Laurel Park Cmty. Llc v. City of Tumwater

• Citation: 790 F.Supp.2d 1290
• Decision Date: 16 May 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. C09–5312BHS.
• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Washington)
• Parties: LAUREL PARK COMMUNITY, LLC, a Washington limited liability company; et al., Plaintiffs,v.CITY OF TUMWATER, a municipal corporation, Defendant.

790 F.Supp.2d 1290

LAUREL PARK COMMUNITY, LLC, a Washington limited liability company; et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF TUMWATER, a municipal corporation, Defendant.

Case No. C09–5312BHS.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington,at Tacoma.

May 16, 2011.

[790 F.Supp.2d 1293]

Emmelyn Hart-Biberfeld, Philip A. Talmadge, Thomas M. Fitzpatrick, Talmadge Fitzpatrick, Tukwila, WA, Troy R. Nehring, Sunberg & Pody Law Office, PLLC, Seattle, WA, Walter H. Olsen, Jr., Olsen Law Firm, Puyallup, WA, for Plaintiffs.Jeffrey S. Myers, Law Lyman Daniel Kamerrer & Bogdanovich, Olympia, WA, Karen Elsa Kirkpatrick, City of Tumwater, Tumwater, WA, for Defendants.ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DISMISSING CASE BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 58, 60). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and the remainder of the file and hereby grants Defendant's (“Tumwater”) motion for summary judgment, denies Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, and dismisses this case as discussed herein.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 19, 2010, Plaintiffs ¹ moved for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 15.

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On March 17, 2010, Tumwater moved for summary judgment as to all claims. Dkt. 20. On May 19, 2010, 2010 WL 2035916, the Court stayed consideration of these motions pending the disposition of Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir.2009), which was to be reheard en banc. Dkt. 52. On December 22, 2010, Guggenheim was reheard. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.2010).²

On March 4, 2011, Tumwater renewed its motion for summary judgment as to all claims brought against it by Plaintiffs. Dkt. 58. On the same day, Plaintiffs filed their renewed motion for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 60. The parties have fully briefed these issues. Dkts. 62, 63, 67.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs challenge Tumwater's adoption of two ordinances: Ordinance Nos. O2008–27 and O2008–009. Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶ 20. These ordinances became effective on March 23, 2009. Tumwater maintains that it adopted these ordinances consistent with its comprehensive plan, which it adopted in accordance with Washington's Growth Management Act, Chapter 36.70A RCW (“GMA”). Id. ¶ 8.

The GMA provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation having been made. The property rights of landowners shall be protected from arbitrary and capricious conduct.” RCW 36.70A.020(6). Id. The GMA further requires Tumwater's comprehensive plan to identify sufficient and suitable land for housing that provides for, but is not limited to, government assisted housing, low-income housing, manufactured housing, multi-family housing, and group homes and foster care facilities. Id. ¶ 9.

According to Washington State Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development (“CTED”), between 1989–2008, Washington MHPs experienced an increasing MHP closure rate. Declaration of David Ginther (Ginther Decl.), Ex. 1 at 2. Between 1989–2002 the closure rate was nearly six MHPs per year; between 2003–2008 that number increased to fourteen per year. Id.

These matters were addressed by Tumwater in February 2008 as part of the annual comprehensive plan update process. Complaint ¶ 10. Tumwater proposed creating a manufactured home park district (“MHP District”). Id. Tumwater maintains that the MHP District “is intended to ensure consistency with RCW 36.70A.070(2)(c) which requires sufficient land be available for all types of housing including manufactured housing.” Ginther Decl., Ex. 2 at 14.

Initial proposals for the MHP District included ten existing MHP communities; Tumwater ultimately reduced the final number of MHPs in the district from ten to six MHP communities. Complaint ¶ 12 (describing the proposal that ultimately became Ordinance No. O2008–027); see also Ginther Decl., Ex. 2 at 25 (map depicting the six MHPs: Eagles Landing, Laural Park, Tumwater Mobile Estates, Thunderbird Villa, Velkommen, and Western Plaza). Tumwater also adopted standards for the newly created MHP District, which became Ordinance No. O2008–009. These ordinances were codified in Chapter 18.49 of the Tumwater Municipal Code (“TMC”). It is undisputed that the Parks

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have operated their respective properties as MHPs for 28–45 years.

TMC 18.49.010 provides that the MHP District “is established to promote residential development that is high density, single family in character and developed to offer a choice in land tenancy. The MHP [District] is intended to provide sufficient land for manufactured homes in manufactured home parks.” Id. TMC 18.49.010 also sets forth the permissible uses for land within the MHP District, which includes the following, among other things: (A) MHP in accordance with TMC 18.48; (B) designated manufactured homes on existing single lots of record; (C) existing MHPs established prior to July 1, 2008; (D) one single family detached dwelling per existing single lot; (E) parks, trails, open spaces, and related recreation facilities; (F) support facilities; and (G) family child care home, child mini-day care center (subject to approval). Id. at 9–10. Conditional uses for the MHP District include, among other things, churches, cemeteries, day care center, public/private schools, community center, group foster homes, and bed and breakfasts.

TMC 18.49.070(1) provides that a MHP owner “may request a use exception or modification from the application of the MHP zoning.” TMC 18.49.070(2) provides that such use exceptions may be approved when the owner demonstrates that (a) “they do not have reasonable use of their property under MHP zoning; or” (b) “the uses authorized by the MHP zoning are not economically viable at the property's location.” Id. at 13.

The following MHPs are a part of the MHP district and owned separately by parties to this litigation: Laurel Park, Tumwater Mobile Estates, and Velkommen Park.

In challenging the MHP District ordinances adopted by Tumwater, Plaintiffs argue that Tumwater's ordinances constitute a regulatory taking and also violate their substantive due process and equal protection rights under the federal and Washington State constitutions. Complaint ¶¶ 27–40. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the challenged zoning constitutes illegal spot zoning. Plaintiffs seek relief from Tumwater for other causes of action, which are derivative of their constitutional claims.

III. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987).

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The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at trial—e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Conclusory, nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and missing facts will not be presumed. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888–89, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).

B. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment, limited to their constitutional claims (regulatory taking, substantive due process, equal protection, and illegal spot zoning). Dkt. 60 at 1. In opposition, Tumwater moves for summary judgment as to all claims asserted against it by Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Dkt. 58.

1. Zoning, Generally

The Ninth Circuit has noted that “land use law is one of the bastions of local control, largely free of federal intervention.” Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Township, 309 F.3d 120, 135–136 (3d Cir.2002). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural communities .... [T]he courts generally have emphasized the breadth of municipal power to control land use...