Lauzen v. Lauzen

Decision Date10 April 1967
Docket NumberGen. No. 66--112
Citation225 N.E.2d 427,81 Ill.App.2d 472
PartiesLeo G. LAUZEN, Appellant, v. Violet LAUZEN, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Thomas A. Mass, Jr., Chicago, for appellant.

Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy & Hupp, Stephen J. Mrkvicka, Aurora, for appellee.

ABRAHAMSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Kane County wherein the court awarded defendant attorneys' fees and denied plaintiff attorneys' fees. The appeal before us is solely on the question of attorneys' fees.

On January 9, 1963, the Circuit Court of Kane County entered a decree of divorce in favor of Leo G. Lauzen, plaintiff herein, and against Violet Lauzen, the defendant, providing, among other things, that custody of the four minor children, ranging in age from 12 to 4 years, be awarded to defendant with liberal visitation rights granted to plaintiff. A property settlement agreement was incorporated into the decree which provided for the payment of $1,000 per month for the support of the minor children. It appears that subsequent to the divorce the four children refused to visit with their father. Plaintiff thereupon petitioned the Court for a modification of the decree seeking a change of custody, or in the alternate, specific visitation rights. Between February 19, 1965, and July 15, 1966, plaintiff filed numerous petitions seeking a change of custody attorneys' fees, a rule to show cause, visitation rights and modification of the support payments. Some 20 orders were entered during this period. Subsequently, the support money was reduced by 25% For failure to comply with the order of visitation. However, the rule to show cause was dismissed after hearing and a stipulation that the defendant had done nothing to discourage plaintiff's rights was entered.

The court entered an order allowing the defendant $3,000 for attorneys' fees and $343.05 costs, from which the plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff's theory of the case is that the attorneys' fees should not have been allowed to the defendant, but that they should have been allowed to him. In support of this theory the plaintiff asserts there was a failure to prove the essential elements which go to determine the amount of fees; that the record demonstrates that the defendant's ability to pay is greater than the plaintiff's, and lastly, that the defendant's resistance to the various petitions of the plaintiff was not made in good faith.

The awarding of attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of the Court. Roback v. Roback, 59 Ill.App.2d 222, 231, 207 N.E.2d 130; Jones v. Jones, 48 Ill.App.2d 232, 239, 198 N.E.2d 195, 10 A.L.R.2d 273. However, the amount of fees depends on the consideration of a number of factors including the nature of the controversy, the questions at issue, the significance or importance of the subject matter, the degree of responsibility involved, the standing and skill of the person employed, and the time and labor involved. Roback v. Roback, ibid. The courts may use the knowledge they have acquired in the discharge of professional duties as to the value of legal services rendered. Richheimer v. Richheimer, 59 Ill.App.2d 354, 365, 208 N.E.2d 346.

The defendant's attorney testified that he had practiced law for approximately 30 years before Federal and State Courts; that he had approximately 240 hours of time expended on this proceeding; that he had an A rating in Martindale-Hubbell; that the fair value of the services was at the rate of $50 per hour. Plaintiff's attorney concedes that the office records indicate 167 hours of time and that the reasonable customary charges made in cases of this nature are at the rate of $20 to $25 per hour for office work and $30 to $35 per hour for court time. It is interesting to note that the petition by the plaintiff for fees indicates that approximately 200 hours were expended on the proceeding and that the customary, reasonable charge for this is $25 an hour for office work and $35 an hour for court appearances.

Everett Jordan, an attorney with 33 years of experience, testified as an expert and in response to a...

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12 cases
  • Green v. Green, s. 58227
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 15, 1976
    ...notice that the minimum fee schedule then in force has been completely withdrawn by the Chicago Bar Association. In Lauzen v. Lauzen (1967), 81 Ill.App.2d 472, 225 N.E.2d 427, an award of $3,000 for attorney fees was affirmed. Counsel there testified that he expended 240 hours and that the ......
  • In re Tilmon
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 11, 1981
    ...financial resources of the parties. See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 22 Ill.App.3d 1045, 1050, 318 N.E.2d 282 (1974); Lauzen v. Lauzen, 81 Ill.App.2d 472, 476, 225 N.E.2d 427 (1967). Consequently, an award of attorney's fees in an Illinois divorce proceeding was ordinarily in the nature of This Cour......
  • Breuer v. Breuer
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 22, 1972
    ...660; Cimino v. Cimino, 93 Ill.App.2d 412, 418, 236 N.E.2d 299; Berg v. Berg, 85 Ill.App.2d 98, 101, 229 N.E.2d 282; Lauzen v. Lauzen, 81 Ill.App.2d 472, 476, 225 N.E.2d 427; Roback v. Roback, 59 Ill.App.2d 222, 231, 207 N.E.2d 130; and Jones v. Jones, 48 Ill.App.2d 232, 239, 198 N.E.2d See ......
  • Collins v. Collins
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 22, 1977
    ...he has acquired in the discharge of professional duties as to the value of legal services rendered (Lauzen v. Lauzen (2nd Dist. 1967), 81 Ill.App.2d 472, 475, 225 N.E.2d 427; Richheimer v. Richheimer (1st Dist. 1965), 59 Ill.App.2d 354, 265, 208 N.E.2d 346). In the case at bar, we find no a......
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