Lavallee v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1889
• Citation: 41 N.W. 974,40 Minn. 249
• Parties: LAVALLEE v ST. PAUL, M. & M. RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

40 Minn. 249

41 N.W. 974

LAVALLEEvST. PAUL, M. & M. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 11, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Chapter 13, Gen. Laws 1887, making railroad companies liable to an employe for injuries caused by the negligence of a co-employe, applies only to those employes engaged in operating the railroads, and so exposed to the peculiar dangers attending that business.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; BRILL, Judge.

Henry C. James, for appellant.

M. D. Grover and Flandrau, Squires & Cutcheon, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

The plaintiff cannot recover, unless under chapter 13, Laws 1887. The deceased and the persons through whose negligence he received the injury from which he died were fellow-servants, and the injury occurred from their negligence, and no other cause, so that upon the principles of the common law there could be no recovery against defendant. Chapter 13 reads: “Every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in this state shall be liable for all damages sustained by any agent or servant thereof, by reason of the negligence of any other agent or servant thereof, without contributory negligence on his part, when sustained within this state, and no contract, rule, or regulation between such corporation and any agent or servant shall impair or diminish such liability: provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to render any railroad company liable for damages sustained by any employe, agent, or servant while engaged in the construction of a new road, or any part thereof, not open to public travel or use.” The question is whether this statute includes all employes, agents, and servants of a railroad corporation, without regard to the character of the business in which they are employed. Taken literally, it does. But it is evident that in some respects, at least, it cannot be taken literally; for, as the court below in its memorandum, in deciding the motion for a new trial, aptly says: “According to its terms, the company is liable without regard to whether the employe is injured in the course of his employment or not.” Of course, that could not have been intended. The plaintiff insists that the act applies to all employes; the defendant, that it applies only to those whose employment subjects them to the peculiar hazards pertaining to operating a railroad. From the authorities we get very little help in determining the question. Decisions from four states having statutes nearly similar to ours have been cited, to-wit, Georgia, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Kansas. In Thompson v. Banking Co., 54 Ga. 509, the supreme court held that the statute was not limited to any class of employes; and in Railroad Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499, when asked to reconsider its former decision, and the point was for the first time made that the act, if given unlimited operation, would be unconstitutional, the court adhered (much on the principle stare decisis) to its former decision, and also held the law constitutional. In Ditberner v. Railway Co., 47 Wis. 138,2 N. W. Rep. 69, the supreme court of that state held the statute of that state to be constitutional, and not to be limited to those employed in operating railroads. In Iowa, under the original act, (of 1862,) the supreme court in McAunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338, held the act valid on its assumption that it embraced only those employed in the business of operating a railroad; and in the case of Deppe v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 52, the court emphasized its previous construction of the act, saying: “The manifest purpose of the statute was to give its benefits to employes engaged in the hazardous business of operating railroads. When thus limited, it is constitutional; where extended further, it becomes unconstitutional.” The supreme court of Kansas, in Railway Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35, and Railway Co. v. Harris, 33 Kan. 416,6 Pac. Rep. 571, holds the act of that state, adopted from Iowa, to be valid, and gives it the same construction. In Herrick v. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 11,16 N. W. Rep. 413, this court held that the Iowa statute did not violate that clause in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which declares that “no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;” and in the case in Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205,8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161, the supreme court of the United States...