Lawrence v. Board of Elec. Com'Rs of City of Chic., 07 C 566.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 07 C 566.,07 C 566. |
| Citation | 524 F.Supp.2d 1011 |
| Parties | Chris LAWRENCE, Citizens to Elect Chris Lawrence, Marilynn Pierce, Joseph Teller and Lynn Rowley, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF CHICAGO and its members Langdon D. Neal, Richard A. Cowen, and. Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Merle L. Royce, II, Law Offices of Merle L. Royce, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
James Michael Scanlon, Joan T. Agnew, James M. Scanlon & Associates, Kathleen Louise Ford, Thomas A. loppolo, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Before me is a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) brought by certain defendants-the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago (the "Board") and its members Langdon D. Neal ("Neal") and Richard A Cowen ("Cowen")-to dismiss the first amended complaint (the "complaint") filed by plaintiffs Chris Lawrence ("Lawrence"), Citizens to Elect Chris Lawrence, Marilynn Pierce, Joseph Teller and Lynn Rowley. Also before me is plaintiffs' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' complaint challenges Lawrence's disqualification as a candidate for the alderman of the City of Chicago's Forty-Eighth Ward (the "48th Ward") in the upcoming municipal election, and contends that his disqualification by the Board was unconstitutional and that the portion of the statutory provision under which he was disqualed, 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2006), is unconstitutional on its face. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the requirement that a candidate file a certain receipt before the last day for filing nominating papers is unconstitutional, a declaration that the disqualification of a candidate for the inadvertent filing of that receipt after the last day for filing nominating papers is unconstitutional, an order for a special election for alderman of the 48th Ward in which Lawrence's name is placed on the official ballot, and attorneys' fees. For the following reasons, I deny defendants' motion to dismiss, deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and grant summary judgment in favor of defendants.
The undisputed facts relevant to both motions1 are as follows:2 Lawrence is a resident of the 48th Ward who decided to run for alderman of that ward. Plaintiffs Marilynn Pierce, Joseph Teller, and Lynn Rowley are registered voters in the 48th Ward who signed Lawrence's nominating petition and participated in plaintiff Citizens to Elect Chris Lawrence by collecting signatures on Lawrence's behalf. Defendants Neal and Cowen are commissioners of the Board.
On December 11, 2006, Lawrence filed with the Board his nominating papers for the office of alderman of the 48th Ward. In support of his nomination he filed a petition sheet containing the signatures of approximately 500 voters who supported his candidacy. On December 18, 2006, Lawrence filed a "Statement of Economic Interests" with the Clerk of Cook County (the "county clerk") as required by 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5. The county clerk issued him a receipt. Although Lawrence was aware that Illinois election laws required him to file the receipt with the Board, he inadvertently failed to do so. On December 21, 2006, two individuals that worked for the reelection campaign of the incumbent alderwoman of the 48th Ward filed objections with the Board to Lawrence's nominating papers, contending that Lawrence had failed to file with the Board the receipt for his "Statement of Economic Interests". After learning of the objection Lawrence tried to file his receipt with the Board, but the Board refused to accept it. A hearing examiner held a hearing on the objections to Lawrence's nominating papers, and recommended that the Board sustain the objections. Subsequently, on January 16, 2007, the Board found that because Lawrence had not submitted his receipt for the filing of his "Statement of Economic Interests" until after December 18, 2006, his nominating papers were invalid and his name should be barred from the ballot for the municipal election.
On January 26, 2007, Lawrence filed an action for judicial review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County, seeking a reversal of the Board's decision, to have his name placed on the ballot, and an order mandating a special election. On January 31, 2007, the circuit court heard argument, denied Lawrence's petition for review, and affirmed the decision of the Board. See Lawrence v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 2007 COLE 000008, slip op. at *1 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Jan. 31, 2007). On January 31, 2007, Lawrence filed a notice of appeal of the circuit court's decision in the Illinois appellate court. On February 20, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision. See Lawrence v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 07-0286, Order at *7 (Feb. 20, 2007). In both of these actions Lawrence raised the arguments that the Board's decision was in violation of the Illinois Supreme Court's previous interpretations of the Illinois Election Code, and that the Board's decision violated the rule of statutory construction that statutes not be interpreted in a manner that would lead to absurd or unjust results. Lawrence did not raise any constitutional arguments before either court, nor did their decisions hinge on any constitutional grounds.
Defendants' motion to dismiss contends that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims since Lawrence previously initiated litigation in state court challenging the Board's decision. I deny their motion.
Although courts have differed about the true standard for motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit clarified the standard in United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2003), holding:
If subject matter jurisdiction is not evident on the face of the complaint, the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) would be analyzed as any other motion to dismiss, by assuming for purposes of the motion that the allegations in the complaint are true. However ... if the complaint is formally sufficient but the contention is that there is in fact no subject matter jurisdiction, the movant may use affidavits and other material to support the motion. The burden of proof on a 12(b)(1) issue is on the party asserting jurisdiction.
Id. at 946 (internal citations omitted). In this case, plaintiffs' complaint properly asserts federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and 2201, but defendants contend this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine established in Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Therefore, I may consider the materials submitted by defendants in ruling on their motion.
I agree with plaintiffs that defendants' analysis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relies on out precedent and is simply incorrect. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to plaintiffs' present claims. These claims do not challenge a state court decision, and this case was filed before the state court entered judgment on Lawrence's claims. In short, there is no basis for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine here.
As recently explained by the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits district courts from hearing "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Id. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. As the Supreme Court clarified in Exxon Mobil, the doctrine is not triggered "simply by the entry of judgment in state court" where there is parallel state and federal litigation, nor does it "stop a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court." Id. at 292-93, 125 S.Ct. 1517.3 Instead, it merely enforces the jurisdiction the Supreme Court has to review state court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Id. at 291, 125 S.Ct. 1517. In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's affirmation of a dismissal of a federal case under the Rooker — Feldman doctrine. Id. at 294, 125 S.Ct. 1517. The appellate court had concluded that, where a party was sued in state court and subsequently brought counterclaims in federal court that essentially duplicated some of the issues in the state court case, and where the state court reached a judgment before the federal court, the federal court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 289-90, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (citing 364 F.3d 102, 103-05 (3d Cir.2004)). The Supreme Court, in reversing this decision, explained that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because 344 U.S. at 293-94, 73 S.Ct. 299. Under the circumstances in the case, the Supreme Court concluded that Rooker-Feldman did not prevent Exxon Mobil from taking this course of action. Id. at 294, 73 S.Ct. 299.
As plaintiffs note, the Seventh Circuit has recognized the holding in Exxon Mobil and itself held in TruSery Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584 (7th Cir.2005...
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