Laurence v. R.I. Dep't of Corr.

• Citation: 68 A.3d 543
• Decision Date: 20 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2012–197–Appeal.,2012–197–Appeal.
• Parties: Norman LAURENCE v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

68 A.3d 543

Norman LAURENCE

v.RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.

No. 2012–197–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 20, 2013.

Norman Laurence, Pro Se.

Thomas A. Palombo, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 7, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The pro se plaintiff, Norman Laurence (plaintiff or Laurence), appeals ¹ from two orders entered in a civil action against the defendants: (1) an order denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and (2) an administrative order restricting him from filing any pro se actions in Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and has been a frequent litigator in our courts. Indeed, plaintiff has presented claims to this Court, the Superior Court, and the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.² Consequently, this Court previously has had the opportunity to review many of the allegations made by plaintiff with respect to this claim.³

The entirety of plaintiff's history with the courts is extensive; for purposes of plaintiff's current appeal, the operative facts and travel are as follows. The plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court on November 18, 2003; he then moved to amend that complaint. That motion was granted on December 15, 2004. In his fifty-three page amended complaint, plaintiff named as defendants fifty-three specific individuals. Generally, the named defendants are employees of the ACI or the larger Department of Corrections (DOC) and A.T. Wall. The principal allegations in the amended complaint centered on the following claims: defendants violated plaintiff's right to privacy by using a hidden camera located in his prison cell to monitor and videotape plaintiff as he reviewed his “legal work” and “legal mail”; that defendants were monitoring his personal activities; that specific defendants displayed these videotapes to various people; and that defendants regularly harassed plaintiff.

The state subsequently filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. In support of that motion, the state argued that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The trial justice heard arguments on the state's motion. In a bench decision delivered at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial justice granted that motion. In her decision, the trial justice found that “a large portion” of the claims were barred by res judicata and, accordingly, she was satisfied that the action must be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12 and 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. An order and a final judgment granting the state's motion were entered on August 22, 2011. On appeal of that decision, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court after concluding that plaintiff failed to establish an issue of material fact; that his complaint did not contain a short and plain statement of claims pursuant to Rule 8(a)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; and that plaintiff had been afforded a full and fair hearing on the motion to dismiss. Laurence v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections, 59 A.3d 1182, 1184 (R.I.2013).

Meanwhile, plaintiff filed another complaint in Superior Court on August 22, 2011. Along with that complaint, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. This complaint named thirteen defendants—all employees of the DOC—and alleged violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff also asserted that his free speech was being constrained by “the use of physical violence, threats[,] blackmail[,] and extortion [,]” that his rights to the courts were being obstructed, and that he was being harassed because of his legal proceedings.⁴

In response, the state filed an objection to plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and argued that plaintiff had filed “numerous meritless actions” in both state and federal court and that his motion should be denied. The state further averred that plaintiff was abusing the state and the judiciary's limited resources. Based on these contentions, defendants asked that plaintiff's motion be denied and the case dismissed or, in the alternative, that the court decline to order a waiver of the filing fee. The defendants implored the court “to fashion a remedy to prevent [plaintiff's] ongoing, nonstop litigation against the DOC and literally every DOC official and officer.”

The motion to proceed in forma pauperis came before the trial justice on August 30, 2011.⁵ Initially, the trial justice indicated that she was “inclined to grant [plaintiff's] motion to proceed in forma pauperis with respect to the filing fees and the transcript fees for the hearing of July 22nd, 2011 [, PC 03–6046].” The state responded that it had no objection to that motion for transcript costs “on the appeal of the 2003 case,” but it expressed its intention “to take a very different position with regard to [plaintiff's new action, PC 11–4971].”

After setting forth the various factors to be considered in a noncriminal matter, including “[t]he need for finality,” the trial justice granted plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis as to the earlier case. When the trial justice turned to the new claim, PC 11–4971, the appeal of which is now before us, the state objected to plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion, arguing that plaintiff's new complaint comprised “similar allegations to [those] set forth in earlier cases,” including the allegations of interference with plaintiff's legal work, harassment and assault by correctional officers, and allegations regarding plaintiff's psychiatric report, and it noted that plaintiff had filed a number of “substantially similar cases.” The state asserted that plaintiff's case should be screened by the court and, further, that plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. In the alternative, the state argued that, if the case were allowed to go forward, plaintiff should be required to pay the filing fees from earnings from his prison job and money deposited in his account by people outside of the prison. The state concluded its argument by requesting that plaintiff's actions be halted, stating that, “at some point this has to come to an end” and “[a]t some point[,] the [c]ourt has to say enough, Mr. Laurence.”

The plaintiff began his response by describing his attempts to write and send letters to attorneys, but “the contents [of his letters were] all over the place” because “correctional officers spread a whole bunch of rumors about lawyers because of what they got from [his] legal work.” At this juncture, the trial justice interposed that she was inclined to deny plaintiff's motion; then she laid out her reasoning so that plaintiff could respond to it. The trial justice indicated that plaintiff's current action was a civil case, rather than criminal, and she would consider that factor. She also stated that plaintiff's pleadings did not comport with the requirements of Rule 8; the complaint, though “very detailed,” was “rambling” and “not concisely pled,” and the trial justice noted that “it was impossible * * * to discern against whom the various aspects of the[ ] claims [were] being alleged.” ⁶

In response, plaintiff requested additional time to amend his complaint. The trial justice asked plaintiff whether his case was “a continuation of the earlier patterns that [he] was alleging in [his] other cases[,]” and plaintiff answered, “Yes, [the case was] for things that have happened in 2000 for three years[,]” and he added that it “ha[d] gone on for a long time.”

After this exchange, plaintiff inquired as to whether he would be allowed to proceed with his lawsuit and whether the court could instruct him as to how many pages his complaint could be. The trial justice explained that “[i]t's not a question of pages,” but rather that “Rule 8 requires notice pleading, which means that when somebody reads the complaint, whether it's long or whether it's short, they really understand that they're a defendant and what claim specifically is being brought against them * * *.” After explaining that plaintiff's complaint was lacking in these regards, the trial justice denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered that the clerk not accept any new filings from plaintiff unless he was represented by counsel and further instructed that any pleadings must be signed by counsel in accordance with Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

Two orders entered on August 30, 2011. One order denied plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and to waive the filing fee in PC 11–4971, and also ordered that the clerk not accept any “new complaint, petition, pleadings, filings or papers” from plaintiff “unless he is represented by counsel” and the papers were signed by counsel pursuant to Rule 11. The other order—captioned “Administrative Order”—prohibited the clerks of the Superior Court from accepting “any pleadings or papers, including, but not limited to, complaints, petitions, motions, requests, claims, and causes of action brought by [plaintiff] or on his behalf unless said pleading or paper is signed by a licensed Rhode Island attorney in accordance with [Rule 11].” Notably, this order was not limited to filings in case PC 11–4971, nor did it exclude criminal cases or cases in which plaintiff might be named as a defendant; the order stated that “[t]he only exception * * * shall be with respect to * * * P.C. 03–6046 * * *.” In conclusion, the order directed that papers submitted by plaintiff be retained “[f]or purposes of record keeping only,”...