Lawler v. Murphy
Decision Date | 30 December 1889 |
Citation | 58 Conn. 294,20 A. 457 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | LAWLER v. MURPHY et al. |
Appeal from superior court, Hartford county.
C. E. Gross, for appellant. C. E. Perkins and A. Perkins, for appellees.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the superior court sustaining the defendants' demurrer. The cause of demurrer upon which the issue was found for the defendant alleges that it appears from the contract for a breach of which the suit was brought that the only agreement made therein was to pay such sum as might be received from a death assessment, and that it is not alleged in the complaint that any such sum was ever received. To understand the force of this objection, and the considerations applicable to it, it is necessary to set out the contract in full. It is as follows:
Is it true, as claimed by the defendants, and in the sense in which they claim it, that the only agreement contained in the above contract is to pay such sum as might be received from a death assessment? Or, to put it in another form, what does the agreement to pay a sum received from a death assessment imply and involve, when taken in connection with the other provisions of the contract? The contract is a peculiar one. It is very inartificially drawn, and it is undoubtedly difficult to give it a satisfactory construction. Of course, it should be so construed as to make its contemplated benefits available, if it can legally be done; and we are at least warranted in assuming that the insurers in accepting the money of the insured, and the insured in paying it, understood that some duty devolved upon the former to secure the promised benefits of the contract to the latter. In addition to the agreement to pay to Mary Lawler, if living, if not, to the heirs of Thomas, in 60 days after due proof of his death, a sum received from a death assessment, but not to exceed $1,000, the contract further provides that the death claim shall be payable in 60 days after satisfactory proof of such death, except in certain cases not necessary to be stated here, and gives the form of notice and process for collecting the death assessment from each member of the association. Each contract contains also a promise by the insured that, upon the death of any member, he will at once pay, if required, to the secretary an additional assessment of whatever the directory shall deem necessary, additional, as the contract shows, to the dollar paid upon becoming a member. This is an agreement by the A. O. H. Insurance Fund to pay the proper person, within 60 days after satisfactory proof of the death of the insured, a sum, not to exceed $1,000, received from a death assessment. The contract contains the agreement of members to pay such assessments, and specifies the process by which its collection shall be undertaken,—"a notice shall be sent" announcing such assessment, etc. All of which, taken in connection with the other provisions of the contract, and the situation and manifest intention of the parties, seems to us to import a promise to make, or cause to be made, the necessary assessment to meet the death claim promised to be paid. It is well established that whatever is necessary to be done in order to accomplish work specifically contracted to be performed is parcel of the contract, though not specified. It is also a principle of general application that whatever may be fairly implied from the terms or language of an instrument is, in judgment of law, contained in it. Currier v. Railroad Co., 34 N. H. 498; Rogers v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114. Addison, in his work on Contracts, (section 1400,) says: "Although the words of a contract under seal do not in themselves import any express covenant, yet the law, in order to promote good faith, and make men act up to the spirit as well as to the letter of their engagements, will create and supply, as a necessary result and consequence of the contract, certain covenants and obligations, which bind the parties as...
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