Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

• Citation: 523 A.2d 864
• Decision Date: 03 April 1987
• Docket Number: INC,No. 84-402-A,ANHEUSER-BUSC,84-402-A
• Parties: Antone LAWRENCE, Jr., et al. v., et al. ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 864

523 A.2d 864

Antone LAWRENCE, Jr., et al. v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC., et al.

No. 84-402-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 3, 1987.

E. Howland Bowen, James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Woolley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, for plaintiffs.

Hugh G. Moore, Jr., Warwick, Seth Bowerman, Hanson, Curran & Parks, Stephen A. Fanning, Jr., Edwards & Angell, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

FAY, Chief Justice.

This case comes before us on appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment to one of the defendants and full summary judgment to the other two in a wrongful-death action brought in Superior Court under G.L.1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-11-1 (the Dram Shop Act). The plaintiffs are Antone Lawrence, Jr., and Mary N. Lawrence, the parents of the decedent and the coadministrators of his estate. The defendants are Fo'c'sle, Inc., a tavern; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the brewer of Budweiser beer; and McLaughlin and Moran, Inc., the exclusive distributor in Rhode Island of the beverages produced by the brewer. We shall refer to the defendants as the tavern, the brewer, and the distributor, respectively.

The action arose out of an automobile collision that occurred in Little Compton, Rhode Island, on or about June 11, 1978. The plaintiffs' son, Christopher Lawrence, was fatally injured after the car in which he was an occupant collided with an automobile driven by David Hudson. Hudson had been served beer at the tavern prior to the collision.

At the time of the incident in question, Rhode Island's Dram Shop Act provided as follows:

"3-11-1. Liability of furnisher of beverages for injuries by intoxicated persons.--If any person in a state of intoxication commits any injury to the person or property of another, the person who furnished him with any part of the beverage which occasioned his intoxication, if the same was furnished in violation of this title, shall be liable to the same action by the party injured as the person intoxicated would be liable to; and the party injured, or his or her legal representative, may bring either a joint action against the person intoxicated and the person who furnished the beverage, or a separate action against each." (Emphasis added.)

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that the tavern was liable for the wrongful death of their son under the Dram Shop Act for having served Budweiser beer in violation of § 3-8-1 (1) to an intoxicated person and (2) to a person of intemperate habits. ¹ The plaintiffs seek to impose liability upon both the brewer and the distributor for the same violations, premising their action upon an alleged agency relationship between each of them and the tavern. ²

The tavern filed a motion for partial summary judgment in regard to its liability for serving beer to an intoxicated person, and each of the other defendants moved for summary judgment regarding all of the counts against them. The trial justice granted the tavern's motion, finding that the version of § 3-8-1 in effect at the time of the collision did not prohibit individuals licensed to furnish alcohol from serving beverages to intoxicated persons and that the version of § 3-8-1 enacted one year later, which did prohibit such conduct, could not constitutionally be applied retroactively to the tavern. The trial justice also granted summary judgment on all counts to both the brewer and the distributor. The plaintiffs now appeal all three judgments to this court.

On appeal this court reviews the propriety of a summary-judgment order by the same standards as the trial justice. Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I.1981). We examine the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and decide if an issue of material fact exists. If not, we determine if the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Russo v. Cedrone, 118 R.I. 549, 555, 375 A.2d 906, 909 (1977); Super.R.Civ.P. 56. Applying this standard to the facts in this case, we find all defendants to have been entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and affirm the decisions of the trial justice.

I THE BREWER AND THE DISTRIBUTOR

The plaintiffs claim that the brewer and the distributor should be held vicariously liable for the actions of the tavern, allegedly in violation of § 3-8-1, relying on a theory of agency. They contend that the statutory scheme regulating the distribution of alcoholic beverages in the state created an agency relationship between the tavern and each of the other two defendants. We disagree.

"Agency" has been defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Restatement (Second) Agency § 1(1) (1958). Thus, the three elements required to show the existence of an agency relationship include (1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him, (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking, and (3) an agreement between the parties that the principal will be in control of the undertaking. Id. at § 1(1) comment b. It is essential to the relationship that the principal have the right to control the work of the agent, McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 164 Conn. 317, 322, 321 A.2d 456, 459 (1973); Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co., 152 N.J.Super. 471, 494, 378 A.2d 53, 65 (1977); and that the agent act primarily for the benefit of the principal. Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 605, 376 A.2d 1, 5 (1977).

The plaintiffs neither alleged specific facts nor submitted affidavits relevant to the existence of any of these factors between the tavern and the brewer or the distributor. Both the brewer and the distributor submitted affidavits stating that they had never entered into an agreement either written or oral with the tavern, either for the sale of their products or for any other reason; that they never authorized the tavern to take any action on their behalf or as a representative of their companies; that they had no beneficial interest in the tavern; and that they had no knowledge of the tavern ever purporting to act on their behalf, and that if it had done so, such occurrence would have been without their consent.

Nor are the factors determinative of agency to be found within the statutory distribution scheme alleged by plaintiffs to create such a relationship. The scheme merely directs the licensed wholesaler, that is, the distributor, to purchase the particular product it desires only from the manufacturer of that product and the licensed retailer to purchase only from licensed wholesalers. G.L.1956 (1976 Reenactment) §§ 3-6-16 and 3-7-18. ³ In fact, as is noted by plaintiffs themselves, the scheme is designed to prevent any influence by a manufacturer over a wholesaler, or by a manufacturer or wholesaler over a retailer, see §§ 3-6-15 and 3-7-22--thus prohibiting in effect the very control critical to an agency relationship. ⁴

Consequently, plaintiffs' claim of vicarious liability against the brewer and the distributor fails. The grant of summary judgment to each of them was accordingly appropriate. ⁵

II THE TAVERN

The version of § 3-8-1 in effect at the time of the collision did not prohibit a liquor-license holder from selling or serving beverages to an intoxicated person. ⁶ The statute, in pertinent part, read as follows:

"3-8-1. Sundays and holidays--Sales to minor--Intoxicated persons and persons of intemperate habits.--Licenses issued under the provisions of this title shall not authorize the sale or serving of beverages on Sunday, nor on Christmas day except in licensed taverns, clubs, victualing houses and retailer's class F licensed places when served with food to guests, and except in places operated under a retailer's class E license described above and except in cars or on passenger-carrying marine vessels operated by holders of class G licenses; provided, that the department may limit the sale of beverages on passenger-carrying marine vessels to the hours from 6:00 o'clock p.m. to 8:00 o'clock a.m. on such days; nor shall they authorize the sale or delivery to any minor, either for his own use or for the use of his parents, or of any other person of notoriously intemperate habits * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Prior to 1966 it was a violation of the statute to sell beverages to intoxicated persons. See G.L.1956 § 3-8-1; P.L.1966, ch. 280, § 1. In 1979, § 3-8-1 was amended, prohibiting once again the sale of beverages "to any minor, either for his own use or for the use of his parents, or of any other person; or the sale of beverages to any intoxicated persons or to any person of notoriously intemperate habits * * *." (Emphasis added.) P.L.1979, ch. 326, § 1. The Legislature provided that the amendment should apply retroactively. P.L.1979, ch. 326, § 2.

The plaintiffs argue that the 1979 amendment should be applied retroactively against the tavern so as to permit an action to be brought against it under the Dram Shop Act for having served beer to an intoxicated person in 1978. They contend that the state's regulation of the sale of intoxicating beverages falls within its police powers and that the expressly required retroactivity of the amendment to § 3-8-1 must be presumed constitutional absent a showing that the Legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational fashion. ⁷

The tavern contends, and the trial court agreed, that retroactive application of the 1979 amendment against it would violate its due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution since the amendment to the statute was substantive, not procedural. ⁸

The tavern in its argument and the trial justice in his decision rely upon a principle of statutory construction not clearly dispositive in this case. It is the general rule that statutes and their amendments are applied prospectively. Emmett v. Town of Coventry, 478 A.2d 571, 572 ...