what happened, which Launza recounts as well. (Id. at 8.) According to John's description of the incident to his partner, Launza exited the vehicle despite John's instructions to stay in the vehicle. (Id.) Launza then ordered John to

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get back into his car and started recording the interaction. (Id.) John then informed Launza that, if he was going to exit his vehicle, John would need to pat him down. (Id.) Launza, however, resisted and would not let John frisk him. (Id.)

John then authored a “false police report.” (Id. at 12.) Launza specifically questions the veracity of several statements in the report. John ultimately arrested Launza for failure to identify and for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 38.02, 38.03.[1]

The rest of Launza's complaint details why he believes that Defendants' actions were unlawful. Again, Launza maintains that “rules and regulations” to which he does not consent do not apply to him and cannot

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serve as the probable cause necessary to execute a lawful arrest. (ECF No. 3 at 9.) Launza also takes issue with the Mesquite Police Department's training-specifically its alleged failure to train its officers when a weapons frisk is justified pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its alleged failure to train its officers to ask for consent before charging a citizen like Launza with “an artificial claim against his freedom.” (Id. at 9, 13.)

As for the court process, Launza challenged the resisting arrest, search, or transportation charge on jurisdictional grounds, but the judge overruled his objection. (Id. at 13). Launza notes that the prosecution played “body camera video” in both trials, that the “prosecution heard the lies directly from John, ” and that the jury convicted him after seeing this evidence. (Id. at 14.) Launza claims that he was “wrongfully convicted” on September 6, 2018, for failure to identify and on June 3, 2019, for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. (Id.) He brings this suit against John, as well as four “unknown, unnamed police officers” in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 1.)

Legal Standards

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes...

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