Lavelle v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. of Illinois

• Citation: 227 Ill.App.3d 764,169 Ill.Dec. 800,592 N.E.2d 287
• Decision Date: 26 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1-91-0449,1-91-0449
• Parties: , 169 Ill.Dec. 800 Thomas LAVELLE, Plaintiff, v. DOMINICK'S FINER FOODS, INC., et al., Defendants (Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; K & S Sprinklers, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee). First District, Fourth Division
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 287

592 N.E.2d 287

227 Ill.App.3d 764, 169 Ill.Dec. 800

Thomas LAVELLE, Plaintiff, v. DOMINICK'S FINER FOODS, INC., et al., Defendants (Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant; K & S Sprinklers Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee).

No. 1-91-0449.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fourth Division.

March 26, 1992.

James N. Kosmond, Michael Resis and Ellen L. Karecki of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, for third-party plaintiff-appellant, Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc.

Frank J. Smith of Murphy & Smith, Ltd., Chicago, for third-party defendant-appellee, K & S Sprinklers, Inc.

Presiding Justice JIGANTI delivered the opinion of the court:

Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., appeals from an order granting K & S Sprinklers Inc.'s motion to dismiss two counts of the third-party complaint. The complaint sought contractual indemnity from K & S and damages for K & S's failure to obtain insurance coverage.

Dominick's and K & S entered into a written contract for the installation of a fire protection sprinkler system in a Dominick's store located in Chicago. After K & S completed its work, Dominick's made final payments. The plaintiff, Thomas Lavelle, an employee of K & S, was injured when he fell while performing sprinkler installation work at the Dominick's store. Lavelle filed a complaint alleging negligence and violation of the Structural Work Act to recover damages for his personal injuries and named Dominick's as one of several defendants.

Dominick's filed a third-party complaint against K & S. In count I, which is not a subject of this appeal, Dominick's sought contribution from K & S for any damages assessed against Dominick's in the event it was found liable to the plaintiff. In count II of the third-party complaint, Dominick's sought indemnity from K & S pursuant to a contractual indemnity agreement. Count III alleged that K & S breached its contractual agreement with Dominick's to obtain insurance naming Dominick's as an additional insured.

K & S filed a motion to dismiss counts II and III of the third-party complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 2-619.) In its motion to dismiss, K & S argued that both counts II and III were expressly waived in a provision of the contract wherein Dominick's, upon final payment for completion of K & S's work, waived all claims against K & S. In the alternative, K & S argued, count II of the counterclaim must be dismissed, as a matter of law, because Dominick's was seeking indemnification for its own negligence, prohibited under section 1 of the Illinois Indemnification K & S further argued that count III of Dominick's counterclaim must also be dismissed, as a matter of law, because Dominick's impliedly waived the requirement for K & S to provide it with insurance when it failed to require K & S to file certificates of insurance prior to allowing K & S to begin work on the project. The trial court granted K & S's motion and dismissed counts II and III of the complaint.

[169 Ill.Dec. 802] Contracts or Agreements Act.

We first address the issue of the provision in the contract which K & S argues serves as an express waiver of all of Dominick's claims upon final payment. The specific provision reads as follows:

"ARTICLE 15

PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION

15.5 The making of final payments shall constitute a waiver of all claims by the Owner except those arising from (1) unsettled liens, (2) faulty or defective Work appearing after Substantial Completion, (3) failure of the Work to comply with the requirements of the Contract Documents, or (4) terms of any special warranties required by the Contract Documents. The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those previously made in writing and identified by the Contractor as unsettled at the time of the final Application for Payment."

K & S argues that the language of this portion of the contract is clear and unambiguous and should be construed to mean that, upon final payment to K & S, Dominick's waived all of its claims, including its claim for indemnification and insurance.

Dominick's, on the other hand, urges this court to view the waiver provision in the context of the entire contract. In particular, Dominick's points out that the waiver provision is found in an article of the contract concerning the progress of the work and compliance with the project specifications and was intended to operate as a waiver of claims which arose out of the completed work.

Dominick's further argues that any other interpretation of the waiver provision would render meaningless the indemnity and insurance provisions contained in the agreement since any claims which Dominick's would have against K & S for indemnification or breach of contract for failure to provide insurance were unlikely to arise or be discovered until after completion of the installation work.

It is the duty of the court to interpret a contract in accordance with the intention of the parties. (Continental Assurance Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1990), 194 Ill.App.3d 1085, 141 Ill.Dec. 711, 551 N.E.2d 1054; Stamatakis Industries, Inc. v. King (1987), 165 Ill.App.3d 879, 117 Ill.Dec. 419, 520 N.E.2d 770.) The court should give effect to the parties' intentions as determined by the language of the agreement. (West Suburban Mass Transit District v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 484, 155 Ill.Dec. 187, 569 N.E.2d 187.) Further, contracts should be interpreted as a whole, giving meaning and effect to each provision. (In re Support of Halas (1984), 104 Ill.2d 83, 83 Ill.Dec. 540, 470 N.E.2d 960; St. John v. City of Naperville (1987), 155 Ill.App.3d 919, 108 Ill.Dec. 551, 508 N.E.2d 1128.) If the terms of a contract are ambiguous, or capable of more than one interpretation, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the parties' intent. (Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (1990), 141 Ill.2d 281, 152 Ill.Dec. 308, 565 N.E.2d 990.) Language in a contract is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties do not agree upon its meaning. (Reynolds v. Coleman (1988), 173 Ill.App.3d 585, 123 Ill.Dec. 259, 527 N.E.2d 897.) Where the contractual provisions are unambiguous, the court will enforce them according to their plain meaning. Thornton v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co. (1981), 84 Ill.2d 365, 49 Ill.Dec. 724, 418 N.E.2d 744.

Neither of the parties have argued that the language of this provision in their contract is ambiguous. Rather, they argue different interpretations of the language. In considering the contract as a whole, we note that Article 15 is one of 20 Articles in the contract. Article 15 is entitled "Payments and Completion," and the provisions within this section of the contract concern payment for the work performed. In the waiver provision of Article 15, the owner agrees to waive "all claims" except for four itemized categories of claims. These exceptions to the claims which the owner agrees to waive are all related to the work performed by the contractor. Within the context of the entire document, we believe the waiver provision refers specifically to waiving "all claims" which are work related except for the four work-related exceptions. We do not believe that it was the parties' intent that Dominick's agree to waive any conceivable claim that it may have in the future against K & S upon final payment for the work. In particular, we do not believe that the parties intended to waive any future claims for indemnification or insurance. Accordingly, we find that Dominick's did not waive its claim for indemnification and breach of contract to procure insurance, as set forth in counts II and III of its complaint.

We next address Dominick's contention that count II of the third-party complaint stated a claim for contractual indemnity which should not have been dismissed at the pleading stage. The following provisions in the contract are at issue. The addendum to the contract states:

"Contractor shall indemnify Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. its agents and employees from any and all loss, claims, demands caused in whole or in part by any negligent or intentional act or omission of the contractor. This indemnification shall in no way limit the indemnification of Article 10.11 of the Abbreviated Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor which is incorporated in its entirety by reference."

Section 10.11 of the contract provides:

"To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless...