Laura C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-CV-1066-MGG |
| Parties | LAURA C.[1], Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Laura C. (“Ms. C.”) seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying Ms C.'s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). This Court may enter a ruling in this matter based on the parties' consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [See DE 8]. For the reasons discussed below the Court REMANDS the Commissioner's decision.
Ms. C. filed an application for DIB and SSI on April 20, 2018, alleging a disability onset date of May 11, 2013. Ms. C.'s application was denied initially on August 28, 2018, and upon reconsideration on October 29, 2018. Following a hearing on February 10, 2020, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision on May 13, 2020, which affirmed the Social Security Administration's denial of benefits. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Counsel declined review on July 22, 2020. SeeFast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 2005).
Ms. C. timely sought judicial review of the Commissioner's decision on October 28, 2020. Ms. C. filed his opening brief on October 29, 2021, and the Commissioner filed her Memorandum in Support of Decision on December 9, 2021. This matter became ripe on December 23, 2021, when Ms. C. filed her reply.
To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be “disabled” as defined under the Act. A person is disabled under the Act if “he or she has an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity [“SGA”] by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
The Commissioner's five-step sequential inquiry in evaluating claims for DIB and SSI under the Act includes determinations as to: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in SGA; (2) whether the claimant's impairments are severe; (3) whether any of the claimant's impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal one of the Listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404; (4) whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work based upon his RFC; and, if not, (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920[2]. The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except Step Five, where the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000).
This Court has authority to review a disability decision by the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, this Court's role in reviewing social security cases is limited. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). The question on judicial review is not whether the claimant is disabled; rather, the Court considers whether the ALJ used “the correct legal standards and [whether] the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2007).
The Court must uphold the ALJ's decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009)). Substantial evidence must be “more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence has also been understood as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has also noted that “substantial evidence” is a term of art in administrative law, and that “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high” in social security appeals. Biesek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). The Court reviews the entire administrative record to determine whether substantial evidence exists, but it may not reconsider facts, reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts of evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004).
On the other hand, an ALJ's decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or inadequately discusses the issues. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). At a minimum, the ALJ must articulate her analysis of the record to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured the ALJ has considered the important evidence in the record. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence in the record so long as she provides a glimpse into the reasoning behind her analysis to build the requisite “logical bridge” from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). Building a logical bridge requires the ALJ to “confront the evidence in [the plaintiff's] favor and explain why it was rejected.” Thomas v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir. 2016); Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Indoranto v.Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004)). The ALJ cannot “cherry-pick” facts from the record to support a finding of non-disability. Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, an ALJ may not disregard a line of evidence that is contrary to her findings. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001). If the ALJ fails in her responsibility to build a logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusions, the case must be remanded. Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996).
Where the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, remand is typically the appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). Conversely, “[a]n award of benefits is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the ‘record can yield but one supportable conclusion.'” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Ms. C.'s hearing before an ALJ on her applications for DIB and SSI took place on February 10, 2020, in Valparaiso, Indiana. On May 13, 2020, the ALJ issued her written decision finding that Ms. C. was not disabled, conducting the requisite five-step analysis for evaluating claims for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520.
At Step One, an ALJ's inquiry focuses on whether a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. Here, the ALJ determined that Ms. C. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 11, 2013. [DE 14 at 17].
At Step Two, an ALJ's inquiry focuses on whether a claimant's impairments are severe. For an impairment to be considered severe, an impairment or combination of impairments must significantly limit the claimant's ability to perform basic work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. Here, the ALJ found that Ms. C. suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative disk disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, chemical induced bronchial hyperactivity with continued cigarette smoking for six years with cessation in May 2019, obesity, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depressive disorder [DE 14 at 18]. These impairments are considered “severe” because they significantly limit Ms. C's ability to perform basic work activities [Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)].
Conversely, an impairment is considered non-severe when the medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on the claimant's ability to perform basic work functions. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522; S.S.R. 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 (Jan. 1, 1985). Here, the ALJ found that that Ms. C. had the following non-severe medically determinable impairments: cervical cancer, cellular dysplasia, metastatic disease, and thyroid nodules. [DE 14 at 18].
At Step Three, the ALJ found that none of Ms. C.'s severe impairments, nor any combination of his impairments, meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Specifically, the ALJ found that Ms. C. failed to meet the listing for Abnormal gait or limitations, Chronic respiratory disorders, Asthma, Endocrine disorders, or Obesity. [DE 14 at 18-19]. Likewise, the ALJ found the severity of Ms. C's mental impairments did not meet or equal the criteria under SSR 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15. [Id. at 19]. However, in analyzing the Part B criteria, the ALJ found that Ms. C's mental impairments cause moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information, moderate limitations in interacting with others, moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and moderate limitations in adapting or managing oneself. [Id. at 20]. Finally, the ALJ found that Ms. C. had mild limitations in her ability to adapt or manage herself. [Id.].
At the Step Four analysis, the ALJ considered Ms. C.'s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). A claimant's RFC...
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