Laurensau v. Pluck
| Decision Date | 05 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-623 |
| Parties | JOSEPH LAURENSAU, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES PLUCK COI; RONALD YOURKIN; LYLE POZIVIAN, COI; WILLIAM SHRADER COIII; GARRET FINLEY COI; GERALD HONSAUER; ROBERT NELSON; ANTHONY KULIK; PAUL WALKER; DR. JINN; DR. CELESTE KOSTLENIK; DR. MICHELLE LUCAS; DR. ROBERT KRAK; FERNANDO NUNEZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Re: ECF Nos. 39, 43
Plaintiff Joseph Laurensau ("Plaintiff") is a prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"), who is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution ("SCI") at Graterford. Plaintiff brings this civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), alleging that Defendants Charles Pluck ("Pluck"), Ronald Yourkin ("Yourkin"), Lyle Poziviak ("Poziviak"), William Shrader ("Shrader"), Garret Finley ("Finley"), Gerald Honsauer ("Honsauer"), Robert Nelson ("Nelson"), Anthony Kulik ("Kulik"), Paul Walker ("Walker"), Dr. Celeste Kostlenik ("Kostlenik"), Dr. Robert Krak ("Krak"), Fernando Nunez ("Nunez") (collectively, "the DOC Defendants"), Dr. Jinn ("Jinn") and Dr. Michelle Lucas ("Lucas") (collectively, "the Medical Defendants"), violated his rights provided by the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution while he was incarcerated at SCI Greene in 2009 and 2010.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint submitted on behalf of the Medical Defendants, ECF No. 39, and a partial Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint submitted on behalf of the DOC Defendants. ECF No. 43. For the reasons that follow, the Medical Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint will be granted, and the DOC Defendants partial Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the issue of exhaustion, will granted as well.
Plaintiff initiated this suit on May 10, 2012, by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. ECF No. 1. The Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis was granted on October 16, 2012, and the Complaint, which Plaintiff submitted with the Motion, was filed on that same date. ECF Nos. 6, 7.
On January 7, 2013, the DOC Defendants filed a Motion for More Definite Statement arguing that the Complaint failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10 because it was simply a ten page rambling, disjointed and often repetitive commentary with no enumerated Counts and no numbered paragraphs. ECF Nos. 28, 29. This Court subsequently ordered Plaintiff to file a response to the DOC Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement and on January 29, 2013, rather than respond to the Motion, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 33. Although the Amended Complaint suffers from many of the same deficiencies as the original Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff purports to bring claims against the Medical Defendants for violating his rights provided by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution relative to the medical treatment he was provided; retaliation claims in violation of his rights provided by the First Amendment against Defendants Pluck, Yourkin, Poziviak, Shrader, Finley, Nelson, and Kulik; claims for violations of the Eighthand Fourteenth Amendments regarding conditions of confinement, excessive force, and lack of medical treatment against Defendants Pluck, Yourkin, Poziviak, Shrader, Finley, Honsauer, Nelson, Kulik, Walker Kostlenik, Krak and Nunez; and Fourteenth Amendment claims relative to nine allegedly false misconducts he received against Defendants Pluck, Yourkin, Shrader, Poziviak, Nelson, Kulik, Finley, Honsauer and Nunez.
The Medical Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 39, on February 27, 2013, and the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint submitted on behalf of the DOC Defendants was filed on March 5, 2013. ECF No. 43. Plaintiff filed a Response to the DOC Defendants' Motion on March 21, 2013, and a Response to the Medical Defendants' Motion on March 27, 2013. ECF Nos. 43, 47. As such, both Motions to Dismiss are ripe for review.
In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properlydismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) ().
Plaintiff has brought his claims pursuant to Section 1983, which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3 (1979) (footnote omitted). Thus, in order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it could be inferred that "the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States." Id. at 423.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights provided by the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.1
The Medical Defendants first argue that most, if not all, of the claims Plaintiff has brought against Defendant Jinn should be dismissed because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Congress did not specify a statute of limitations for actions arising under Section 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in, Kasteleba v. Judge, 325 F. App'x 153, 156 (3d Cir. April 28, 2009). Courts, therefore, are to consider Section 1983 actions as tort actions and borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury or tort actions from the appropriate state. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 278. The state statute of limitations for personal injury/tort actions in Pennsylvania is two years. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524. See Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). As such, for Section 1983 actions brought in the federal courts located within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the appropriate limitations period is two years. Id.
The statute of limitations requires that a complaint be filed within its time limits from the time a cause of action accrues. See Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. F.C.C., 76 F.3d 1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The date of accrual for claims brought under Section 1983 is governed by federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998). Under federal law "'the limitations period begins to run from thetime when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.'" Id., quoting Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp, 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir. 1991). See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. at 388 () (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Defendants contend that because Plaintiff's original Complaint was not filed until October 16, 2012, that any claims based on events that occurred more than two years earlier, or prior to October 16, 2010, are untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants' argument is misplaced.
Although the Complaint in this matter was not filed until October 16, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that where a pro se plaintiff submits a complaint along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis, the complaint is deemed to be constructively...
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