Lawrence v. Calin
| Citation | 104 R.I. 373,244 A.2d 570 |
| Decision Date | 25 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 239-M,239-M |
| Parties | Steven C. LAWRENCE v. Ross CALIN P. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Eugene A. Liberati, Providence, for petitioner.
John P. Bourcier, Providence, for respondent Ross Calin.
Frederick R. DeCesaris, Asst. Town Solicitor, for respondent Johnston Town Council.
This is a petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto brought pursuant to G.L. 1956, § 10-14-1, whereby the petitioner seeks the ouster of the respondent as a commissioner of the housing authority of the town of Johnston and the confirmation of his title to that office. The petitioner claims the office by virtue of an admittedly proper appointment and qualification and an alleged illegal removal therefrom by the Johnston town council after a hearing on the specific charges of 'neglect of duty and misconduct in office.'
Before proceeding further we deem it appropriate to make the following observations. We issued the writ in this cause on October 16, 1967. A citation directed the municipality to forward us the pertinent records on or before November 6, 1967. The record was not produced at the appointed time. Subsequently, numerous requests were made of the town for prompt compliance with our directives. Finally, after repeatedly receiving unsatisfactory responses, this court felt reluctantly constrained to issue an order to the clerk of the Johnston town council directing him to appear before us on February 5, 1968 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for what appeared to be an unwarranted delay in producing the necessary records in this case. On February 2, 1968, the town solicitor appeared at last and presented the record to us. The dilatory manner in which the town of Johnston has responded to our directives is indeed highly regrettable especially when, as here, a man's reputation and integrity are questioned.
The town of Johnston Housing Authority was organized pursuant to the provisions of § 45-26-5. The general assembly has constituted a municipal housing authority as '* * * a public body and a body corporate and politic * * *' and given it extensive powers. The authority is composed of five commissioners who are appointed to serve a definite term without compensation. The purposes and objects of a housing authority are well known. Aided by funds which are provided by the federal government, a local housing authority can acquire land and build thereon public housing facilities to service the needs of various segments of our citizens. At the time the instant controversy erupted, the Johnston authority was building a housing project designed especially for the elderly.
The petitioner is an employee of one of the state's largest banks. He works in the portfolio management section of the bank's investment department. The council apppointed him as a housing commissioner on July 28, 1965, to serve in that position until September 11, 1968. This period of time represents the unexpired term of John D. Guido, who had resigned as a commissioner to become the authority's executive director at a salary of $4,800 a year. The petitioner served the first year and a half of his term in comparatively peaceful circumstances. There then occurred a series of events which culminated in his being discharged from office and the ensuing litigation.
When the authority held its regular monthly meeting in December, 1966, Vito A. Petrone assumed office as a new commissioner succeeding an individual who had been the authority's vice-chairman. At this meeting, petitioner was elected to the vacant post of vice-chairman. During the course of its meeting, the authority approved a resolution, by a vote of three to two, ordering Guido to submit within 30 days his resignation as executive director. Admittedly petitioner was one of the three commissioners who voted in favor of the requested resignation. Guido did not resign. Instead, he drafted a letter dated January 9, 1967, and sent it to councilman Thomas L. Ucci, who that same day was chosen council president by the newly-elected town council of Johnston. In his letter, Guido claimed that his removal was illegal and politically motivated. He listed as a reason for the demand for his resignation his alleged refusal to transfer the authority's banking business to the bank where petitioner worked. About a week after its organization, the town council voted to conduct a hearing on the allegations contained in Guido's letter. Pursuant to the council's direction, the town clerk dispatched a letter to petitioner whereby it notified him that a council hearing was to be held as a result of the charges made against him by Guido. The notice informed petitioner that he was '* * * being charged specifically with neglect of duty and misconduct in office.' The notice-letter further listed seven separate accusations offered in support of the charges lodged against petitioner.
In due course, three different council hearings were conducted on this matter, two of which lasted approximately four hours and the third approximately two and one-half hours. During the hearings the council heard testimony from four people-Guido, the chairman of the Johnston Housing Authority, an official from the bank at which petitioner is employed, and petitioner himself. An affidavit executed by one of petitioner's co-employees at the bank was accepted and made a part of the record. Our reading of the stenographic transcript of the hearings and our listening to the audio tape recordings of the proceedings lead us to the conclusion that the orderly decorum and dispassionate objectivity which should accompany a quasi-judicial hearing were ruefully missing.
On April 20, 1967, the council met in special session at which the town clerk read a 13-page decision which held that petitioner was clearly '* * * guilty of inefficiency, neglect of duty and misconduct in office.' The decision stated that the evidence supported only five of the seven accusations made against petitioner. Upon motion being made and seconded, it was voted to accept the decision. Three councilmen voted in favor of the motion, one opposed it and the fifth councilman was absent. Moments after this vote, the same three members voted to remove petitioner from office and elected respondent to fill petitioner's unexpired term.
Initially, we wish to point out that there is a variance between the council's ultimate findings and the notice sent to petitioner on January 23. That notice expressly stated that there were two specific charges to be considered by the council-'neglect of duty and misconduct in office,'-whereas in its decision the council curiously found petitioner guilty of a third charge of 'inefficiency.' Because of our decision, we deem this difference of little significance.
With respect to the present petition there are, in our opinion, two issues raised. The first is whether or not the council effectively and lawfully expelled petitioner from his position as commissioner in view of the fact that only two of the five councilmen were present for all of the hearings in question. The second is whether or not there was introduced in the record any legally competent evidence which would warrant a finding that petitioner was guilty of '* * * inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office * * *' as those terms are used in the context of § 45-25-14. For the reason that our decision of the second issue disposes of the instant petition, it is unnecessary to consider the first issue.
Since the evidence at the hearings was not in any way identified with any one specific accusation, but was introduced in potpourri fashion, it is difficult to relate each item of evidence to any specific accusation. Essentially, though, the accusations fall into two categories: first, those which concern the use of undue influence by petitioner on Guido to obtain for his employer the housing authority's banking business; and second, those which deal with petitioner's attempt to have Guido removed as the authority's executive director.
Although a housing authority in any town in the state is organized pursuant to chap. 26 of title 45, the authority and its commissioners are subject to all the provisions of chap. 25 of title 45 which relate to an authority organized by any of our cities. Section 45-25-14 states that a commissioner may be removed for inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office only after he has been given a copy of the charges against him at least 10 days prior to any hearing thereon and has had an opportunity to be heard either personally or by counsel. The general assembly has not defined the terms 'inefficiency,' 'neglect of duty' or 'misconduct in office.' Nor has the legislature expressly set forth a commissioner's duties except in § 45-25-12 wherein it says, 'The authority and its...
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Centazzo v. Canna
...this court has reviewed a town council's discharge of an incumbent member of a municipality's housing authority. In Lawrence v. Calin, 104 R.I. 373, 244 A.2d 570 (1968), it was pointed out that although § 45-25-14 authorizes the removal of a housing commissioner on the grounds of 'inefficie......