Lavalle v. Scruggs-Leftwich

• Decision Date: 10 September 1987
• Docket Number: SCRUGGS-LEFTWICH
• Citation: 519 N.Y.S.2d 218,133 A.D.2d 313
• Parties: In re Application of Gilda LAVALLE, Petitioner-Respondent, For a Judgment, etc., v. Yvonne, etc., Respondent-Appellant, and Elmars Jurjevics, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 218

519 N.Y.S.2d 218

133 A.D.2d 313

In re Application of Gilda LAVALLE, Petitioner-Respondent For a Judgment, etc., v.Yvonne SCRUGGS-LEFTWICH, etc., Respondent-Appellant and Elmars Jurjevics, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

Sept. 10, 1987.

A.R. Franquinha, S.M. Singer, T. O'Donnell, New York City, for petitioner-respondent.

J.C. Rose, New York City, for respondent-appellant.

Before MURPHY, P.J., and ROSS, ASCH, MILONAS and SMITH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Louis Grossman, J.), entered May 20, 1986, which granted the petition of Gilda Lavalle to the extent of annulling as arbitrary and capricious a determination of respondentState Division of Housing and Community Renewal(DHCR), dated October 10, 1984, finding that respondent-tenant Elmars Jurjevics qualified for eviction-exempt status pursuant to Section Y51-6.0(b)(1) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, as amended by Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1984, and which remitted the matter to respondent DHCR for further proceedings, unanimously reversed, on the law, respondent DHCR's determination is reinstated, and the petition denied and dismissed, without costs.

In August, 1983, petitioner landlord was granted a certificate of eviction entitling her to recover for her personal use and occupancy possession of premises occupied by respondent tenant.The tenant thereafter filed a protest to the Certificate of Eviction with respondentNew York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal(DHCR).While the tenant's appeal was pending before DHCR, the Legislature enacted Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1984, amendingSection Y51-6.0(b)(1) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.As is here relevant, the amendment barred issuance of a Certificate of Eviction entitling an owner to regain possession of premises for his or her own personal use and occupancy "where a member of the household lawfully occupying the housing accommodation ... has been a tenant in a housing accommodation in that building for twenty years or more...."The amendment further provided:

"The act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to any tenant in possession at or after the time it takes effect, regardless of whether the landlord's application for an order, refusal to renew a lease or refusal to extend or renew a tenancy took place before this act shall have taken effect...."(Laws of 1984, Chap. 234, section 4.)

In October, 1984, respondent DHCR granted the tenant's administrative appeal based upon its finding that upon the effective date of the above-cited amendment, the tenant had been in possession of the subject apartment for at least 20 years, and that he, therefore, came within the amendment's protective scope.

On Article 78 review, Special Term annulled the determination of DHCR and remanded for further proceedings.The court ruled that in computing the 20-year period from the time of the administrative appeal determination rather than from the date the landlord filed her application for a certificate of eviction, DHCR had employed an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the amendment.We see no basis whatsoever for this conclusion.Indeed, the amendment does not easily permit of any interpretation other than the one adopted by DHCR in deciding respondent tenant's appeal.

By its express terms the amendment, upon enactment, was to apply to any tenant lawfully in possession for 20 years or more, regardless of whether there had been a prior application for a certificate of eviction.Computation of the 20-year period in the manner suggested by Special Term effectively rewrites the amendment to limit its application to tenants in possession for 20 years, not as of the effective date of the legislation, but as of the time of landlord's application for a certificate of eviction.

Clearly, this reading is at odds not only with the amendment's plain language, but with its remedial purpose.The Legislature plainly...