Law v. People Ex Rel. Louis C. Huck

• Decision Date: 30 September 1877
• Citation: 1877 WL 9871,87 Ill. 385
• Parties: IDA IRENE LAW et al.v.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Louis C. Huck, Collector, etc.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

87 Ill. 385

1877 WL 9871 (Ill.)

IDA IRENE LAW et al.

v.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Louis C. Huck, Collector, etc.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1877.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. MARTIN R. M. WALLACE, Judge, presiding.

This was an application, by the treasurer and ex officio collector of revenue of Cook county, made at the July term, 1876, of the county court, for judgment for taxes against lands and lots alleged to be delinquent for the year 1875, and for back taxes and forfeitures to the State, together with interest and costs due and unpaid thereon. To that application defendants appeared, as objectors, for property described in the record, in which they allege they were severally interested. Their objections were overruled, judgment entered in the usual form as prescribed in the statute, and it is upon their several appeals the cause is to be heard in this court.

Mr. JOHN BORDEN, Mr. JOHN P. WILSON, and Mr. EDWARD ROBY, for the appellants.

Mr. FRANCIS ADAMS, Mr. JOHN M. ROUNTREE, and Mr. CHARLES H. MORSE, for the appellees.

Mr. WILLIAM H. HOLDEN, for West Chicago Park Commissioners.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

It appears that the bonded indebtedness of the city of Chicago has, at all times since the adoption of our present constitution, been more than five per cent on the assessed value of the taxable property in the city, as ascertained for State and county taxation. And it further appears, that notwithstanding such bonded indebtedness, the city has each year, since 1872, if not previous to that time, issued certificates of indebtedness for temporary loans, bearing interest, intended to be paid out of the revenue levied for the current year, but not so stated in the certificates, and upon which money was loaned to and used by the city to meet its expenses.

On the 10th day of August, 1875, the city, by ordinance, in detail, levied various sums to meet the expenses of the various departments of the city government, aggregating the sum of $5,123,905.29, reciting that it was the total amount of appropriations previously made by the city to meet its expenses, in accordance with the law.

There are, amongst the items thus appropriated and levied, these: “For payment of interest on general bonded (municipal) debt of the city, and on temporary loans, in addition to the unexpended balance of April 1, 1875, and to amounts for interest, $300,000.” Another, “For entertaining official visitors, $2000.” “For interest on temporary loans for this (water) fund, $40,000.” “For interest on temporary loans for fire department, $25,000.” “For interest on temporary loans (police department), $25,000.” These levies were made in pursuance of an ordinance adopted on the 30th of June, 1875, making the several appropriations for the purposes named.

There were outstanding certificates for temporary loans, issued after the constitution went into effect and on the first day of April, 1875, for the sum of $3,000,000, or more. On the 31st day of December, of that year, these certificates outstanding amounted to $4,500,000. The evidence shows the item of $300,000, appropriated and levied as before stated, was for interest on the bonded debt and on temporary loans then outstanding; for interest on the bonded debt the sum of $251,310 was required; and the remainder, $48,690, was to meet the interest on temporary loans. Thus, we see, there was levied for the payment of interest on temporary loans, by that ordinance, $138,690, which we understand to be in addition to an unexpended balance of a fund previously appropriated and levied to meet interest on these temporary loans.

It is insisted, that all of the first item levied to pay interest on temporary loans is unauthorized and void, and all of the other specified items, as above, were prohibited by the constitution from being levied; that the city was not only without power, but is expressly prohibited by the constitution and charter from making these loans, as the city was indebted beyond the constitutional limit when these temporary loans were made, to pay the interest on which this tax was levied; that these debts are illegal and void, and, being so, the city had no power to levy a tax to pay interest on a void debt, and the levy can not be enforced.

The constitutional provision supposed to be violated by the issuing of these certificates for temporary loans, is the first clause of the 12th section of art. 9, and is this: “No county, city, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness.”

The language of this clause is clear, explicit and emphatic, that no city shall be allowed to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, beyond the prescribed limit. The city of Chicago was indebted beyond the limit when these certificates were issued, and if they, in any manner or for any purpose, create an additional indebtedness beyond that limit, they are clearly prohibited. The language prescribing the limit is so plain as to admit of no doubt, and forbids all construction, and the provision must be enforced as it is written. When the intention of the framers of the constitution is ascertained, it must, as all will concede, be held paramount to all other powers in the State. It embodies the sovereign power of the State, by virtue of which, and by which alone, all legislative, executive and judicial power is exercised. It is the source to which all the departments of government, and all of its officers must ultimately look, to authorize or sanction their official acts. It not only confers, but it limits the exercise of governmental powers to the mode prescribed.

This prohibition was manifestly intended to limit the power of the General Assembly, municipalities and all others, in the creation of indebtedness by these bodies to the amount named, and they can not, either separately or conjointly, transcend that limit. It is the command of the supreme power of the State, and it must be obeyed. Nor is there lodged, in our form of government, in any department or functionary, any authority to dispense with this or other provisions of the fundamental law, or to mitigate its requirements.

It has also been repeatedly held, and is regarded as settled doctrine, that all negative or prohibitory clauses of this character found in a constitution execute themselves, as legislative provisions, in the same or other language, prohibiting the incurring of such indebtedness, could be no more binding or forcible than the constitution itself. But even if that were possible, the city charter has prescribed the same limit to its power to create indebtedness, and in almost the same terms of the constitution. (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 218, sec. 62.) If the General Assembly were to impose a penalty for the violation of this prohibition, that would add nothing to the invalidity of the act. If that body were to add a sanction to this violation of the prohibition, by imposing penalties and forfeitures on those who should violate this provision, that could not lend the slightest force to the prohibition. Such an enactment might deter officers from violating this section, but it could accomplish no more.

Did these certificates, issued to procure temporary loans of money, in any manner or for any purpose, create an indebtedness? When issued, negotiated and delivered, did they purport to become debts? They have all of the essential forms of evidences of indebtedness, and that they purport to create indebtedness seems to be so plain a proposition, that we are at a loss to know how to discuss it or to render it more manifest, than by the mere statement of the proposition. We apprehend, these certificates, stating that the city owes the holder a specified sum of money, and promising to or directing the treasurer to pay it at a specified time, or otherwise, are debts, according to the definition of the word as given by any English dictionary, and we apprehend, among the people, no one, according to the general understanding of the word, would say they are not evidences of indebtedness owing by the city. And if this is the generally accepted meaning of the word, as we think all must concede, then, according to the canons of interpretation, we must presume it was used in that sense by the framers of the fundamental law, unless it is apparent, from the instrument itself, that the word was intended to be used in a different sense. No such intention appears, when the entire section and article are examined. The framers of the article could not have used the term in the sense that the sum must be due, to be indebtedness, as that is not the generally received meaning of the word, and to apply such a meaning would remove all limit on the amount of indebtedness that might be incurred, except the extent of the credit of the municipality. Such debts are usually created on time, and if such are not prohibited, then, if persons could be found to purchase such paper, the indebtedness could be increased even beyond the value of all the property in the city. Hence, such could not have been the meaning attached to the language by those who adopted the provision, and for us to apply such a strained meaning to the word, would defeat the obvious purpose of the convention and the people who adopted the constitution thus framed.

It is said, that to so hold will work great hardship and injustice on the holders of these certificates of indebtedness. The same may be frequently said of any other persons who violate the law, or act contrary to its provisions. The persons loaning this money did it in the face of this constitutional provision, and the...