Lawrence v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1960
• Docket Number: No. 2870,2870
• Citation: Lawrence v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 92 R.I. 1, 165 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1960)
• Parties: Edward J. LAWRENCE, Jr. v. AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY. Equity
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 735

165 A.2d 735

92 R.I. 1

Edward J. LAWRENCE, Jr. v. AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY.

Equity No. 2870.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 30, 1960.

Edward Bromage, Jr., Providence, for petitioner.

Worrell & Hodge, Eldridge H. Henning, Jr., Providence, for respondent.

FROST, Justice.

This is an original petition for workmen's compensation. After a hearing before a trial commissioner a decree was entered denying and dismissing the petition. From a decree of the full commission affirming that decree the petitioner has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The petition alleges that petitioner, an employee of the respondent insurance company, suffered injuries as a result of an 'Automobile accident in Middleboro, Massachusetts while returning from an outing of employer in Plymouth, Massachusetts.'

It appeared in evidence that for about three and one-half years petitioner had been an agent in the employ of respondent out of its Providence office and was licensed to write insurance in this state; that the home office of respondent was in Wakefield, Massachusetts; and that the office of the New England division of the company was in Boston, Massachusetts. It also appeared that there were some thirty-odd people connected with the Providence office and that they customarily had an outing once a year in this state but that petitioner had never before attended such an outing. There was testimony that respondent company sponsors no outings, but that the various offices have associations of employees who customarily hold outings; that the outing of June 4, 1958 was a joint outing of the Home Office Employees' Association and the New England Office Association; that membership in the various associations was not compulsory; that petitioner not being a member of any association went as a guest; and that tickets were $6, of which amount petitioner paid $3 and respondent company paid $3 for each employee who attended.

Chester W. Higgins testified that he was an assistant vice-president and personnel director of respondent corporation; that the company itself had nothing to do with sponsoring any outing except to make a final contribution to the association; and that there were different associations of employees in respondent's various offices, membership in which was wholly voluntary. He said that the day of the outing was a half day for those who went to the outing but employees were paid for the full day. When asked if he thought outings contributed to the welfare of the company, he replied that the outing was a source of concern to him and to many other officers of the company and had been for some years.

The petitioner left the office about 10 a. m., did some business in Riverside and then went on to the outing in Plymouth. He drove his own car at his own expense. While at the Mayflower Hotel he played softball and conversed with many people, including some of the officers of the company. At about 11 p. m. he left the hotel and while on the road in Middleboro fell asleep in his car which ran off the road and struck a tree. The petitioner received severe injuries and was unable to return to the office before August.

The petitioner's appeal contains five reasons which in substance are: (1) that the decision that the outing was purely social was erroneous since petitioner did discuss with officials the matter of automobile underwriting; (2) that the decision holding that attendance was wholly voluntary disregarded evidence that petitioner was influenced to attend the outing by advice and words of his superiors; (3) that petitioner's acceptance of the invitation to attend the outing conferred a benefit upon himself and respondent and he thereby became an employee at the time of his injury within the scope of his employment; (4) that the conclusion of the commission that the outing was purely social was erroneous and led to an erroneous conclusion of law; and (5) that the evidence was sufficient in law to hold that petitioner's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, connected therewith and referable thereto.

The essential facts as heretofore stated are not in dispute. The single commissioner found that petitioner's accident and subsequent injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, were not connected therewith and were not referable thereto. Are his findings, which are affirmed by the full commission, a reasonable conclusion on the evidence adduced and are they supported by decided cases? The petitioner contends that the commission's findings are not reasonable and cites several cases from other jurisdictions to support his position.

In Miller v. Keystone Appliances, Inc., 133 Pa.Super. 354, 2 A.D.2d 508, the plaintiff died as a result of injuries received in an automobile collision while returning from a picnic given by his employer. The defendant arranged for facilities at the park, and free tickets for the various amusements and refreshments were distributed to those attending the picnic. The president of the defendant company gave an address in the evening at which time h...