Law v. Vannoy
Decision Date | 27 December 2018 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 1:17-CV-01068 |
Parties | DEMARCUS W. LAW v. DARRELL VANNOY, WARDEN |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Demarcus W. Law ("Law") filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Law has not carried his burden of proving he is entitled to habeas relief, his § 2254 petition should be denied.
Law filed a § 2254 habeas petition contesting his 2012 conviction by a jury in the Louisiana 10th Judicial District Court in Natchitoches Parish, on one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted second-degree murder (Doc. 1). Law was sentenced to life plus fifty years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. (Doc. 1); See State v. Law, 2012-1024 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/3/13), 110 So.3d 1271, writ den., 2013-0978 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 475.1
Law raises the following grounds for habeas relief:
Respondent answered the petition (Doc. 22), and Law filed a reply (Doc. 23). Law's habeas petition is now before the Court for disposition.
The facts of this case as set forth by the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit at Law, 110 So.3d at 1272-73, are as follows:
The Court is able to resolve this habeas corpus petition without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing because there is no genuine issue of material fact relevant to the petitioner's claims, and the state court records provide the required and adequate factual basis. See Moya v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 329, 332-33 (5th Cir. 1983); Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 761 (5th Cir. 1980); Habeas Corpus Rule 8(a).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall be considered only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The role of a federal habeas court is to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not to apply de novo review of factual findings and to substitute its own opinions for the determination made on the scene by the trial judge. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2202 (U.S. 2015) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214, which is applicable to habeas petitions filedafter its effective date on April 24, 1996, habeas relief is not available to a state prisoner with respect to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. den., 534 U.S. 885 (2001).
Therefore, § 2254(d) demands an initial inquiry into whether a prisoner's "claim" has been "adjudicated on the merits" in state court; if it has, AEDPA's highly deferential standards apply. See Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).
When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has summarily denied relief without a statement of reasons, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits, in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. A habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported, or could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner'sburden must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
Pursuant to AEDPA, pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1), and questions of fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(2). See Martin, 246 F.3d at 475-76.
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. A state court decision falls within the "unreasonable application" clause when it unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent to the facts. See Martin, 246 F.3d at 476; see also Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. den., 555 U.S. 827 (2008).
A federal habeas court making the unreasonable application inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively reasonable. A federal court cannot grant habeas relief simply by concluding that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously; the court must conclude that such application was also unreasonable. See Martin, 246 F.3d at 476. An unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). When a state court determines that a constitutional violation is harmless, a federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself wasunreasonable. See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); see also Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (citing Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007)).
To prevail on a habeas complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel, a complainant must meet the two-pronged test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. A defendant is prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. To make that determination, the court must examine the proceedings as a whole, giving due consideration to the weight of the evidence supporting the verdict and evaluating the alleged failings of counsel in that total setting. The court does not assess any alleged error in isolation. In an examination of state proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court will not reject an adjudication on the merits unless the action by the state court is found to be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or the state court's determination of the facts is manifestly unreasonable in light of the evidence. Jones v. Cain, 227 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2000), and cases cited therein.
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. den., 532 U.S. 915 (2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Thus,the court's scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. The court must be particularly wary of arguments that essentially come down to a matter of degrees, such as whether counsel investigated enough or presented enough mitigating evidence. Those questions are even less susceptible to judicial second-guessing. See Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 743 (citing Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 703 (5th Cir. 1999)).
In a habeas proceeding alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has the burden of proof. See U.S. v. Chavez, 193 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. den., 513 U.S. 966 (1994)).
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