Laurence v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-2268,89-2268
• Citation: 885 F.2d 280
• Parties: 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1839, 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,394 Henry J. LAURENCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 280

885 F.2d 280

50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1839,

51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,394

Henry J. LAURENCE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-2268

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1989.

G. Alan Kramer, John B. Honeycutt, Leslie A. Ohr, Houston, Tex., for Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

Alan McNeill, Beaumont, Tex., for Henry J. Laurence.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, KING and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Defendant, Chevron, appeals a jury verdict awarding back pay and liquidated damages to its employee, Henry J. Laurence, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634. Finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict, we reverse.

I. Background

Henry J. Laurence began working for Chevron at its Pascagoula, Mississippi, refinery in November 1967. By 1976, he had attained the position of Technician I. In that year, he moved to Saudi Arabia to work for Aramco as a "loaned" Chevron employee. Laurence spent eight and one-half years in Saudi Arabia and during that time was steadily promoted within the company. At Aramco, he worked in a supervisory capacity, reaching the salary equivalent of Chevron's Group II, which was five steps above the Technician I level at Pascagoula.

In 1985, Laurence was told that due to a manpower reduction he was no longer needed by Aramco and was to return to the United States. Chevron's policy requires that the company attempt to place repatriated employees, such as Laurence, in a position at a level equivalent to that achieved while abroad. If no organization can be found with an opening for a returning employee, the organization from which he left is required to take him back in a position at least equal to that held immediately prior to transfer. Pascagoula, on the other hand, maintains a somewhat contradictory practice of returning repatriated employees to the same position they had before going to Saudi Arabia, regardless of experience gained abroad.

After Laurence's file was circulated to various Chevron facilities without response, he returned to Pascagoula and was placed in the same salary classification he held before he left, Technician I. One month after his return, a Group II Operating Assistant position was filled by a 28 year old Lead Engineer, Greg Roos. At that time, Laurence was 47 years of age.

Laurence brought this suit under the ADEA alleging that Chevron discriminated against him by first demoting him and later failing to promote him because of his age. As evidence of Chevron's discriminatory motives, Laurence alleges that he had refused an early retirement package upon returning from Saudi Arabia and that a 28 year old was promoted to the job for which he was qualified. He also testified to his belief that age motivated Chevron's decision and cited the contradiction between Chevron's and Pascagoula's policies in reference to repatriated employees as further evidence of age discrimination.

Chevron claimed Laurence's placement as a Technician I was consistent with Pascagoula policy, which has been applied uniformly to employees returning to Pascagoula directly from Saudi Arabia. Chevron further contended that Laurence lacked the requisite qualifications to be considered for the Group II Operating Assistant position; that at the time of the decision it had no current evaluations of his performance in Saudi Arabia; and that the individual who was promoted, Greg Roos, was better qualified for the position.

Although the jury found Laurence's demotion did not violate the ADEA, it found both that Chevron failed to promote him because of his age and that it did so willfully. Accordingly, Laurence was awarded $82,126.00 in back pay and this amount was doubled to provide liquidated damages for the finding of willfulness. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(b). The district court denied Chevron's motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial.

Chevron appeals the district court's denial of its motions, claiming that the jury's findings are unsupported by the evidence.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Keeping in mind that "it is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses," Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc), we review the district court's denial of Chevron's j.n.o.v. motion to determine whether, upon the record, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that age was a determinative factor in failing to promote Laurence. See Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1465 (5th Cir.1989); Boeing Co., 411 F.2d at 374-75.

B. Elements of an Age Discrimination Case

As a disparate treatment suit based on circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff's case may be analyzed by the well worn test developed for Title VII plaintiffs in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638-39 (5th Cir.1985).

Under McDonnell, a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on age, an employee must demonstrate merely that: (1) he is within the protected class, that is, between the ages of 40 and 70, see 29 U.S.C. Sec. 631(a) (amended 1986); (2) that he was qualified for the job in question; and (3) that an employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 639.

To rebut the presumption, the employer carries the burden of production to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. While an employer need not persuade a court that the proffered reason actually motivated its decision, the defendant's evidence must raise "a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Id. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. If an employer meets its burden, the plaintiff may establish discrimination by proving that the reason is merely pretextual. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2448, 104 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1989).

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Chevron concedes that Laurence established a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he was 47 years of age at the time that he was denied the promotion; (2) he applied for the Group II Operating Assistant position, for which he was minimally qualified; and (3) Greg Roos, a person outside the protected class, was treated more favorably by being given a promotion for which Laurence was turned down. Chevron, however, contends that Laurence failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that Chevron's proffered reasons for the promotion decision were pretextual.

Chevron introduced evidence to support several reasons why Laurence was not promoted. First, it claimed the decision was consistent with its "no end run" policy. The "no end run" policy evolved as a means of protecting the expectations of employees who remained working "in the system" rather than going to Saudi Arabia. To realize this goal Pascagoula management does not permit employees who leave lower positions in Pascagoula and rise through the less-competitive ranks in Saudi Arabia to make an "end run" around employees who have worked within the Pascagoula system. In accordance with this policy, repatriated employees are returned to positions at the level from which they left. Since Laurence had arrived at Pascagoula only a short time before the Operating Assistant position became available, Pascagoula's failure to promote him was apparently consistent with this policy.

Operating Assistant positions are highly competitive--with only twelve of the positions available in a refinery of over one thousand employees. Chevron presented evidence that Pascagoula management has consistently selected Operating Assistants from only two groups: (1) Lead Engineers with engineering degrees from four-year accredited universities and with five years experience; and (2) "mustangs"--shift supervisors and refinery shift coordinators without engineering degrees who have worked numerous key positions at Pascagoula. Chevron introduced evidence that Laurence didn't fit either category, since his engineering degree was from a correspondence school and his experience did not include the requisite "mustang" jobs at Pascagoula. A Chevron management employee also testified that Laurence was not a viable candidate because he would not pass "the bulletin board test," which is the management's subjective evaluation of how a promoted individual will be accepted by rank and file workers.

As an additional reason for...