Laux v. State

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: BAKER
• Citation: Laux v. State, 985 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. App. 2013)
• Decision Date: 20 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 27A04–1205–PC–269.,27A04–1205–PC–269.
• Parties: Fredrick Allen LAUX, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.

985 N.E.2d 739

Fredrick Allen LAUX, Appellant–Petitioner,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.

No. 27A04–1205–PC–269.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Feb. 20, 2013.

Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Laura L. Volk, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Henry A. Flores, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

In this case, the appellant-petitioner, Fredrick Laux, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief after he was convicted of murdering his wife and receiving a sentence of life without parole (LWOP). Laux claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: 1) properly question a juror regarding bias; 2) object to alleged victim impact evidence; and 3) object to instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Laux also contends that his trial counsel did not adequately prepare for the penalty phase of the trial. Finally, Laux maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present these alleged errors on direct appeal.

Concluding that Laux has failed to show that he received the ineffective assistance of either trial or appellate counsel, we affirm the denial of Laux's request for postconviction relief.

FACTS

As set forth in Laux's direct appeal to our Supreme Court, the facts are as follows:

In June 2001, Heidi Laux separated from her husband Fred Laux, moved with her two daughters from Anderson to Marion, and began divorce proceedings. Soon thereafter, Laux also relocated to Marion, and moved into a house situated less than one mile from Heidi. On November 19, 2001, the divorce became final. On the following Valentine's Day, February 14, 2002, Laux personally delivered a rose and card to Heidi at her place of work. Heidi gave the rose to a friend, disposed of the card, and told Laux what she did with his offerings.

The next day, Heidi and Laux agreed to attend a dance sponsored by Heidi's employer. Laux had the daughters for weekend visitation and brought them with him to the dance. During the dance, Laux became increasingly suspicious that Heidi was involved with a co-worker. Laux left the dance around 8:00, went home, and played cards with his daughters before going to bed. Around 3 a.m. the following morning, Laux awoke and decided to “fix” Heidi. He dressed in two pairs of sweatpants, a sweatshirt, gloves, a hat, and a ski mask. He collected a flashlight and a crowbar and ran to Heidi's house.

Upon arrival, Laux used the crowbar to pry open a coal chute and gain entrance to Heidi's house. He entered the basement through the chute and made his way upstairs. Laux proceeded to Heidi's bedroom, struck her three times with the crowbar, strangled her, and left. She died from her injuries within twenty minutes.

The State charged Laux with murder, felony murder, and burglary resulting in bodily injury. It later requested a sentence of life in prison without parole. After a three-day trial, the jury found Laux guilty on all counts and recommended life in prison without parole. The trial court merged Laux's murder and felony murder convictions and sentenced him to life in prison without parole for the murder and a consecutive term of twenty years for the burglary.

Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816, 817–18 (Ind.2005).

At the penalty phase of the trial, the State called three witnesses, Drs. George Parker and Velma Atkinson, both of whom interviewed Laux following a motion for evaluations for competency, and Detective Stephen Dorsey. The State used the doctors' testimony to recount the facts of Laux's criminal offenses as he had described them during his evaluations. Laux cross-examined the doctors regarding their opinions as to his mental health.

Dr. Parker, a psychiatrist, determined that Laux suffered from “moderately severe major depression” but that the “severe mental disease” did not interfere with Laux's ability to distinguish between right and wrong. Tr. p. 431–32, 435–41. Dr. Atkinson, a psychologist, found no evidence of mental disease but diagnosed Laux with anti-social personality disorder. Dr. Atkinson also noted that, at the time of the offense, Laux was cognizant of distinguishing between right and wrong.

Laux testified and called the following witnesses: his priest, Father Richard Wiesenberger and Cathy Cole, who attended the same church and was one of his daughter's kindergarten teachers. Both witnesses testified about how Laux was a devoted Catholic, father, and husband, and his beliefs about divorce under Catholicism. Laux testified about the details of his actions and thoughts before, during, and after the murder. He also introduced evidence of his lack of criminal history, his employment history, being a graduate of Purdue University, and obtaining a new job to move closer to his children.

At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Laux murdered Heidi while he was committing burglary. The jury also found that the aggravating factors outweighed any proffered mitigators. As a result, the jury recommended a sentence of LWOP. The trial court ultimately sentenced Laux according to the recommendation of the jury. Laux was also ordered not to contact his children or his wife's family.

On direct appeal, Laux asserted that: 1) that Indiana's death penalty statute was unconstitutional because the jury need not find all elements of the alleged crime; 2) the inclusion of the order precluding him from having contact with his children or the victim's family was improper; 3) his convictions for both murder and felony murder violated double jeopardy principles; 4) his consecutive sentence for burglary after it was the aggravating circumstance for LWOP violated double jeopardy principles; 5) the trial court failed to assign appropriate weight to his lack of criminal history; and 6) his sentence was inappropriate. Laux, 821 N.E.2d at 818–23. In a 3–2 decision, our Supreme Court vacated the no-contact order, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. Id. at 823.

On May 11, 2011, Laux filed an amended petition for post post-conviction relief,¹claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to properly question a juror to reveal potential bias; 2) failing to object to alleged victim impact evidence/testimony; 3) failing to object to alleged irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; 4) admitting during closing argument that the State had proven its statutory aggravator in the penalty phase allegedly without Laux's consent; 5) failing to adequately prepare and investigate prior to the penalty phase of the trial; 6) admitting evidence of anti-social personality disorder; 7) failing to adequately cross-examine the mental health experts and to provide them with sufficient material to render an accurate diagnosis; 8) failing to object to testimony that did not relate to the statutory aggravator; and 9) failing to object when the trial court informed the jury they may be sequestered at the conclusion of the penalty phase but not because they were in danger.

Laux also maintained that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issues on appeal that his trial counsel did not raise pursuant to the fundamental error doctrine.

At the post-conviction hearing, Laux presented testimony from his trial and appellate counsel, a juror, Dr. Parker, Laux's sister, and a former co-worker. Laux's coworker and sister testified about Laux's positive traits, his childhood, and demeanor throughout the divorce.

The juror testified that she was harassed by a man who requested that she alter his pants. The harassment led to three acts of battery. Although the man believed that they were in a steady relationship, the juror denied this and further testified that the man raped her once but that she did not report it to the police. However, the juror unequivocally testified that she had no pre-conceived notions about Laux and that her verdict was based solely on the evidence presented and not on any prior incident.

Dr. Parker reaffirmed his diagnosis that Laux suffered only from major depression and criticized Dr. Atkinson's opinion that Laux suffered from antisocial disorder. Dr. Atkinson was unable to testify because she had died on November 19, 2004.

Laux's trial counsel testified that this was his first LWOP case and that to prepare, he read material from the Public Defender Council regarding those types of cases. Trial counsel also testified that his preparation for the penalty phase “was essentially similar to preparing for a sentencing hearing in a normal case.” Tr. p. 13, 31–32. However, the record demonstrates that prior to trial, Laux's trial counsel initiated proceedings for mental evaluations. Those evaluations were discussed, through testimony, during the penalty phase on cross-examination by counsel. The evidence also established that trial counsel reviewed the physicians' reports prior to the penalty phase and that he spoke to Dr. Atkinson before she talked to Laux and before Dr. Atkinson testified.

Laux's appellate counsel could not remember whether, or how, any alleged victim impact evidence was presented at Laux's trial, and therefore could not recall why he did not present such an argument. Laux's counsel on appeal also could not remember any evidence of non-statutory aggravators that were presented during the penalty phase. However, Laux's appellate counsel was able to discuss the reasons for pursuing the claims that were raised in his brief, including his arguments regarding the inappropriateness of Laux's sentence.

Following a hearing, the post-conviction court issued findings of facts and conclusions of law denying Laux's request for relief. It was determined that neither Laux's trial counsel nor his appellate counsel was ineffective. Laux now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review—Post–Conviction Relief

In reviewing the judgment...