Laurent v. Costa.
| Decision Date | 05 November 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 664.,664. |
| Citation | 61 A.2d 804 |
| Parties | LAURENT v. COSTA. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.
Action by Major Astor Costa against Suzanne Laurent for return of a deposit on account of rent and other damages for breach of defendant's agreement to have a rented house ready for plaintiff's occupancy on specified date. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed, with instructions.
Richard L. Merrick, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Elmer E. Cummins and Charles H. Quimby both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.
On September 11, 1947, defendant Suzanne Laurent accepted a deposit of $500 from plaintiff on account of rent of her home, with the understanding that she would have certain painting, decorating and other work done to prepare it for plaintiff's occupancy. Claiming that defendant had breached her agreement plaintiff sued her for the return of his deposit and also for other items of damage allegedly resulting from such breach. The jury awarded plaintiff $878 and defendant appeals.
We think the judgment must be reversed because of error in eliminating from the case and withholding from the consideration of the jury certain evidence relating to a supplementary agreement which defendant claimed she had with plaintiff to extend the time for completion of painting, etc., by her.
According to plaintiff the original agreement, made when he paid the $500 deposit on September 11, was that defendant would have the house ready for his occupancy on October 1. Defendant's version of that agreement was that she did not agree to give possession on October 1, but that she told plaintiff the work would take at least a month and that plaintiff agreed, urging her ‘to have the house ready as soon as possible.’
On October 7 plaintiff wrote defendant demanding a definite understanding as to when the house would be ready for him. Defendant claimed then and at the trial that despite her strenuous efforts to get artisans in to do the work she had not been able to do so. Approximately October 20 the parties met at defendant's home. Present with them were a friend of plaintiff and also a real estate broker whose aid defendant had enlisted to expedite the work and who had undertaken to do so.
At that conference, according to testimony for defendant, it was agreed that the broker would assist in getting the work done promptly and that plaintiff would accept the property provided the work on the interior of the house was finished by November 1, and that the painting of the exterior would be done later. This was contradicted by plaintiff's testimony.
The trial judge ruled out this alleged agreement on the ground ‘that there was not sufficient additional consideration’ to make it effective. At the outset of his charge he told the jury that the new contract could not be considered and that they could only consider the original agreement of September 11. This, as we have said, was error; and the effect of it was to deprive defendant of a basic ground of valid defense.
There is no question that parties may modify an existing contract and by mutual agreement substitute new terms for old. 1 The parol evidence rule is not involved here because aside from plaintiff's check and defendant's receipt (which did not express the terms of the contract) the original agreement was entirely verbal.
We think it was error to rule that the new agreement was not supported by ‘sufficient additional consideration.’ Earlier in the trial the trial judge himself pointed out, in overruling plaintiff's motion to strike the testimony as to the new agreement, that consideration was present ‘and a promise for a promise does represent a consideration.’ At a later session he reserved ruling on the question and then at the close of the case, though defendant's version of the new agreement had in the meantime been clarified and strengthened by additional testimony, he ruled out the new agreement entirely. We mention this not to criticize the manner in which it was handled but to indicate that the final ruling was incorrect.
It has been held that with reference to an executory contract (as this one plainly was) the time of performance may be extended without any consideration other than the mutual consent of the parties 2 and that the original consideration extends over and supports the modified or extended contract. 3 It should be noted that the new agreement in this case involved more than a mere extension of time. 4 Here, according to defendant's evidence, the parties resurveyed the situation in its entirety and negotiated wholly new terms of performance. The evidence was in such a confused state as to the original agreement of September 11, that the jury...
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Houts, In re
...308 Ky. 128, 213 S.W.2d 806 (1948); Fresno City High School Dist. v. Dillon, 34 Cal.App.2d 636, 94 P.2d 86 (1939); Laurent v. Costa, 61 A.2d 804 (D.C.Mun.App.1948); 1 E. Thornton, Attorneys at Law, §§ 258, 263 On the question of the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the law requires such ......
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Graves v. P. J. Taggares Co.
...308 Ky. 128, 213 S.W.2d 806 (1948); Fresno City High School Dist. v. Dillon, 34 Cal.App.2d 636, 94 P.2d 86 (1939); Laurent v. Costa, 61 A.2d 804 (D.C.Mun.Ct.App. 1948); 1 E. Thornton, Attorneys at Law, §§ 258, 263 In re Houts, supra at 481, 499 P.2d at 1279. This rule is necessary to protec......