Lawlor v. Zook
| Decision Date | 15 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 2:15cv113 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | MARK ERIC LAWLOR, Petitioner, v. DAVID W. ZOOK, Warden, Sussex I State Prison, Respondent. |
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by counsel for Mark Eric Lawlor ("Lawlor" or "Petitioner"), a Virginia state inmate. ECF No. 20. Petitioner was convicted for the capital murder of Genevieve Orange and was sentenced to death on July 2, 2011. The Petition alleges numerous violations of federal constitutional rights arising out of Petitioner's conviction and sentencing in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Respondent, the Warden of Sussex I State Prison ("Respondent"), filed an answer and moved to dismiss the Petition, and a reply was filed by Petitioner. ECF Nos. 27-29, 35. Petitioner thereafter filed a related motion seeking to supplement the record. ECF No. 38.
The Petition and motion to supplement were referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation ("R&R") pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and Local Civil Rule 72 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. On August 26, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued his R&R, recommending that this Court: (1) deny and dismiss the motion to supplement; and (2) grant Respondent's motion to dismiss Lawlor's § 2254 petition in its entirety. R&R 2, ECF No. 50. By copy of the R&R, Petitioner and Respondent were advised of their right to file written objections to the findings and recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
In light of the number, and complexity, of the procedural and substantive issues raised in the Petition, and addressed in the R&R, this Court granted Petitioner's motion seeking an extension of time to file objections to the R&R. ECF Nos. 51-52. On October 24, 2016, this Court received Petitioner's objections, which challenge the recommendations in the R&R as to sixteen of the eighteen claims raised in the Petition. ECF No. 53. On December 5, 2016, the Court received Respondent's brief in opposition to the objections. ECF No. 54. On December 29, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion seeking leave to amend his § 2254 Petition. ECF No. 55. Such motion was fully briefed by mid-January, 2017. ECF Nos. 56, 57.
Having reviewed the record and examined Petitioner's objections to the R&R, and having made de novo findings withrespect to those portions objected to, this Court hereby ADOPTS and APPROVES the findings and recommendations set forth in the R&R, with the clarifications set forth below. Petitioner's motion for leave to supplement is DENIED, Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the § 2254 Petition is DISMISSED and DENIED. Additionally, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion for leave to amend.
The Court adopts and incorporates herein the Magistrate Judge's account of the facts and procedural background of Petitioner's state case and the instant federal habeas case. R&R 2-5.1 In summary, at the conclusion of the guilt phase of Lawlor's state trial, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilt on two capital murder charges (murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile, and murder in the commission of rape or attempted rape). At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the sentence was fixed as "death" by the same jury after the jury "found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt" that, as to both capital convictions, "there is a probability that [Petitioner] would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" (hereinafter "future dangerousness") and that Petitioner's "conduct incommitting the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim." Joint Appendix ("JA") 12940-42. The presiding judge, after conducting a separate sentencing hearing, found "no reason to intercede" and impose a sentence different than that fixed by the jury, and he therefore "affirm[ed] and impose[d]" the sentence of death as to both counts. JA 13134.
Petitioner filed an appeal, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions and sentence. Lawlor v. Com., 285 Va. 187, 738 S.E.2d 847 (2013). Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of Virginia ("state habeas petition"), and such petition was dismissed. Lawlor v. Davis, 288 Va. 223, 229, 764 S.E.2d 265, 273 (2014). Petitioner timely filed the instant § 2254 Petition in this Court, and now that the referred proceeding before the Magistrate Judge has been completed, this matter is ripe for review.
"The Federal Magistrates Act requires a district court to 'make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] . . . to which objection is made.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); see also R. Gov. § 2254 Cases in U.S. Dist. Courts 8(b). Because "[s]ection 636(b)(1) does not countenance a form of generalized objection," but rather, requires "a party's objection to a magistrate judge's report be specific and particularized," de novo review must only be performed when an objection is advanced with "sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection." United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 621-22 (4th Cir. 2007). When a party fails to advance a specific objection, "a district court . . . must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (). After performing the appropriate level of review, the district court may "accept, reject, or modify" the Magistrate Judge's R&R, "in whole or in part," or may "recommit the matter" to the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Federal habeas relief is available to a person in state custody "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Before a federal court may consider a writ of habeas corpus presented by an individual in state custody, the petitioner must first exhaust all available state courtremedies or demonstrate the absence or ineffectiveness of such remedies. Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)); see West v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. West v. Westbrooks, 136 S. Ct. 1456 (2016) (). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, and demonstrate eligibility for federal habeas relief, the petitioner must generally "give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process" which requires "presenting to the state court both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles associated with each claim." Longworth, 377 F.3d at 448 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Claims for relief that were fully exhausted in state court must also be "cognizable on federal habeas review" before § 2254 relief can be granted. Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 717 (4th Cir. 2008). Importantly, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. Maguire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). "Matters of State law not involving federal constitutional issues are [therefore] not appropriate grounds for federal habeas corpus relief," and errors "merely related toa State procedural question . . . may not be reached in a federal habeas corpus petition unless the alleged error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, or exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." Hailey v. Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As there is "no federal constitutional right to post-conviction proceedings in state court," a federal habeas petitioner is generally not entitled to relief based on errors occurring during a state habeas proceeding because such claims of error represent "an attack on a proceeding collateral to detention and not to the detention itself." Lawrence, 517 F.3d at 717 (citations omitted).
Even if state court remedies have been exhausted as to habeas claims that are cognizable in federal court, "[a] state prisoner seeking § 2254 habeas corpus relief faces several procedural obstacles." Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 160 (4th Cir. 2009). Failure to comply with applicable state procedural requirements can result in a "procedural default" which generally precludes a federal court from adjudicating the merits of a petitioner's claims. Id. (citing Vinson v. True, 436 F.3d 412, 417 (4th Cir. 2006)). As explained in detail by the UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit"):
Under the procedural default doctrine, federal habeas review of federal claims defaulted by prisoners in state court "pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule . . . is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). "The procedural default doctrine and its attendant cause and prejudice standard are grounded in concerns of comity and federalism and apply alike whether the default in question occurred at...
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