Lawler v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 14 February 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-7702,81-7702 |
| Citation | 698 F.2d 439 |
| Parties | 31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 11, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,350 Joseph C. LAWLER, Timothy Goggins, and Charles L. Bryant, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clifford ALEXANDER, as head of the United States Department of the Army, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Vanzetta Penn Durant, Montgomery, Ala., Brent Simmons, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Ann Robertson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., Thomas J. Feeney, Headquarters, Dept. of Army, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before HILL and FAY, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the decision of the district court entered in an employment discrimination class action. The trial court found against the appellants on the class and individual claims. For the reasons stated below we remand.
This action was originally filed on December 20, 1977, charging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16 (1976). On December 20, 1978, the case was certified as a class action on behalf of all black employees in competitive service positions at Ft. McClellan, Alabama, who, on or after November 3, 1976, were discriminatorily denied promotions. Defendants objected to the class and made a motion for decertification or, in the alternative, redefinition of the class. The court responded by limiting the class to all appropriated fund employees who, on or after November 3, 1976, "have failed to be selected for a position they were referred ... [or] have been misassigned by their supervisor ... or have been unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain a requested reclassification of their jobs." Record on Appeal at 134. This redefinition of the class considerably narrowed the potential plaintiffs and more importantly changed the substantive value of much of the evidence presented.
The limiting of the class to those employees who have been "referred" involves some explanation and background regarding Ft. McClellan's promotion practices. Ft. McClellan is a United States Army installation primarily engaged in the training of soldiers. The promotion process at Ft. McClellan begins when a position becomes vacant or is newly established. 1
Initially, a description of the available position is compiled and circulated to all employees. The applicants are then given performance analyses and appraisals. The civilian personnel office reviews the applications and eliminates those candidates who are not minimally qualified. The remaining qualified candidates are further evaluated on their performance by reviewing their experience, education, and other relevant criteria. The applicants are then assigned points on a scale from 1-100. After all points are assigned, the "best qualified" top ranking candidates are "referred" to the selecting official. This usually encompasses the top 4 or 5 candidates. It is only these top 4 or 5 "referred" candidates who comprise the class membership under the trial court's redefinition of the class. The selecting official chooses the candidate for the job and fills out a form indicating his or her choice and the reasons for that choice. 2
The first issue raised upon appeal is the redefinition of the class, limiting the class to only those candidates who had been "referred." This removed from the class all persons who had applied for promotion, but whom, after being ranked, failed to be among the top five candidates.
While no specific objection to the definition of the class was made, it is clear from the record that the class plaintiffs urged the court to consider all those applicants who were encompassed in the original class designation. The plaintiffs, in their second set of interrogatories, which were developed after the redefinition of the class order, requested data and information pertaining to Ft. McClellan's promotion practices at the pre-referral stage. Defendant's response to this request was that any information regarding practices at pre-referral stage was irrelevant and beyond the scope of the litigation of the case. Plaintiffs responded with a Motion to Compel and a conference was held with the court. The trial judge concluded that this information was relevant and that defendants must respond to the interrogatories. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and the subsequent conference demonstrate plaintiffs' objections to the redefinition of the class. We conclude that plaintiffs' actions sufficiently called to the district court's attention their opposition to the redefinition order limiting the class. In light of our recent holding in Roofing & Sheet Metal Service, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982 at 989-990...
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