Lawlor v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi.
| Decision Date | 13 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-117 |
| Parties | DENIS LAWLOR and DANIEL VARALLO, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the motion to dismiss [32] filed by Defendants Major Luis Gutierrez, Lieutenant Cynthia Tencza, Karen Stec, and the Illinois State Police (collectively, the ), the motion to dismiss [35] filed by Defendants Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago ("MWRD"), Kaye Heidenreich, David St. Pierre, and Denise Korcal (collectively, the "MWRD Defendants), and the motion to dismiss [38] filed by Defendant Motorola Solutions, Inc. ("Motorola"). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions to dismiss [32; 35; 38] are granted. To the extent Plaintiffs' claims are not dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiffs are given until April 16, 2018 to file an amended complaint, if Plaintiffs believe they can cure the deficiencies identified below. The case is set for status on April 24, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.
This lawsuit stems from the alleged malfunction of a handheld radio manufactured by Motorola, which caused a conversation between Plaintiffs Denis Lawlor and Daniel Varallo to be inadvertently broadcast over a radio channel dedicated to the Illinois State Police. A recording of the conversation was copied and given to Plaintiffs' employer, resulting in their termination.
Plaintiffs Denis Lawlor and Daniel Varallo were police officers for the MWRD. [1, at ¶¶ 15-16.] At approximately 1:00 a.m. on January 18, 2015, Plaintiffs were engaged in what they characterize as a private conversation, which was intercepted by the Illinois State Police's Chicago North radio channel. Id. at ¶ 30. Only the Illinois State Police were authorized to access and broadcast on the Chicago North radio channel. Id. at ¶ 30. The conversation between Plaintiffs lasted approximately 58 minutes. Id. at ¶ 32.
Illinois State Police Telecommunication Specialist Angie Vandenberg, who was working as the dispatcher on the Chicago North radio channel, did not recognize the voices of the persons talking. Id. at ¶ 33. Vandenberg used an alert tone in an attempt to get Plaintiffs' attention and attempted to instruct Plaintiffs to stop talking, but the transmission of the conversation between Plaintiffs continued. Id. at ¶ 34. Vandenberg admitted that she recognized that Plaintiffs' conversation was personal in nature and did not involve official Illinois State Police business or a public safety matter. Id. at ¶ 36.
Acting Master Sgt. Rodney Collins, who was the midnight shift commander that night, listened to the entire conversation between Plaintiffs as the conversation was being transmitted over the Illinois State Police's Chicago North radio station. Id. at ¶ 38. Sgt. Collins realized that the conversation between Plaintiffs did not have anything to do with any official Illinois StatePolice business or public safety matter. Id. at ¶ 39. About 40 minutes into the private conversation between Plaintiffs, Sgt. Collins figured out that it was MWRD personnel who were inadvertently broadcasting over the Chicago North channel of the Illinois State Police. Id. at ¶ 30. Sgt. Collins then called Sgt. Patrick Kennedy at the MWRD, and the transmission ended shortly after. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiffs allege that the Illinois State Police recorded the entire private conversation between Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs do not indicate whether the Illinois State Police always recorded the Chicago North radio channel. Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiffs also fail to indicate who at the Illinois State Police recorded the conversation.
After the incident, Sgt. Collins sent an email to his supervisor Captain Luis Gutierrez (a State Defendant) to document the incident. Id. at ¶ 43. Defendant Gutierrez instructed Sgt. Collins to open an investigation after the incident to determine whether or not there was any criminal violation. Id. at ¶ 44. Defendant Gutierrez verbally requested Karen Stec (a State Defendant) to provide him with a copy of "the communication." Id. at ¶ 45. Defendant Stec had experienced several open mic situations in the past, but had never recorded any other open mic situation to a CD. Id. at ¶ 46. After listening to the conversation, Defendant Gutierrez realized that the conversation had nothing to do with an emergency situation. Id. at ¶ 51. Defendant Gutierrez then gave Illinois State Police Lieutenant Cindy Tencza (a State Defendant) a CD containing Plaintiffs' conversation and directed her to conduct an investigation. Id. Defendant Gutierrez noted, however, that any such investigation should be closed if the MWRD conducted an internal investigation. Id.
Defendant Gutierrez did not receive a formal written request or a subpoena from the MWRD for the CD containing the recording of the private conversation between Plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 52. Rather, Defendant Tencza spoke with Kaye Heidenreich (an MWRD Defendant), theChief of Police for the MWRD, and Defendant Tencza volunteered to give Defendant Heidenreich the CD containing the recording of Plaintiffs' conversation, which she did on January 22, 2015. Id. at ¶ 53. After Defendant Heidenreich listened to the CD containing the recording of Plaintiffs' conversation, Denise Korcal (an MWRD Defendant), the Director of Human Resources for the MWRD, was summoned to Defendant Heidenreich's office to listen to a portion of Plaintiffs conversation. Id. at ¶¶ 58-59. Defendant Korcal called David St. Pierre (an MWRD Defendant), the Executive Director of the MWRD, and ordered that copies and a transcript of Plaintiffs' conversation be made. Id. at ¶¶ 59-61. The MWRD Defendants used the recording of Plaintiffs' conversation to terminate Plaintiffs' employment with the MWRD. Id. at ¶¶ 68-69.
Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the State Defendants and the MWRD Defendants violated Plaintiffs' (1) First Amendment rights, (2) Fourth Amendment rights, (3) due process rights, and (4) equal protection rights. Plaintiffs also allege that the State Defendants and the MWRD Defendants violated the Electronic Communication Privacy Act. Finally, Plaintiffs bring a number of state-law claims against all Defendants, including Defendant Motorola. Before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss.
The standard that the Court applies to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends on the purpose of the motion. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2009); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir.2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). If a defendantchallenges the sufficiency of the allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443-44; United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946. In ruling on the motion, the district court also may look beyond the jurisdictional allegations alleged in the complaint and take into consideration whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists. Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 952, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The burden of proof is on the party asserting that jurisdiction exists—here, Plaintiffs. Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2014 WL 26283, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2014) ().
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given "fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original). Second, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the "speculative level." E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. In reviewing a motion to dismisspursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded facts of the complaint must allow the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Langworthy v. Honeywell Life & Acc. Ins. Plan, 2009 WL 3464131, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2009) (citing McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)). Evaluating whether a "claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. (quoting McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616).
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