Law Offices of Snider & Assocs., LLC. v. Gates
| Decision Date | 28 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:10–cv–01822 CRC |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.3d 100 |
| Parties | Law Offices of Snider and Associates, LLC., Plaintiff, v. Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, Defense Finance and Accounting Service Agency, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
James Lawrence Fuchs, Snider and Associates, LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.
Rhonda Lisa Campbell, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Snider and Associates, LLC., a Baltimore, Maryland law firm, filed a FOIA request for payroll records of civilian employees of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service Agency (“DFAS”) denied Snider's request because, according to its record-keepers, the sole information system that houses these records can only be searched by inputting the social security number of each employee and Snider did not provide social security numbers for the employees whose records it sought. Although DFAS's declarations are less detailed than would be ideal, it has put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it conducted an adequate search, and Snider has not provided sufficient evidence to contradict DFAS's proffers. The Court will thus grant DFAS's motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, Snider and Associates, LLC requested from DFAS payroll and related information for certain civilian employees of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Def.'s Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 1–2. It requested spreadsheets of “overtime worked and all overtime pay,” “compensatory time” earned and used, and “credit hours” earned, used, and left unused regarding “all Bargaining Unit Employees of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, including all bargaining unit employees represented by AFGE Local 22 (BUS Code 3273),” along with “each employee's first and last name, pay rate, position title, Agency position number, position description number, job series, grade, step, and FLSA exemption status (E or N).” Compl. Ex. 1 at 1–2. DFAS advised Snider that it “do[es] not maintain electronic spreadsheets or electronic lists with the information indicated in [Snider's] request;” that its “payroll records for Department of Navy civilian employees, ... do not include information regarding bargaining unit employee status and/or the exclusive representative for bargaining units;” and that DFAS “does not have records indicating position titles, Agency position numbers, and position description numbers of employees of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, who are Department of Navy and not DFAS employees.” Def.'s Mot for Summ. J. Ex. C at 1–2.
Snider responded by letter to DFAS, contending that the agency “can easily identify the proper records to produce to us” because Snider “receive[s] payroll data identical to that requested under this FOIA from DFAS all the time in other cases.” Id. Ex. D at 1. Moreover, Snider claimed that counsel for the Norfolk Naval Shipyard “has been trying to get this data from DFAS for years, directly and through [the shipyard's] personnel office.” Id. DFAS, while continuing to process Snider's FOIA request, informed the firm that “to conduct a search for the records you are seeking, it is imperative that you provide us with the full social security number of the individuals about whom you seek records.”Id. Ex. E.
Snider filed suit to compel DFAS to produce the requested records. Compl. ¶¶ 4–8. Moving for summary judgment, DFAS argues that it has satisfied its burden to demonstrate an adequate search. In support of its motion, it submits the declaration of Jeffrey Presley, “Deputy Director of Civilian Pay Operations at the DFAS site in Cleveland, Ohio[,]” First Presley Decl. ¶ 2, which states that the Defense Civilian Payroll System (DCPS) is the only record system in DFAS likely to contain responsive records and that it requires social security numbers to access the relevant records. Id. ¶¶ 5,7. Snider apparently has not provided the necessary social security numbers. See Def.'s Mot for Summ. J. Ex. D, E.
Snider opposes summary judgment, arguing that DFAS's declarations are conclusory and that its exhibits disprove DFAS's contention that social security numbers are required to search for employee records. Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. at 9–10, 13–15. Snider has also moved for discovery, including Presley's deposition. Pl.'s Mot. for Discovery at 4–6.
“It is typically appropriate to resolve FOIA cases on summary judgment.” Shapiro v. Dep't of Justice, 969 F.Supp.2d 18, 26 (D.D.C.2013), appeal dismissed, 13–5345, 2014 WL 1378748 (D.C.Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C.Cir.2011) ). The Court should grant summary judgment where the pleadings, stipulations, affidavits, and admissions in a case show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ; accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must accept as true the evidence and draw all reasonable interferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
“In the FOIA context, the government must demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute regarding the adequacy of its search for or production of responsive records.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 971 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2013) (citing Nat'l Whistleblower Ctr. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 849 F.Supp.2d 13, 21–22 (D.D.C.2012) ). “The agency must ‘show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.’ ” Negley v. FBI, 658 F.Supp.2d 50, 57 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Oglesby v. Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990) ). This Circuit has long “required agencies to make more than perfunctory searches and, indeed, to follow through on obvious leads to discover requested documents.” Valencia–Lucena v. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C.Cir.1999). “If the record leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Id. (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C.Cir.1998) ).
“Summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. Dep't of Agric., 455 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.2006). An agency affidavit is to be afforded “substantial weight[ ] so long as it ... is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency's bad faith[.]”Judicial Watch v. Dep't of Defense, 715 F.3d 937, 940–41 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quotation omitted). Government affidavits “cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’ ” Safe C ard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C.Cir.1981) ).
DFAS “must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68 (citing Weisberg v. Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984) ). It can satisfy this burden through affidavits that “adequately describe the agency's search[,]” id. but not ones containing “ ‘claims [that] are conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, or ... too vague or sweeping.’ ” Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Hayden v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C.Cir.1979) ).
Although terse, DFAS's affidavits are specific enough to enable the Court to determine that an adequate search was performed. DFAS “cannot limit its search to only one record system ... if there are others that were ‘likely to turn up the information requested.’ ” Negley, 658 F.Supp.2d at 57 (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68 ). According to Presley's declaration, however, DCPS is the only information system within DFAS likely to contain payroll information for Norfolk Navy Shipyard employees and it requires social security numbers to perform a search. Second Presley Decl. ¶ 7. As the “Deputy Director of Civilian Pay Operations at the DFAS site in Cleveland, Ohio,” First Presley Decl. ¶ 2, which is the DFAS site that processes Department of the Navy civilian employee payroll transactions, North Decl. ¶ 5; Second Presley Decl. ¶ 7, Presley appears to be in a position within the agency to know whether alternative record systems exist that are likely to turn up relevant documents. Cf. Am. – Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 516 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C.2007) ().
Presley's declaration is similar to the government's affidavit in American–Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee v. Department of Homeland Security, 516 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C.2007), where the government sought summary judgment in a FOIA suit seeking data on the nationality of 230 individuals detained in an “enforcement initiative by ICE[,]” by submitting an affidavit that “ICE does not maintain information relating to ethnicity and religion.” Id. at 86–87 (internal quotations and brackets in original omitted). While acknowledging that this statement “[v]iewed in isolation ... is akin to simple ipse dixit [,]” because of the affiant's “role as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations[,]” the court “presumed [him] able...
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